I am.
Thank you, Mr. Tweed.
First of all, I would say that we are appearing here on very short notice of only a day or so. We don't have a written brief. Unfortunately, I could not be joined this afternoon by my colleague Gerry Einarsson, who is our expert on air safety matters, but I have been extensively consulting with him over the past two days. I hope the verbal presentation I make today will be useful to you.
You may normally think of Transport 2000 as a consumer organization that is primarily concerned with urban transit and railway matters. We last appeared before you in October of last year to discuss matters relating to rail travel. But we have been strongly concerned, mainly from the consumer perspective, about air transportation for quite a number of years. In fact, we appeared before this committee back in November 1999, as part of a coalition of nine different consumer organizations that were very concerned about consumer issues arising from the merger of Air Canada and Canadian Airlines.
At that time, one of the organizations that joined that coalition, along with the Public Interest Advocacy Centre and others, was the Air Passenger Safety Group, which was a group of people with strong expertise in the air industry who were particularly concerned about safety matters. That group subsequently became an affiliate of Transport 2000, and with their expertise over the subsequent seven or eight years, we have been quite heavily involved in airline-related matters. In fact, we're often called on directly by the national media for comment, particularly when there is an air safety issue, when there is a major air incident. We do believe that we try to provide an informed and balanced comment that is useful, in the public interest, and helpful to people when it comes to understanding the circumstances surrounding various incidents.
One good example of this was the crash and burning of the Air France flight at Pearson Airport, where we were quite extensively involved. We were actually told by representatives of the Transportation Safety Board that they had found the interviews we were giving to the media to be quite to the point and appropriate. So that's just some background.
We do also participate quite actively, in a consultative way, with various groups in the administration of the aviation industry, with Transport Canada, and with airline organizations—for example, in CARAC, the Canadian Aviation Regulatory Advisory Committee.
When it comes to Bill C-6, we strongly support the principles of the amendments as they are identified here. Matters such as aircraft emission regulations and the ability of the minister to make emission regulations relate quite closely to our commitment to sustainable transportation and to transportation that benefits the environment.
I'll talk a bit more, but we are quite concerned about the ability of the minister to handle fatigue countermeasures. Whistle-blower provisions are crucially important.
The whole area of SMS and provisions for more self-regulation by the industry is a matter on which we certainly understand the economic importance, but we feel it has to be balanced with a concern not only for absolute safety—which is, of course, always a matter of concern for Transport Canada—but also for public perception. It is in the interests of the industry itself that the public perceives that air travel continues to have the very high safety standards and safety record it is well-known for. In fact, we believe this relates to improved consumer choice.
You can talk as much as you like about a free market, but a free market implies that consumers have the knowledge to make the choices within that marketplace, and knowledge of the safety measures, and even the safety records, of the air carriers is an important part of that informed consumer choice.
I know I have to try to be brief here, but with respect to SMS, we do believe it is essential for the department to continue to have enough resources to do the monitoring, surveillance, and evaluation of the safety programs. In other countries we've had too many examples of where responsibility for safety and maintenance has been devolved. A very bad example occurred in Britain, where maintenance of the railways was devolved entirely to the private sector and resulted in a large number of severe and multiple-fatality accidents. They needed to practically shut down the entire national rail network after one particular incident resulting from the maintenance decisions under a self-regulation environment. There was a subsequent need for the government to re-nationalize both railway infrastructure and railway maintenance after they had been privatized.
It is very important that as you introduce these SMS programs and self-regulatory regimes you retain the ability in government to understand how well it's working, because once it fails, it's very expensive and complicated and difficult for all concerned to rectify the problems and to take it back.
Public oversight is absolutely essential. There have been many incidents that could have been prevented if this kind of whistle-blower protection had existed. As a specific example, I can go back as far as the Dryden crash in 1989, which was a de-icing matter, where it was clearly established that had employees been able to speak without fear of reprisal, the 24 deaths in that accident could have been avoided. We learned from that, and in fact de-icing procedures worldwide have improved as a result of what we learned from those fatalities, but in fact the fatalities might have been unnecessary if whistle-blowing protection was available.
It's not a Canadian situation, but an Alaska Airlines crash that happened in January of 2000 again was a case where known maintenance issues had been suppressed because there was no protection for the employees who could have provided that information. The plane crashed due to failure of its tail assembly, and the 88 fatalities that resulted could have been avoided.
We understand that this legislation is being dealt with against the background of diminishing and decreasing resources at Transport Canada, and although that may be a reality, and there may be great difficulty as experienced inspectors retire and so on--difficulty in replacing them--that by itself isn't an excuse for downgrading the level of safety in the industry. If the resources are required for safety, they must somehow be found.
Finally, we found some very good remarks, which I hope the members of this committee will have read or be aware of--and if you aren't, then I recommend them to you--in the remarks made by Justice Moshansky last November. He did the original investigation of the Dryden crash in 1989. He made a speech in November that was still quite concerned about the state of the management of aviation safety in Canada, about lessons that had been learned but had not necessarily led to improvements being made. Particularly, he had strong remarks related to the problems of inadequate supply of inspection capability--inspectors at Transport Canada.
Yes, it is appropriate to improve the act along the lines that are requested here and to devolve in a way that maintains safety and Transport Canada's ability to monitor the adequacy of safety mechanisms, but also in a way that will ensure that the public continues to have confidence in the safety of the airline system and can make informed choices.
Thank you.