Yes, I am, Mr. Chair.
We're pleased to be here with you today.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, for the purposes of our appearance today, I would like to reiterate that CATSA's main objective is to protect the public and to provide a level of service in air transport security that is professional, effective and uniform across the country.
For your information, I will begin with a brief overview of the six responsibilities contained in the mandate of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. Those six responsibilities are described in the folder which was distributed to you. I will talk about them briefly.
The six responsibilities are: pre-board screening of passengers and their carry-on baggage; hold baggage screening; non-passenger screening in restricted areas of Class I and II airports; development of a restricted area identification card; administration of the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program; and administration of Government of Canada funding agreements for supplementary police services.
Through these various security activities and elements, we have succeeded in accomplishing two things: reducing the risk of attacks against civil aviation and regaining the public's confidence in air transport. According to a survey conducted by Decima Research for CATSA in March 2006, 94% of the travelling public said they have confidence in the system in place to ensure air transportation security in Canadian airports.
I believe that this increased confidence comes from the fact that travellers who transit Canadian airports are protected by one of the most advanced air security systems in the world. Incidentally, CATSA has met ICAO—International Civil Aviation Organization—international security standards by screening 100% of checked baggage on international flights. In so doing, CATSA also met a national standard for domestic commercial flights in 89 Canadian airports.
Having said this, we must understand that in order to be truly effective, a security system must be viable. To create such a system, we must strike a balance between sufficient screening measures and detections of threats and risk on the one hand, and an efficient flow of travellers and baggage through screening points on the other. In order to maintain the efficiency of the air transport system, I believe it is unrealistic to have an environment of air transport security that is 100% infallible, an opinion shared by many experts in air transport security.
Why? It's because it is unrealistic to think we can eliminate 100% of the threats in civil aviation. In fact, such a screening would encumber the air transport network to the point of paralyzing it. That is why we have a multi-layered security system.
I would also argue that we must assign resources and staff according to threats and risks, whether it is through screening techniques or technologies. I would add that human capital must be integrated into the system and be used to its full potential. I firmly believe that any new security screening layer must, above all, improve the efficiency of the system. It must not encumber it in any way. It must never be superficial and bring no added value.
As the authority providing air transport security screening, CATSA strives to act in a preventive and proactive fashion. In this respect, we use the following model to guide our actions and strategies. We call it the AGILE model. Because terrorists are not static, we need to be agile.
AGILE is a five-part concept of action rather than reaction. It is based on flexibility rather than rigidity, and coordination rather than isolation.
The first phase of this model is assess. We have to better understand the environment we are working in by working closely with our partners in air transport security to keep abreast of the constantly changing threats to air transport throughout the world, and more particularly in Canada.
The second phase is to guard. By adding enhanced layers of security, we are better able to protect the travelling public, our airports, and our airplanes against potential attacks.
The third phase is to intervene. We need to ensure that we have sufficient mechanisms to intervene in the event of any incidents that threaten the security of our operations and travels.
The fourth and fifth phases are to learn and to evolve. These two phases are essential for ensuring that our practices and procedures remain relevant and effective.
In the area of continuous improvement, allow me to draw your attention to the following CATSA achievements.
First, screening services contracts include important clauses that encourage an improved uniform control process, an enhanced performance management program, and improvements in the code of ethics and bilingualism requirements.
Second, CATSA has developed the restricted area identification card, or RAIC, incorporating technology that identifies the fingerprints and iris of the card holder. By the end of December 2006, the authorities of 29 Class I and II airports will have replaced the previous restricted area pass with this new biometric identification card.
Third, with regard to non-passenger screening in restricted areas of airports, CATSA conducts random screening in 29 Class I and II airports in Canada of all persons with access to restricted areas under the authorization of Transport Canada and its security screening. CATSA applies this screening consistently to pilots, plumbers and maintenance staff. This is just one of the many air transport security measures in Canada.
Mr. Chair, if we are determined to maintain a safe and efficient air transport system, I definitely believe that what is most important is to continually improve our screening methods and procedures. Although screening devices, barriers, and detectors are important, it is our courage and determination to preserve the values we cherish and to overcome adversity that remain our true instruments of action.
That is my testimony, Mr. Chair.