Science and Research Committee on June 20th, 2023

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

I would say that since 2015, we've seen significant changes in Australia, in particular when it comes to foreign funding, including a foreign agent registry that requires universities to report such funding. We've seen aggressive measures by the U.S. administration, including the arrest of at least one very prominent professor for apparently having misidentified his relations.

That is to say that two of our key allies, Australia and the United States, have been much faster out of the starting blocks and much more aggressive than the current federal government.

[Charles Sousa, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

I appreciate those comments, and I also appreciate the fact that Canada took some major steps with Huawei, as you know. That was very public for a number of years with the detention of the president.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you both.

Mr. Blanchette-Joncas, the floor is yours for six minutes.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I would like to welcome the witnesses who are joining us for this important study.

My first questions are for Dr. Leuprecht.

Dr. Leuprecht, let me begin by expressing my surprise that your opening remarks were in English only. You even said in French that you would be speaking in English only. To my knowledge, you represent a bilingual military college. Now, that usually means speaking two languages, and Canada's two official languages are French and English, so I would very much like it if, in your future comments, you could speak in both of Canada's official languages, which are, I repeat, English and French. I understand that—

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

If I could just interrupt, the bells are ringing. I'd like to see if we have unanimous consent to finish with the last two six-minute rounds, which will take us to about a quarter to 12 o'clock. The votes are going to be just after 12 o'clock.

Is that okay around the room?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you.

I'm sorry to interrupt. Please continue.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

All right. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I will return to the topic of the study, but I would still like for my comment to be taken into consideration.

As you know, today's study is on Chinese interference in our teaching establishments. The draft report of the House of Commons Special Committee on the Canada–People's Republic of China Relationship identified five research areas that are vulnerable to threats: artificial intelligence, quantum technology, 5G technology, biopharmaceutical research and clean technologies.

In your view, Dr. Leuprecht, are there any other areas that might be susceptible to risk, to which we should be paying special attention?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

First of all, thank you for your comments regarding the use of both official languages and for your concern in this regard. In the past, in other committee meetings, your Bloc Québécois colleagues have commented on the quality of my bilingualism. I am an immigrant to this country and I have made the effort to master both official languages. However, I was asked to appear in front of the committee three days ago and, since I have a busy schedule, that did not give me enough time to prepare my remarks. I would therefore ask that, next time, I be given more time so I can prepare my remarks properly in both official languages. That said, I am grateful to you for your concern about official languages. I have been a strong defender of both official languages for a long time, including in the federal establishment where I teach.

As for the five vulnerable areas, I would draw your attention to the areas I mentioned in my remarks, and particularly to everything having to do with computing. It seems to me that, in the entire computing field, there should never be any collaboration with countries that are considered problematic, because all the research that comes out of such collaboration risks being used for purposes that are not compatible with Canada's national interests. In addition, as I mentioned as well, it seems important to me to add to the specific areas mentioned in the report the research related to electric vehicles, particularly with regard to critical resources and producing advanced materials.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Dr. Leuprecht, based on your expertise, could you tell me where Canada stands compared to other western countries in terms of national security in the research context?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

It is a problematic issue. Certain notable countries in this field, such as Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and France are much further advanced than we are. Germany is having pretty much the same conversations we are. However, since Canada has a very diverse society, some of our researchers present a very high risk in terms of vulnerability. So we must compare not only the countries themselves, but also their vulnerability and their networks with important allies. In this respect, Canada is a very specific target for China. Germany may not be targeted in the same way because it is in a position to defend itself. Canada, on the other hand, is less capable of doing so.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

More specifically, I would like to know where Canada stands compared to other G7 or G20 countries. Is Canada doing more or less than other comparable countries?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

As an example, it took the government seven years to ban Huawei from Canada's telecommunications sector. So, in terms of the time it takes to make important decisions concerning national security and the ability of the national security intelligence system to facilitate relevant decision-making, it seems to me that this is not well calibrated in Canada.

For example, we saw that the decision concerning Huawei really sent an important message to universities. Indeed, it was after the government made that decision that universities reacted to collaborations. In my view, the current federal government's leadership was weak, compared to that of our allies. The decisions that were made had important consequences in terms of refocusing universities' trajectories.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you, Dr. Leuprecht.

Among G7 countries, Canada is far behind in terms of research investments, as we know. I would even say that Canada is among the last in the G20. Is this negligence also felt in research security?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

The problem is the way we establish links between investments and—

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

I'm sorry. We're over time.

I'm going to have to ask for that in writing, because we are over time.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

You can indeed submit your answer in writing, Dr. Leuprecht.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you. I apologize.

We have Mr. Cannings, please, for six minutes.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Thank you.

Thank you to the witnesses for being before us today.

I'm going to start with Mr. Leuprecht. You mentioned in your opening comments that you thought this was a study specifically about Canada's research relationships with China, but you made the specific comment that we should be country-agnostic when it comes to these considerations. You mentioned Russia and Iran, I believe.

I'm wondering if you could expand on that and how this conversation should perhaps be broadened to include any country that might pose these risks.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

There are three considerations here.

One is that the data we have on China and Chinese problematic collaborations is more comprehensive in the public domain than that for other authoritarian hostile actors. However, the challenge by China, because of the nature of its industry and society, is perhaps also more expansive than that posed by other state actors.

I'd also say, as I just mentioned in my previous comments in French, that the federal government is not particularly nimble—not just this government, but the Government of Canada more broadly—when it comes to key decision-making on security, intelligence, defence and foreign affairs. This is a long-standing problem. It takes a long time to make decisions, let alone the right decisions. We need to make sure that we set up this posture or framework in such a way that it remains agile and adaptive for the future.

The third consideration is that we want to make sure we identify the challenge—which is authoritarian hostile actors who might use or are using this technology, in the case of China, to actively undermine Canada's national interests—rather than any one particular country, per se.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

I think the next point you made in your comments was about listing problematic entities. I assume, therefore, that you would want to see problematic entities anywhere in the world listed in this context.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

Yes. I would say that some would perhaps take a different approach from Mr. Hinton, which is that universities can do a significant amount of the legwork if they are told what the sensitive research areas are and what the potentially problematic countries are, and if they are told the specific entities and actors with whom they should be avoiding collaboration. This won't give us full domain awareness, but it will allow universities to do a reasonably comprehensive initial vetting process.

We want to make sure that researchers don't even submit applications that could be problematic. We don't want to rely on the federal government's and other entities' vetting processes. We want to ultimately generate a framework whereby most of these problematic relationships can be identified and self-policed by the universities themselves.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

That would include your comments on certifying a research security plan, or something like that.

I'm just wondering if you could expand on that. What would that entail? What would a researcher have to do to get through those hoops properly?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

There are two problems here.

One is researchers who, in the past, have had collaborations as co-authors, for instance, that would today be construed as problematic. How do we get them to atone for the sins of their past?

The other is that there may still be reasonable grounds on which to have research collaborations with certain problematic actors. For instance, that might be, on the one hand, in climate change technology, but on the other hand in intelligence or military technology in terms of dual-use components. Computing is a good example.

For those, the researcher should be allowed to submit a research security plan that demonstrates appropriate risk mitigation measures, because we can't just tell a researcher, “Because you worked with problematic Chinese research or an entity in the past, you can never get any research funding again for the area in which you specialize, or you can never work with those actors again.” We should leave it up to the researcher to demonstrate that those collaborations do not pose a risk to the way Canada has articulated its red lines when it comes to its national interests and its security interests.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

How much time do I have?