Science and Research Committee on April 16th, 2026

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski—La Matapédia, QC]

That's because you consented to it, Mr. Saint‑Jacques.

In China's case, it's the opposite: We do not consent.

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

The time is up for MP Blanchette-Joncas.

Now we will go to MP Ho for five minutes.

MP Ho, please go ahead.

[Vincent Ho, Conservative, Richmond Hill South, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Kovrig, during the election last year, the Prime Minister said that Canada's biggest security threat was China. After he was elected, he went to Beijing and announced a new strategic partnership. In your view, did Beijing change that quickly, or did the Prime Minister change?

[Michael Kovrig]

I think Beijing didn't change at all. In fact, all of the evidence indicates that China is continuing on the same trajectory it has been on at least since Xi Jinping became general secretary in 2012. That is a trend toward deeper totalitarian governance, turning China into a police state with more egregious violations of human rights and more aggressive international behaviour.

For example, although China is perhaps not currently putting coercive pressure on Canada—although, as Ambassador Saint-Jacques noted, there are still barriers to pork and other products—it is aggressively bullying Japan, for example, and it continues to put pressure on other neighbours, such as the Philippines. No, it has not changed.

[Vincent Ho, Conservative, Richmond Hill South, ON]

How should Canadians understand that leap, from the Prime Minister calling Beijing the top security threat to now calling it a strategic partner? Is that a coherent doctrine on the part of the Prime Minister, or is it just a political rationalization for the deal that was going to get done anyway with the Liberal government?

[Michael Kovrig]

There are certain realities that China's economy is sufficiently large and systemic enough that trade with it, in some form, is going to take place. The question is this: What are the terms, safeguards and protections in what sectors? I think that's really where this committee needs to offer guidance and support to the government and offer greater understanding for Canadian citizens, because you cannot have unfettered free trade with China. You need to have tight restrictions.

[Vincent Ho, Conservative, Richmond Hill South, ON]

At Davos, the Prime Minister said major powers now use “economic integration as coercion.” Do you think the Prime Minister was referring to Beijing?

[Michael Kovrig]

I don't know what was in his head, but I would imagine that he was focusing particularly on the United States—it's a bit of the phenomenon of focusing on the crocodile closest to the canoe. However, it's imperative that Canada does not forget that China has not become any less of a risk and that all of our policies with China keep that in mind.

The world is bifurcating into two technology stacks, realistically. One is centred on Beijing, and one is centred on the United States and other western governments that partner with it. It's not going to be feasible to be part of both of them, eventually. Decisions that Canada makes now about technology and industry are going to have long-term ramifications for that.

We should absolutely be working with other like-minded partners and diversifying, but we need to think strategically about what kind of limited association we continue to have with China, how we mitigate risks from that and how we manage that in the context of our relationship with the United States.

[Vincent Ho, Conservative, Richmond Hill South, ON]

In Davos, the Prime Minister said, “But when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness. We accept what's offered.”

Do you think the Prime Minister simply accepted what he was offered on trade with Beijing, or do you think he should be standing up more for our values and sovereignty?

[Michael Kovrig]

I think he made a short-term political calculation to remove a short-term problem of pressure on vulnerable sectors in Canada, particularly canola.

I can understand the imperative to do that, but one needs to then have reversibility and step-back provisions. The problem is that the deal trades several months of restored trade in that sector for what is potentially a permanently embedded relationship. Once you have dealer networks, once you have consumer brand loyalty, if you start to have investment and so on, that becomes hard to reverse.

You need to factor into that Canadian values and the protection of human rights. These are not tradable items. You cannot simply choose between trade and human rights because, ultimately, the human rights situation in China is embedded in the trading relationship.

[Vincent Ho, Conservative, Richmond Hill South, ON]

I have a final question.

During his visit to Beijing, the Prime Minister signed a memorandum of understanding on co-operation in combatting crimes between the RCMP and the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China.

Do you see an issue with that?

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

Please provide a quick 15-second answer.

[Michael Kovrig]

Yes, I do see an issue with that because that organization is complicit in massive human rights violations, including against Canadians. You need to have some kind of dialogue with it, but you need to be very careful that it doesn't have any influence or that it doesn't serve as a back door to compromise Canadian safety.

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

Thank you.

We will now proceed to MP Noormohamed for five minutes.

[Taleeb Noormohamed, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

Mr. Kovrig, it's good to see you again.

Just to pick up where my colleague left off, you've been remarkably clear that despite what you personally endured, countries need to find ways to move forward and figure out where their relationships need to go. Given that framing, what would a well-designed reset with China look like in the context of where we are today, in the context of the reality that Canada is facing with the United States, where increasingly we are seeing that cleave continues to grow and not come closer?

Is there a version of a China-Canada engagement on EVs that you would be able to support, I suppose?

[Michael Kovrig]

First of all, going back to your colleague's point about Prime Minister Carney's statement in Davos, Canada should be doubling down on alliances and deepening relations and coalitions with like-minded countries, partners and allies.

Rather than trying to negotiate exactly that relationship you're talking about—a one-on-one with China—in a context where the Chinese Communist Party is going to have most of the leverage, strength and coercive power, Canada needs to be focusing on building coalitions with like-minded countries with similar and aligned trade barriers, cybersecurity standards, human rights, labour standards and so on. We should be presenting the Chinese Communist Party with a unified alignment of countries that have the same standards and will not backfill for each other.

That will help protect each other, and through that sort of mechanism, it will ideally align as much as possible with the United States. You can then have a stronger negotiating posture with China. You should be looking for policies that deliver certain benefits in sectors within Canada where it is still safe to have trade and investment. They're going to be strictly limited. These sectors should not be taking actions that in any way deliver benefits to a regime that is ultimately seeking dominance and centrality in the world in ways that are harmful to Canada.

[Taleeb Noormohamed, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

If you were to dig into that and you were to look at these sectors where there are opportunities.... You've discussed some of those—for example, agriculture. There are opportunities around EVs, critical minerals, and so on and so forth.

In the context of the safeguards around Chinese EVs, Canada has effectively gone to where Europe has gone in terms of the safeguards and in terms of the issues relating to data protection. Would that not then align with exactly what you said in respect of working with like-minded countries to ensure that when we are trading, even though conversations may be bilateral, that the context is multilateral and the context is then predicated on what others with like-minded values and like-minded circumstances have actually either done or are doing?

[Michael Kovrig]

There is some scope for implicit, if not directly coordinated, but effectively aligned policy-making, and we need to see more of that. It doesn't always necessarily need to be an obvious trade bloc, but rather aligned policies and consistency, so that there are not back doors to circumvent the trade barriers that all of these economies agree are necessary.

I want to be clear that I don't think that Chinese electric vehicles can solve the problems that Canada and this committee are looking to solve. Ultimately, automakers that are in that sector are not competing simply with a rival corporation. They're competing with an entire industrial ecosystem that is designed to drive them out of business. That will deter other automakers, let's say, Japan, Korea or other more trustworthy countries, from entering the Canadian market and helping us build that ecosystem.

It's actually going to have, I think, a negative effect that hollows out the industrial base and weakens us. We need to protect against that and instead align with countries that are not only more like-minded in values but also in economic policy and a commitment to free market principles.

[Taleeb Noormohamed, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

On that basis, going back to EVs because that is the topic of this study.... We could have a much longer conversation about geopolitics and the other challenges we face, but if we come back to this question of EVs and talk about like-minded countries, I don't think there's anybody in this room from any side who isn't clear about the desire of certain Chinese auto manufacturers and others in that ecosystem to ensure that they have global dominance. This is what we have seen with what the Americans tried to do with their auto sector in years past, and so forth.

Having spent time in Europe, I was shocked to see the number of BYDs on the road and the excitement with which people in those countries are using their Chinese EVs. How has Europe managed this issue in terms of their own manufacturing and their own auto sectors? They seem to have found a balance, or they appear to have found a balance.

[Michael Kovrig]

I don't think they've found a balance at all, I'm afraid. I think they are in long-term structural industrial decline. How has Europe managed this? They have managed it badly and inadequately so far. Their duties and their quotas are not going to be strong enough, and their industrial bases are going to be hollowed out. If you look at the economic malaise that has gripped Germany, there are empirical examples of it. There have been 10,000 manufacturing jobs lost per month over the last year. It is going to be devastating to Europe, and they need a new strategy.

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

Thank you. The time is up.

Before we end this panel, we will have two minutes with MP DeRidder, and two minutes with MP Rana. Then this panel will end, and we will have the second one.

MP DeRidder, you have two minutes. Please go ahead.

[Kelly DeRidder, Conservative, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Mr. Kovrig, a lot of members of my community have reached out to my office because they're worried about their jobs. They're a part of the larger ecosystem with auto manufacturing and what's happening with the decline in our auto industry right now. I am speaking on behalf of them when I'm asking you questions.

When we open the door to tens of thousands of Chinese Communist Party-linked EVs while our sector is already under pressure, does this risk weakening our local manufacturing ecosystems over time?

[Michael Kovrig]

It does, very much so. Realistically, I think Canada needs a plan A and a plan B. Plan A is one in which we are doing everything we can to preserve a North American automotive ecosystem to the extent that we can persuade the U.S. government to enable that, and then, we need a plan B if that fails, if that doesn't work. What is Canada's alternative, and how much of an industry can we preserve by looking to work with other partners?

I don't think Chinese electric vehicle companies are a solution in either of those cases.

[Kelly DeRidder, Conservative, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Saint-Jacques, I'm going to challenge you on a statement you made on allowing Chinese investment into our natural resources. Wouldn't those then be Chinese-owned companies or Chinese Communist Party-owned companies that would be unearthing our minerals and therefore own the intellectual property to unearth our minerals? They'd then have the ability to charge us at retail for our own assets in the future.

[Guy Saint-Jacques]

That's a good question, but, you know, it's for the Canadian government and for provinces to set the regulations and to apply them. The reality is that we don't have enough capital to develop all the mining projects that are required. Furthermore, the Chinese companies—and they are not all state-owned; there are many private companies—have developed the technology to extract rare earth and critical minerals. Again, if we were to tell them, you have to—