No, not at all. I didn't mean it the way it probably came out.
The problem here is that if you have actor-agnostic recommendations, most of the universities simply do not comprehend them. You are talking about some countries, some risks and some non-democratic actors, and the initial response from universities and research centres is, “Who and what should we safeguard, exactly?”
If you can't make the discussion about China—and most of the time it is about China—then we pretend it's not about China. Most of the time, if it is really about China, we have to say China is going after 15 critical technologies, and China is not shy about it. It's basically in all of the documents. All of the technologies that are listed for import are actually there. It's not just quantum computing; it's a specific type of quantum that is sought by China.
I think we probably have to go with the balanced way and have an actor-agnostic approach whereby we are talking about risks, no matter what kind of actor is posing them, but also job risk that is specifically about China as an actor that has very unique characteristics within the STI system, the science, technology and innovation system.
No, I'm not an advocate for vetting all of the co-operation with China, for the simple reason that in some areas, such as artificial intelligence, we are actually losing out. If we want to have access to Chinese data, we will have to be smarter about how to get this data and how to co-operate and collaborate with China, but under our terms, to make sure that the research is protected from our side.