Transport Committee on Feb. 19th, 2007

[Michael Wing]

In terms of the premise of your question, it would be irresponsible for us, as an organization, to put forward a position that would provide less safety within the workplace. That's not what we are putting forward.

As far as SMS are concerned, safety management systems, we do not object to a culture where safety is primary within an organization. There might be something that's very good about introducing that. Our concern and our experience have been what then happens at Transport Canada, with its removal of itself from the process and delegation of that authority to the industry to identify problems.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

There has been some suggestion that this is akin to either deregulation of the industry or a move to significant self-regulation. Transport Canada officials made it very clear that this is, in fact, not self-regulation, but a significant enhancement in safety. It's ensuring that companies take ownership of safety within their operations. In fact, the audit process that is being suggested by Bill C-6 is intended to make sure that at the end of the day we actually have an enhanced system.

This is not a move backwards. It's not even the status quo. At the end of the day, the intention is for there to be improved safety within the airline industry.

Have you received any indication that the number of inspectors is going to be reduced or that the audit process is going to be less rigorous than our overall inspection program is today? Do you have any evidence to that effect?

[Michael Wing]

Yes.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

Be specific.

[Michael Wing]

We have certainly seen a reduction in the number of inspectors at Transport Canada.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

Hold it. Bill C-6 isn't even in place.

[Michael Wing]

Right.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

You can't blame Bill C-6 for that.

[Michael Wing]

I don't disagree with that. I think Transport Canada has basically been carrying on as though this legislation was going to be put in place. They've been trying to get this through the House now for quite some time. They've already begun to change the way they do business.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

How many inspectors has Transport Canada gotten rid of?

[Michael Wing]

I will get those numbers for you and will give them to you, but I can tell you that the way in which inspection has been done is changing, and it's changing as we speak.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

Could you table that information with the chair?

[Michael Wing]

I certainly will.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Mr. Temelkovski.

[Lui Temelkovski, Liberal, Oak Ridges—Markham, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and my thanks to all of the presenters.

Mr. Stoss, maybe you can expand a little bit. You said earlier that public reporting is done when it is only a systemic problem.

[Nick Stoss]

We report publicly on all our investigations. My comment was that we only issue board recommendations when we have a systemic problem. However, if we find a deficiency during an investigation, we will definitely report that deficiency in our report. Frequently, we'll take action to disseminate that deficiency to the industry or stakeholders at an earlier point in time in the investigation. We won't wait for the final report.

The only premise I had there is that we don't issue a recommendation on a particular issue unless we find it to be systemic.

[Lui Temelkovski, Liberal, Oak Ridges—Markham, ON]

Systemic would mean there were three or four occurrences, repetitive occurrences?

[Nick Stoss]

It is a common pattern in a number of investigations. We could take a look and say this particular element has been proven to be part and parcel of an occurrence, which means that it contributes to the occurrence in a number of areas. It's based upon the significance, according to the risk assessment that we have on that and including the possible consequences of the issue as well. So that is what we base our recommendations on.

[Lui Temelkovski, Liberal, Oak Ridges—Markham, ON]

By systemic problems, do you mean technical problems? Or are we talking about some other sort of problems such as human error and so on and so forth?

[Nick Stoss]

Our general approach to the investigation is that human error is a human fault. We'll normally look for the underlying factors that contributed to that particular human error. I'm talking about things that facilitated somebody's making a wrong decision, for example. We normally get down below the human error to find out what contributed to that.

[Lui Temelkovski, Liberal, Oak Ridges—Markham, ON]

You mean things such as maybe fatigue, counter-fatigue measures of air traffic controllers, shift work and those sorts of things?

[Nick Stoss]

It could be a fatigue error associated with a current work program or with the number of hours worked. It could be an equipment problem. It could be an interface between personnel and equipment.

[Lui Temelkovski, Liberal, Oak Ridges—Markham, ON]

I was recently on a flight, and when we took off, we heard a pop. The pilot came on shortly after and told us not to worry, that it was one of the tires blowing up. He told us not to be alarmed because we had two tires and we could land with one. That was a frontal tire.

Six hours later, when we were landing in Toronto, he told us not to be concerned about it because we had four tires. So I was concerned that he didn't know his aircraft. Does that happen often?

[Nick Stoss]

I can't comment upon the individual pilot's decision or his communications. All I can say is that particular type of incident is reportable to us, the Transportation Safety Board, and it's also reportable to Transport Canada.