Thank you, Chair, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
Mr. Chair, I'd like to move the following motion:
That pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(i), the committee study the use of federal government research and development grants, funds, and contributions by Canadian universities and research institutions and partnerships with entities connected to the People's Republic of China, in areas including but not limited to: photonics, artificial intelligence, quantum theory, biopharmaceuticals, and aerospace; and including but not limited to, intellectual property transfers and developments with Huawei Technologies and the National University of Defense Technology; that the committee hear from the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, department officials, top research officials from Canadian universities, the federal granting agencies, and any other witnesses deemed relevant to the study; that the committee allocate a minimum of ten meetings to the study; and that the committee report its findings to the House.
Mr. Chair, I know that this motion is interrupting today's study and I apologize to the witnesses. I was concerned that I would not be able to move this motion prior to Parliament rising for the summer, so I am doing so now.
I believe that it is an important motion that needs to be debated in public and not behind closed doors. Mr. Chair, this is a very serious matter, and it's a timely one that this committee needs to examine.
The motion that I moved is regarding a topic that has been gaining significant media attention over the last few years and in particular over the last few months.
This motion is not a partisan motion. It is not a political motion. It is a motion in the interest of research and development in Canada. Members of this committee may not be aware of the recent reports in the media, so I'll refer to them later in my remarks. I will also be reflecting on some of the testimony that was shared with this committee during our previous study on the support of commercialization of intellectual property, because it reaffirms the urgency of the study.
I will remind members of this committee of the mandate of the Standing Committee on Science and Research: As a committee, we are responsible for studying all matters related to science and research. I see no other committee better suited to studying this use of federal government research and development grants and contributions by Canadian universities and research institutions than the Standing Committee on Science and Research.
This committee has undertaken many studies that this motion would impact, including a study on support for commercialization of intellectual property; a study on successes, challenges and opportunities for science in Canada; and a study on top talent research and innovation.
Most of the time, we examine research and development. We only hear about the good things associated with partnerships and funding agreements, but the reality is that there are matters threatening the future of research and development in Canada. In order to have a future where research and development can prosper in Canada, we as members of the Standing Committee on Science and Research have to study the roadblocks preventing and threatening that future prosperity.
The Globe and Mail reported that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service “has publicly warned that Beijing is threatening Canada's national security in intellectual property in five sensitive areas of research and development including quantum theory, photonics, artificial intelligence, biopharmaceuticals and aerospace.”
That is why my motion specifically lists these areas. These areas were not flagged by me; they were flagged by our country's top security officials.
We also know that Canadian universities are conducting joint research with Chinese military scientists. It was the Minister of Innovation who responded to the national security aspect of this matter, which is another reason that this matter should be studied at this committee.
I will remind members of the statement given by the member of the government's own cabinet. He said he was looking to impose “additional requirements when it comes to strengthening research security in Canada”.
That statement was not from the Minister of Public Safety, it was not from the Minister of National Defence and it was not from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. That statement was given by the Minister of Innovation.
This further confirms that this motion is best suited to be studied at this committee and that it should be supported by the Liberal members of this committee.
It hasn't been only Liberal members who have highlighted this pressing issue. NDP Leader Jagmeet Singh commented on research that puts national security at risk too, as was also reported in The Globe and Mail:
“NDP Leader Jagmeet Singh said open and collaborative research is fine in principle, but not when it puts national security at risk. “Whenever there is a security concern and there is national security impact then we should make decisions to protect our national security and Canadian safety and security”.
That's what he told reporters. I trust that the NDP will support this motion as well.
I will remind members of this committee that a lot of information came to light during our last study on the support of commercialization of intellectual property regarding partnership with Huawei Technologies. Despite Huawei's being banned from Canada's 5G network for security reasons, we learned that Huawei has been very involved in research partnerships in Canadian universities.
When I brought a signed patent agreement between the University of British Columbia and Huawei Technologies to the attention of this committee on March 21, 2023, Dr. Gail Murphy, the vice-president of research and innovation at the University of British Columbia, tried to dismiss these concerns by stating the following: “I will say that as research security guidelines have evolved with the federal government, we have been changing our agreements in that respect and have moved to new standards.” When I asked her if the University of British Columbia is still working with Huawei in any form she stated, “Yes, we do.”
It is very clear that the current measures that the government has taken are not effective. This is another reason that we must study this issue as a committee and make recommendations to the government.
Furthermore, on the same day I asked the vice-president of research at the University of Calgary if they will continue to work with Huawei in any form, Mr. William Ghali responded, “We don't at this time because of the guidance that has come to us through the bodies I just mentioned”—