Excellent.
Thank you, Madam Chair and honourable members. I am very grateful for the opportunity to speak to you today. It's a real privilege to address you. I understand you're considering, as a committee, doing a study on gender budgeting.
I'm going to limit my comments to 10 minutes, as I've been requested to do.
The first point I want to make is that any study of gender budgeting really must look at the tax side of the budget as well as the spending side. Internationally, most gender budget exercises have looked at the spending side mainly. There are a few exceptions, but most are focused on spending, and there are reasons for that.
In Canada, I'd like to make the point that the tax side of the budget is very important, and increasingly important. The reasons for this are that the federal government in Canada has broad and sweeping powers over tax policy, whereas it has much more limited powers, as you know, over spending on programs. So this makes tax an extremely important part of the fiscal picture in Canada.
Secondly, since around 1995 we've had a very noticeable shift, politically, away from a focus on spending towards tax cuts in our fiscal policy. This, again, makes the tax side of the budget so important to look at from the perspective of women.
For both those reasons I've just mentioned, there is an increasing trend to use tax expenditures to address a whole range of social and economic objectives. By tax expenditures, you all know that I mean targeted tax cuts.
Gender-blind tax policy, which is generally what we have--tax policy that's made without explicitly taking gender into account--is simply not good tax policy. It's based on incomplete information. That, I think, is the best reason anyone could give for doing a gender analysis of tax policy. You'll end up with a more effective policy to achieve your stated objectives as well as a more equitable policy.
I'll move on in my written presentation to the principles that really should inform a gender analysis of the tax side of the budget.
There are certain basic principles that one should attend to, regardless of which tax policy we're talking about. I'm going to use the example of income splitting, because I believe you have a brief in front of you as well that I prepared with Nancy Peckford about income splitting. It's a very good example of the problems you get into, the mistakes you make, if you fail to do a careful gender analysis before bringing in a tax change.
The first principle that I would like to see any gender analysis of tax policy consider is the impact on women, both distributively and behaviourally. By distributively, of course, I mean, who is benefiting? Are women getting a fair share of the benefits of the tax change? And behaviourally, how is it impacting their choices? Is it going to impact their choices in a way that's different from the choices that men might make?
These impacts are very likely to differ for women for many tax policy changes because they have less income, on average, than men, because they derive their income from different sources, and because they have much heavier unpaid responsibilities. Those three aspects of their economic profile mean that women will often be impacted differently, be affected differently, by tax policies.
In the case of income splitting, the distributive impact we know is that the pension income splitting rules, for instance, benefit higher incomes much more than lower incomes. In fact, you need to have an income that is at least in the second tax bracket, at least around $38,000, to get any benefit whatsoever from income splitting.
Well, if we consider women's and men's incomes, and we see that women's, on average, are around $26,000, the average woman will get no benefit from that, whereas the average man will have a better chance of benefiting. We also know that as you go up the income scale, those earning over $100,000 will get the vast bulk of the benefits, and that group is comprised of only 23% of women. So there is both a class and a gender bias there.
In terms of behavioural impact of income splitting, there is real concern--Professor Lahey has written about this--about deterring women from entering paid work. Women's labour force behaviour is much more sensitive to changes in tax rates than men's are. Perhaps she will explain more of that. But there is a concern, both distributively and behaviourally, with the income splitting.
A second principle one must always consider I think is the impact on men and women as individuals. In other words, we need to get beyond the household-level analysis, which is the standard analysis that's done by tax policy-makers. There's an assumption that if you deliver a tax cut to a household, all members of the household will benefit equally. I would disagree with that. I think giving a tax cut to the breadwinner does not guarantee that women will get a share of it.
We see that problem arising very starkly with the income splitting case. With the pension income splitting rules, there is a transfer of tax liability to the lower-earning spouse--I'm going to call her the “caregiver”--without any transfer of income required. This is a first in Canada. Always, in the past, any income splitting that is legally allowed requires assets to actually be transferred from the higher-earning spouse to the caregiver. For the first time now, with the pension income splitting rules, we have a rule that says you can put income on the caregiver's tax return without any legal obligation to share the actual income with her. If you look at it, it's really the main breadwinner in the household who's getting the tax cut. The caregiver is getting a new tax liability, without necessarily any addition to the resources under her control.
I think this is what you reveal by going beneath the household level to look at the individuals within the household. If you look only at the household level, this inequality is obscured; it's hidden from view. By getting to the individual level, you reveal it.
A third principle, then, would be that you must consider differences among women, the impact on different groups of women. In my handout to you I've given some examples.
I'll simply highlight the very first one, which is the intersection between gender and poverty. We know that lower-income women are left out of many tax cuts. In 2004, a full 38% of women who filed tax returns had no tax payable. This is because their income was too low to pay income tax, or because they already qualified for other credits that reduced their tax payable to zero. This means that those women cannot benefit from any further income tax cuts. So reducing the lowest rate or providing a new child tax credit, none of that will be delivered to those women.
The only kind of tax cut that can benefit lower-income women is something called a refundable credit, and I would be happy to go into more details about what that is in the question period. One strategy you might want to look at as a pro gender equality tax reform strategy is to convert more of our non-refundable credits into refundable credits, precisely so they can reach those lower-income women.
The final principle, I think, must be central to a gender budget analysis. On the tax side it's to consider the impact on women, both as paid workers and as unpaid caregivers. I would hope that any gender budget analysis would avoid dichotomizing these two. They're very much interlinked as issues for women's equality, and most women struggle to combine these roles in some way over the course of their lives.
Fiscal policies should, I believe, seek to reduce barriers to the labour market. However, they should also support caregivers, and they should do so in a way that delivers support directly to caregivers, not via another person in the household.
Finally, then, to conclude very briefly, what processes could one use to improve the quality and transparency of a gender analysis of our budget? I've pointed out here on the handout that you need both internal and external dimensions to any process. There is some very good international literature that shows that the most effective gender budget processes around the world have included a combination of internal and external elements. Either on their own is less effective.
The last point I'll make, because I'm about to run out of time, is that the Department of Finance must be part of this picture. It is the key agency in making tax policy. It has the expertise about tax policy. It engages in the budget development process in a highly confidential manner, as you know, to the extent that outsiders--in other words, people in other departments or parliamentary committees--are left to do the gender budget analysis, and they will be extremely limited in what they can do because they will only be able to critique what comes out after it comes out. They will not be on the inside of the development process.
Since tax policy is extremely complex and technical, it will be difficult for members of Parliament, for parliamentary committees, for other departments, to catch and understand and to analyze thoroughly what the gender impact is.
We must deploy the expertise of the Department of Finance. If they are not included and invested in a gender budget process, it will have limited effect. I would obviously support whatever any other department or committee can do, but Finance is crucial.