Science and Research Committee on Nov. 22nd, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Blanchette-Joncas.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Vigneault, I understand that there is no such thing as zero risk and that your organization is making efforts to counter various threats from around the world.

Personally, I get the impression that you are trying to fight with one hand tied behind your back. I'll tell you why. Canada's national security policy was established 20 years ago, in 2004. The policy does not include the word “China” or the word “Russia”. The federal government has asked you to conduct audits of organizations working in sensitive areas in order to be aware of current and emerging economic and security threats. But you don't even have the legislative authority to do that.

In addition, you say that everyone has to work in the same direction, but there is information that you cannot even pass on to businesses, municipalities or university institutions. So there is a breach of trust between the private sector and the government.

I would like you to tell us about the need to modernize the current policy, which is not only flawed, but also outdated.

[David Vigneault]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

There are two aspects to your question.

Although no new documents have been published, the way in which national security issues are managed is constantly evolving. The most recent example is the Prime Minister's announcement concerning the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. This will allow the right ministers and government agencies to give specific advice to the government on current challenges. I think this is a new component that shows that things are changing even though there have been no new documents.

With regard to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, I believe that our public reports were quite clear. The threat has changed, as have Canadians' expectations and those of our partners. In the context of the committee's study, the universities are asking us for more information. They have been given an idea of the threats, but they need more concrete information.

The Minister of Public Safety publicly acknowledged that he was working on making changes to the act.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Vigneault.

I can tell you what Minister LeBlanc mentioned. In fact, he did not want to explain why—

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Unfortunately, we're at the end of the two and a half minutes.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

—his government does not want to update the national security policy.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you.

Mr. Cannings, go ahead for two and a half minutes, please.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Thank you again.

I think I've asked this question before during this study, but I'd just like to get a sense.

I feel as though I should be asking Mr. Lametti, because I'm wondering about the legal framework under which you operate. It's all very well to be working with researchers who may be unaware of what's been leaked and what they're losing to China, but what if you come across a researcher who is just a pure scientist who wants to do the research to discover the results and who doesn't mind that he's being paid by China to do that research and is outside the tri-council system? Is there some legal line that he might cross that would lead you to say he can't do that, or are there any powers you have to shut that down?

I'm wondering where that line is or where the lines are, because there might be several.

[David Vigneault]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the question.

CSIS does not have enforcement powers. We do not have those powers ourselves.

Sometimes when you have a discussion with CSIS and you are told about a number of elements in how your research or collaboration could be creating a risk to national security, it is impactful. That's on the one hand.

On the other hand, we would never want to have the intelligence service deciding what type of research gets done and who the researchers and the people are that universities can employ. However, I think it is a fair question to ask universities to make sure they have the right mechanisms in place to police themselves to determine if it's in their interests to have those types of relationships.

Finally, I would say that if there are activities that are covert and potentially violate the Criminal Code, we work very closely with the RCMP as well. I believe, Mr. Chair, that the member referred to a case recently with Hydro-Québec, in which criminal charges were laid against an individual, so the system is working. We probably just need to make sure it works in overdrive a little bit more.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

That's terrific. Thank you.

We've been efficient with our time. We can go to the Conservatives for five more minutes and then for five to the Liberals.

Mr. Tochor is starting off.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

Director, you've just said that it's working—that the system is working and that it just needs fine tuning. Is that correct?

[David Vigneault]

I think I said that we need to put it in overdrive.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

In overdrive....

There are patents that have been filed in Canada in association with Huawei and the University of Toronto this year. Obviously, that's not working, right? Would that be an example of this not working?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, I have a level of awareness about the transaction, but not enough detail to speak specifically to it. I think we have to be careful not to look at a specific activity and determine that it is nefarious in and of itself, but I would not have enough details to share with the committee today to say if those specific patents filed, you know—

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

Just on Huawei, are you saying that CSIS is comfortable with some research dollars from the taxpayers of Canada going to Huawei?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, I believe that I have not said that. What I have said, however, to a previous question, is that we are very concerned about organizations that are subject to the legislation of the PRC, and that, if and when forced to do so, will be able to share and will be acting on behalf of the government of the PRC. From that point of view, we do have a very high level of concern, which is why we've been speaking publicly and redirecting many more of our investigative resources to countering that threat.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

To go back to this one company, obviously you're well versed on the dealings of Huawei. There's a list that's been promised to come out that will ban different entities from working with universities in Canada with taxpayers' dollars for funding. In what world would Huawei not be on that list?

[David Vigneault]

Do you want to take that?

[Shawn Tupper]

Well, first of all, the list isn't out, so you will have to wait—

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

I'm assuming there is an internal list that's getting compiled, right?

[Shawn Tupper]

That's the entities list.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

Yes.

[Shawn Tupper]

Yes. That list is being compiled. Advice will be given to the government, and the government will release that list when it is ready to do so.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

The government has that list, you're saying...?