Transport Committee on April 30th, 2007

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, meeting number 47. The order of the day, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), is a study of rail safety.

Joining us today we have David Chudnovsky, who is an MLA from Vancouver-Kensington; we have George Kosinski, former CN locomotive engineer; and representing the United Steelworkers, Todd Cotie, representative of local 2004 union.

Normally we ask you to make a seven-minute presentation. We'll do the presentations first and then go to questions around the table.

We'll start with Mr. Chudnovsky, please. Welcome.

[David Chudnovsky, MLA, Vancouver-Kensington, Legislative Assembly of B.C., As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Chair, and thank you to the committee for the opportunity to speak to you today.

My name is David Chudnovsky. I am the member of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia for the constituency of Vancouver-Kensington, the best, the very finest of the 79 constituencies in British Columbia. I am also responsible, on behalf of the official opposition, for being the critic of the Minister of Transportation, and that begins my interest in this issue.

I want to begin by recalling that in August 2005 there was, as I'm sure you're aware, a disastrous spill into the Cheakamus River, which is in southwest British Columbia near the town of Squamish. As a result of that spill, the derailment of a CN train, I became very involved in this issue.

Before I go any further, Mr. Chair, I want to pay tribute to your clerk, Mark D'Amore, who was very helpful in getting us ready for this and making sure the brief was translated, etc. So thank you to Mark.

The reason I point to the spill in the Cheakamus Canyon, Chairperson, to begin with, is that I want to impress upon the committee that this is not simply a technical exercise. People in British Columbia are scared and have been scared for a couple of years. They're nervous. People who live in CN rail corridors have had enough derailments that it's something that folks think about all the time. You'll recall--and I'm sure you've looked at some of this stuff--that there was for a while, it seemed, a derailment every day or every couple of days.

I point you to appendix 1 in my submission. I won't go through it, but it is a timeline of derailments working backwards from now. It's only a couple of years' worth, and only in British Columbia, and there are pages and pages of them.

So the first thing I want to impress upon you is the seriousness with which the folks who live in British Columbia take this issue and the fear and nervousness they have with respect to CN.

I also want to say in introduction that I asked the Minister of Transportation, the Honourable Kevin Falcon, to accompany me here today to give whatever information he could provide to you together with me. He chose not to do that, but I encourage you to be in touch with the Honourable Kevin Falcon, the Minister of Transportation for British Columbia, who among other things was involved in the negotiation of the sale of the former B.C. Rail to CN. One of the questions I would encourage you to ask that minister, and I've asked him many times, is what discussions, if any, took place with CN, at the time of the privatization of B.C. Rail, about safety maintenance or environmental protection. What commitments, if any, were made?

I want to say I have set my mind and that of my colleagues to the question of what it is that has made the situation with CN in our province so peculiar over the last couple of years. Why is it there have been so many derailments and so many tragedies and near tragedies in British Columbia? I would suggest, Chair, there are two explanations for that, which we need to look at carefully.

First of all, I believe CN was not ready for the topography, the geography, and the environment of British Columbia when it took over the former B.C. Rail line. They thought they were just running a railway in the same way as they did in the rest of the country. But as we know, the topography and the geography of British Columbia are unique. The changes in elevation, the curves--the range of topography is such that it is unlike anything else that a major rail company faces in North America. So that's the first reason that I think we have seen for the problems we face in B.C.

The second reason is the fact that we moved from a crown corporation, a company that was owned and run by the people of the province of British Columbia, which, to some extent at least, was operating on the basis of providing a service and a return to the people of British Columbia. We moved from that to a very large international corporation that has a very different strategy and philosophy of running its operation. What arose from that were very specific choices they made, for instance, to move locomotives and rolling stock from the B.C. situation to the rest of the continent. This seems to have been a contributing factor to some of the problems we face.

I want to say parenthetically that I read the transcript of the submission to you last week by Mr. Gordon Rhodes, with whom we have been in touch over the last couple of years. I want to be clear that in every case--I read it carefully--the situations, the problems, the reductions in safety standards he described to you that are attributed to CN, we, in our office in B.C., have heard as well, from sources beyond Mr. Rhodes.

I would point out that in the brief--and I hope you'll have an opportunity to read it--we have itemized, among many, many of the situations that have been described to us by people in British Columbia, a number of changes that we focused on. The changes and practices chosen by CN after they took over from B.C. Rail are the areas we chose to focus on. Some of those you've heard a lot about in your deliberations: the length of trains, dynamic braking, and power at the centre of the trains. There are a number of others that you wouldn't have heard very much about, which I would encourage you to have a look at. They are on page 4; I don't have time to read them precisely.

The last point I want to make--and I hope there will be a chance to have questions and answers--is that the relationship between the company as employer and the workers as employees is one of the contributing factors to the problems we face. Appendix 2 at the end of my brief outlines some of the problems in terms of the employee relations used by CN.

Chairperson, I'll finish now by thanking one other person for helping to prepare the brief, and I hope people have a chance to look at it carefully. I will thank our researcher--whose time I get one-sixth of in the legislature in B.C.--Sarah Goldvine, who has done a tremendous amount of work over the last couple of years in preparing this material.

Thank you very much for your patience.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Mr. Kosinski, please.

[George Kosinski-Ritmeester, Former CN Locomotive engineer, As an Individual]

My full name is George Kosinski-Ritmeester, as I appended my wife's name when we got married. Railroaders of my day knew me as George Kosinski.

I worked for CN for five years as a switchman, breakman, and conductor, and then for the next 10 years until my resignation in 1989, I worked as a locomotive engineer. With the exception of CN track formerly belonging to B.C. Rail, I've run trains on every subdivision west of Wainwright, Alberta, to the Pacific Ocean, except the stretch from Blue River to Boston Bar in B.C. When I resigned in 1989, I was already becoming alarmed by the dramatic reduction in track maintenance forces taking place and the impending elimination of the caboose. I just completed my first draft of a thorough evaluation of the Transport Canada action plan to address CN safety issues, commonly known as the CN audit report, to which I will henceforth refer simply as the report.

With the few minutes at my disposal, I'd like to highlight some key points and some key omissions in this report.

The phase one report defines the derailment cause “Unknown/Data Not Entered — contributing factor not yet determined” and indicates that this category of derailment tripled from 2000 to 2005, increasing at a faster rate than the total number of derailments. This emphasizes not only the urgency of resolving these unknown factors but the possible need for new investigators, who, with a fresh perspective, may discover significant facts overlooked by previous investigators.

The report states: “Should non-compliance to legislative requirements, or threats to safety be found, Transport Canada takes immediate enforcement action.” While this assertion appears to offer some external safeguards, it is unfortunately not worded strongly enough. It should be made clear that Transport Canada will take enforcement action against any threat to safety, regardless of whether it is or is not in compliance with legislative requirements. If Transport Canada has no authority beyond enforcing compliance with legislative requirements, then either its authority should be expanded or Parliament should step in immediately to legislative prohibition against a specified safety threat.

In the discussions following the 1997 derailment that killed two running trades employees on the Ashcroft subdivision, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Ways Employees national vice-president, Gary Housch, said that CN had eliminated over 50% of its track maintenance forces in the decade preceding this accident, clearly expressing his concern that lack of adequate track inspection forces may have been a contributing factor. Nevertheless, with respect to the activity of having track inspected visually shortly before it is traversed by a train, at least in locations and/or under conditions that reflect a compelling need, chapter 3 of the phase one report on corrective actions offers not even a hint of the possibility of increasing these forces. In fact, of the nine initiatives undertaken by CN Rail listed on page 29, not a single one of them would have prevented this accident, illustrating the dangers of overreliance on technology and underutilization of humans.

In any case, increasing the use of track testing equipment is of limited value when, as the report points out, CN is not using the data obtained from these tests to take necessary actions so that track conditions do not deteriorate to a point where they fall below the track safety rules before the next inspection.

The class system with respect to disciplinary action must be eliminated. Front-line supervisors who pressure employees into unsafe practices should be vulnerable to the same disciplinary procedure of official internal investigations, potentially leading to the awarding of demerits, the accumulation of which may lead to dismissal. Where it can be reasonably established that a contributing factor in an accident is an unsafe practice that appears to be condoned by the highest levels of management, it is not sufficient to fine the corporation, even if the fine is higher than the additional net profit accrued from the unsafe practice. The executives of the corporation must be personally fined as well, just as running trades employees are subject to fines for safety or rule violations undertaken on their own initiatives.

For example, if the recent accident that killed the CP engineer in Trail involved a locomotive not equipped with dynamic brakes, I would regard that as criminal negligence on the part of management.

Page 19 states: “Transport Canada’s Rail Safety Directorate, in conjunction with the Department’s Transportation Development Centre, is currently conducting an information review on operation of long trains.” The intent is to develop terms of reference for a research initiative describing safety impacts and industry best standards and practices associated with long-train operation. In view of the recent spate of derailments, it is simply unacceptable to wait for the results of this review. It is of the utmost importance to take immediate action, not only to protect against potential environmental disasters but also to protect the lives of running trades employees, who should not have to work under conditions where the occasional death of one or more of their members, every once in a while, seems inevitable.

As a temporary measure, until the review is completed, a blanket length restriction should be imposed. Every train on any subdivision between Edson, Alberta, and the west coast should be restricted to a maximum length of 100 cars, with trains carrying any cars containing toxic chemicals restricted to 50 cars and five miles per hour under the speed limit. These restrictions should also apply in mountainous areas in other provinces, as well as on flat track containing many tight curves, and in other locations where permanent or temporary conditions suggest a compelling need.

Perhaps the review will conclude that it would be wise to retain these restrictions permanently. Transport Canada appears to be authorized to enforce such restrictions, but if it isn't or it isn't willing to authorize them, then Parliament should enact legislation to impose these restrictions. If the federal government has the power to force striking rail workers back to work, they should also have the power, and do have the responsibility, to ensure that those workers and the communities to which their trains are travelling are not subjected to dangerously narrow margins of safety.

CN may complain that such restrictions would increase operating costs, but the fact that it paid its CEO $46 million in salary bonuses and stock options in 2005 suggests that it can easily absorb the minor increase in the operating costs.

I would also like to address the issue of rest, which was completely ignored in the report. However, time restrictions prevent me from offering anything more than one brief comment.

The pay structure, as it was constituted in 1989 and perhaps still is, creates a conflict with a desire to obtain adequate rest. A 1983 study carried out by an American presidential study commission condemned the existing pay structure. Its final conclusion was that there is no reason--logical, legal, moral, or otherwise--to perpetuate the present system as it is, for the unborn child and for persons not yet employed. So one might wish to inquire as to whether it is, 24 years later, still being perpetuated.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Cotie, welcome.

[Todd Cotie, Representative of Local 2004, Union, United Steelworkers]

Thank you for this opportunity to address the standing committee.

My name is Todd Cotie. I'm a machine operator for CN Rail. I've been there for 12 years. Currently I'm the health and safety coordinator for USW local 2004, representing 3,200 track maintenance workers across Canada. I'm speaking on behalf of those members.

The United Steelworkers are very concerned about safety for the workers we represent, as well as for all users of the rail system and for the communities through which the railways pass.

First, I want to lay out some general concerns with what we see as a deteriorating commitment to safety at CN, where the bottom line is pushing safety down the list of priorities. This is unacceptable.

Second, I want to offer a suggestion to the standing committee for concrete action they could take that would immediately improve rail safety. That is legislating mandatory track slow orders to trains when they pass railway maintenance workers in close proximity.

Here are our general concerns.

First, accidents and derailments are on the rise. As this committee has been made aware, 2005 was a particularly bad year for derailments, with more derailments and with dramatic environmental consequences in some of the higher-profile derailments. These serious accidents have tipped the balance in terms of public awareness and have led to increasing public pressure on companies such as CN and on government bodies such as the standing committee to take action to fix railway safety in Canada.

Second, government's hands-off approach is not working. Transport Canada cannot expect CN to self-regulate. CN is a corporation; it is accountable to its shareholders. It is clear that CN's focus, now more than ever, is the bottom line. Net income for 2006 was just over $2 billion. CN is employing fewer people and passing on more earnings per share. Dividends to shareholders were up 30% last year. CN is working hard to impress investors.

CN boss Hunter Harrison, as George mentioned, paid himself $7.3 million in salary and bonuses in 2006, but his real income comes from the fact that he is also an investor in CN. In 2005, the year in which CN derailments were so extreme, Hunter Harrison exercised his stock options and upgraded his take-home pay for 2005 alone to $46.4 million. He has a deep personal interest in CN's stock price. We believe business pressures are pushing CN away from the safety-first culture. Transport Canada must play an active and responsible role in ensuring that safety comes first.

Third, accidents don't just happen. Accidents are preventable. We say this as a union, but CN says it too. The difference between us is how we each think you prevent accidents.

CN will tell you that the vast majority of accidents are caused by human behaviour. That seems to be their catchphrase right now. In other words, they believe accidents are the fault of individual bad workers. This isn't true. If it were, CN would be able to discipline its way to safety. Instead, we believe you prevent accidents by fixing the overall safety culture. The problem at CN is that CN culture prioritizes productivity over safety. This is confirmed by the recent Transport Canada safety audit on which this committee has already heard evidence. We encourage you to take this audit very seriously.

That audit found that most CN employees report that there's more emphasis on productivity than on safety. The safety audit also confirmed what we know from experience: front-line supervisors are under enormous pressure to deliver the bottom line. Pressures to get the job done include productivity measurement, workload, and fear of reprisals. All of these are driving the daily routines of front-line supervisors in a direction different from top management's official position that CN prioritizes safety.

Our work crews are under pressure to work faster and longer, with fewer breaks and less time off between shifts. Fatigue, stress, and a pressure to get things done faster instead of better undermine safety on the railways.

All this is to paint a picture of the culture at CN, a culture that forces workers and front-line supervisors to sacrifice safety in order to improve productivity. It's reckless. The company is playing Russian roulette with their workers without even having the courtesy to let them hold the gun. We're asking the government to take the gun away.

Fourth, contracting out undermines safety standards. CN often uses contractors instead of experienced CN crews for a number of reasons, none of which increase safety. Contractors can appear to be cheaper for CN and can potentially reduce CN's liability when there's an accident, but contractors are often not as experienced. Their awareness of the rules, instructions, and safety procedures is not as thorough. Their tools and equipment are substandard. Further, in our experience, because of their more precarious employment, contractors are more likely to be pushed to take shortcuts in order to get the job done more quickly and stay competitive with other contractors vying for the same jobs.

Accidents involving contractors are reported separately and are more easily swept under the rug. What can't be swept under the rug is the fact that on November 11, 2006, a 19-year-old contractor working on the Kingston sub was killed when he was crushed by a machine turntable that wasn't properly locked out. He wasn't properly trained in the lock-out/tag-out procedure used by CN employees.

Transport Canada needs to take a much more active role in monitoring and enforcing proper training, safety procedures, and certification, and in ensuring that adequate and properly functioning tools and equipment are used by all workers, including contractors.

Fifth, we are concerned about CN's lack of accountability internally to health and safety committees. CN's internal structures for joint management–union health and safety meetings are somewhere between non-functional and non-existent. If safety were indeed CN's highest priority, they would make much better use of these committees. They can talk the talk about safety, but the question is, can they walk the walk? Our experience shows that they need to be pushed.

I would like to close with a specific suggestion: slow down trains when passing work crews working on adjacent tracks in order to reduce risk and the possibility of a derailment next to these people working.

We hope this body will find it worthwhile to exert pressure for this measure to be adopted. This would not cost anything for the government or Transport Canada, and it would cause no undue problems for CN. It would dramatically increase safety. As a simple analogy, when highway work crews are on the road, speed limits for motorists are reduced and fines for speeding are increased. Provincial governments are actively enforcing appropriately increased safety measures when traffic passes crews. The logic behind this ought to apply to railways, but it does not.

This is not a hypothetical issue. Passing trains do kill workers. Less than two weeks ago, on Thursday, April 19, a CN employee, not a member of our union, was killed near Cornwall by a train passing at full speed on double mainline track. When workers, whether they are in our union or not, are working on a main track, sidings, or backtracks that are near another active line, trains should, at the very least, slow down to 30 miles an hour while passing the work crew. This would dramatically increase safety without placing any undue burden on CN's productivity. We believe this to be a reasonable request, when it's considered that the safest way to perform track work would be for no trains to pass workers.

Currently, when trains pass a crew, the presence of that crew has no bearing on speed limit. Whether there is a crew there or not, the movement is limited only by the condition of the track. Freight trains can maintain their speed at 65 miles an hour, and passenger trains at 100 miles an hour, right past the crew. The presence of work crews is ignored. This is not right. Tracks are only eight feet apart, rail to rail, one with work crews and the other with trains. The force of a train passing at 100 miles an hour can blow a worker's helmet off their head. A slower train would allow engineers and work crews more time to notice and react to situations. Slowdowns are safer.

Railways are mandated to slow down when hazardous materials are being carried through populated areas. I believe that was passed in the Railway Safety Act. However, these rules do not apply when carrying the same hazardous material through work sites in non-populated areas. Work crews should be given the same consideration and made aware of the actual hazardous material contained in the railcars passing their work sites. This makes sense both from a worker's right to know perspective, as well as from a preventive joint management–union approach to health and safety.

Work crews often have difficulty clearing for these passing trains on a work site, because of tripping hazards, ties, rails, uneven ballast, etc. High embankments, reduced shoulders, deep snow, bridges, flying debris from the trains, or dragging equipment from the trains also create an increased risk to the worker. God forbid if a train derailed beside a work crew. They've had three in the Kingston sub in the past six weeks.

We are fighting for what is simply common sense. Anyone else I've explained this to understands the reasons for a slowdown. The only ones who can't understand are CN.

On April 28, I was at the annual day of mourning ceremony at Sudbury, Ontario, honouring workers who have been killed on the job. I mentioned the recent tragedy that occurred in Cornwall with the CN worker being struck and killed. It was suggested that I write a letter to CN requesting that flags be lowered to half-mast when an employee is killed. I said, “I've written dozens of letters to CN requesting that the speed of trains be lowered near workers so we don't have to lower flags.”

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Bell.

[Don Bell, Liberal, North Vancouver, BC]

Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen, for coming. I appreciate the comments you've made.

Mr. Chudnovsky, I have a couple of questions about the material you presented. One of the issues you addressed is a concern of mine. I asked CN about it, but we didn't have a chance to get an answer at that point. It was the issue of dynamic brakes. The B.C. Rail engines had them, but I don't know where the B.C. engines went. I understand they were disposed of or moved away. The few engines that had dynamic brakes were disabled, or are no longer in service for some reason. The feeling--certainly of Mr. Rhodes--is that had dynamic brakes been available on his engine, perhaps his two co-workers would still be alive.

That's the difference you referenced in your presentation between a water-grade railway and railways in B.C., with the radiuses and inclines we have. I think the most recent accident involved 13 miles, I think they said, at 2.5% grade, which is substantial.

What concerns me is some of the other practices I saw in the report. They're not only in British Columbia, but they're magnified when they're in British Columbia. For example, track patrols had been reduced. There was one example given to us of where a track had been hit by a rock and misaligned. The engineer, through skilful handling, was able to get 27 cars over the joint before there was a minor derailment, and he had slowed down. So the track patrols concern me.

The other is the notices and orders. There were 99 outstanding when this report was done in November 2005, and I think 24 of them went back to 2000 or earlier. I find it incongruous that they weren't addressed, when we're dealing with these kinds of things.

Another issue is bad orders. I think 75% of the inspectors said it was not uncommon for the tag to be taken off a car and the car put back in.

The other issue is the use of U.S. standards for both the engines and cars. The most convenient standard seemed to be the one that was favoured, for the most part. I understand that when they're running an operation between the U.S. and Canada it's sometimes difficult to make those distinctions, but the witnesses--even the vice-presidents of CN who were here--acknowledged that for the most part Transport Canada regulations are stricter. There are some in the States they say are stricter, but for the most part Transport Canada regulations are stricter.

On the two issues identified in the reports as the major causes of accidents, one was the equipment, the rolling stock; and the other was the track conditions, the maintenance of the tracks. I've heard some suggestions here.

My concern is obviously the workers' safety and the public's safety in the area where a train derails. There are examples, in the States in particular and here, of derailments with hazardous chemicals that have put the public at risk. There was one incident in Mississauga years ago, and others since then, such as Hinton.

The other issue is the environment, like in the Cheakamus River, where the fish stock might be damaged for 20 or 30 years.

Then there's movement of goods and services--the imports and exports that this country relies on. With the Pacific gateway and the growth of the Asia-Pacific market--China and India in particular--it's important that we have the ability to keep these trains moving to serve the ports and the trucking industry so we can have an efficient economic system.

So the whole issue of safety is extremely important, which is why this committee undertook this inquiry. We're interested in safety in air, water, and rail. Rail was one of the issues because of the high number of incidents in 2005, and the high-profile incidents.

You've heard some of the testimony and you've had the chance to review the testimony from the other individuals. You've made one suggestion, Mr. Cotie, about mandatory track slow-down orders. The records don't seem to be available as to when those were involved. We've heard about the others.

Mr. Cotie, is it practical for workers to move away from the track when they see a train coming so it doesn't have to slow down as much?

To Mr. Kosinski or Mr. Chudnovsky, do you have some recommendations that this committee could make in dealing with the issues of regulations and legislation? I know one of the suggestions is that we put more teeth into the Railway Safety Act, much like the Aeronautics Act has, for accountability and responsibility.

Maybe Mr. Cotie, and then back over to Mr. Chudnovsky.

[Todd Cotie]

The 30 miles per hour has come from various rules. I referred to hazardous materials going through populated areas. I believe that speed limit is 35 miles per hour. A train passing us does not necessarily have to reduce its speed to 35, because it might be out of one of those populated areas.

We have boarding cars, white fleets, where we sleep--sleeper cars--that are adjacent to the track, eight feet away, the same as a work crew would be, and there are rules in CP's general operating instructions--which you may be familiar with, that's what they operate on--to reduce the train speed to 30 miles per hour when passing white fleets--within 30 feet of centre of track, which would mean the siding and the back track. We fought for the last two years with CN to adopt similar rules. They finally have issued a 30 miles per hour slowing to pass these white fleets. That's where the 30 miles per hour is coming from.

The work crews that I'm talking about are generally larger rail gangs, tie gangs, that are on the Kingston sub, which is double mainline track. The way they're protected is through a flagging system. There are two red flags. Trains are given orders to contact a contact person who is responsible for that area through the flags. Employees are warned that a train is coming, but they don't reduce the speed through the red flag. So they're aware. There are a lot of places out there where they can't clear, because of shoulders--or clear to a reasonable degree. I believe the minimum distance is 16 feet from nearest rail through their rail to maybe the shoulder. That's reduced when there are curves in the rail, and also at night, with reduced visibility. There are tripping hazards on their side, because they're changing ties and what not.

The protecting person for the red flags is a unionized employee. Safety suggestions have been made through job briefings that they reduce the speed to 30 miles per hour. They have done that. The guys have come back to me and other safety reps and said that they're very comfortable with the 30 miles per hour as opposed to the normal 65 for freight trains or the 100-mile-per-hour VIAs.

The company got word that they'd reduced the speed in the red flags. They came back and upped the speed again, saying that it's not necessary.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Mr. Chudnovsky, would you like to comment?

[Don Bell, Liberal, North Vancouver, BC]

I'd like to thank you for getting your access to information. We asked for these reports and couldn't get them initially.

[David Chudnovsky]

I would like to make several points. I'll make them as quickly as I can. One of them relates to that.

First of all, on the issue of the problems that have been identified, I want to say that as soon as the Cheakamus derailment happened, and then a series of them afterwards, I got dozens of calls from people who work on the trains, and all said the same stuff. They said length of train, dynamic braking, distributed power--over and over again.

It seems to me that we need to learn from these people. We need to learn from the people who are actually doing the work, and take them seriously. I learned more about streamlining in two weeks than I ever thought I would know. Everybody knew and understood...I shouldn't say “knew”. The opinions that were expressed by folks who actually do the work were unanimous. They described the reasons for this spate of derailments. They all used the same descriptors and all described the same reasons. I think there's a lesson for all of us to be learned there.

Point two is with respect to the standards. You made the comment, and you're right, that the standards for reporting and for maintenance and safety in the United States are lower than the Transport Canada standards, but the B.C. standards used to be even more stringent than that. It certainly seems to me that one thing we need to think about is the unique situation and characteristics of the B.C. situation. If it's for you and for the federal Parliament to decide what the national standard should be, certainly somebody has to take account of the fact that we have a very unique situation in B.C.

The third point I wanted to make very quickly was on transparency. It's outrageous that we should have to go to access to information to get this information. It was our office, many months ago, that made the access to information request that resulted in the audits' being made public. As I say on page 2 of my brief, there are three other sections of that access to information request that haven't been complied with yet, all of which would provide useful information to all of us who are concerned about this issue.

Finally, the fourth point I wanted to make, Chair--thanks for your patience--is on the issue of self-regulation. If you're looking to me for a recommendation, I'd say self-regulation is ridiculous. We cannot expect companies whose responsibility is to their shareholders and the bottom line to be regulating themselves when it comes to an issue as important as rail safety.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Mr. Laframboise.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chudnovsky, I want to get back to what you said about the safety management systems.

The committee is reviewing this issue and is facing Transport Canada who is trying to convince us of the advantages of its safety management system. The department says the system requires companies to add another layer of safety. But we know that Transport Canada has fewer inspectors to make the visual checks that were done previously. This is the situation we are now facing.

They want to implement safety management systems in the air transport industry. We are presently discussing this issue. You said that contracting out safety management to private companies without supervision is problematic. I can appreciate that.

However, I have somewhat of a problem with the B.C. government position. You said that stakeholders should take action. Last week, the mayor of Montmagny told us there were several accidents on a section of the rail line located in his municipality. He wanted the speed limit to be lowered. The committee unanimously decided to review the matter and to recommend that Transport Canada reduce the speed limit on a section on the line.

However, British Columbia covers a vast area. The B.C. legislature would have to give us a mandate. If the B.C. government is happy with the present speed limit, it would be very difficult for us to legislate in this area. A change in the speed limit could have an economic impact on the transportation of goods, passengers and so on. Given the area covered by B.C., I would agree to support you provided the B.C. legislature asks for specific regulations.

Why doesn’t the legislature do it? Otherwise, you will have to convince me to disregard the B.C. government who has higher standards. Up until now, according to what you said and what I read, the B.C. government never asked the federal government to change the regulations applying to this province.

[David Chudnovsky]

First of all, thank you for your question. I can only endorse your frustration with the B.C. government. That's what I live with all the time.

Let me try to explain my understanding of the position of the B.C. government--it's not mine--and then my position with respect to what they say.

The former B.C. Rail, which was a crown corporation in British Columbia, was sold to CN. The deal finished in 2004. The position of the Minister of Transportation in British Columbia, and therefore of the British Columbia government, is that the railway, having been sold to CN, with CN being an interprovincial, national railway, is now a federally regulated entity.

The answer of the minister, when I questioned him, often and assertively, both in public and in the legislature, was, “That's federal. Go talk to them in Ottawa.” Here I am.

My view of his position is that while there may be a sense in which he's formally correct, it's nevertheless the responsibility of the Government of British Columbia to advocate on behalf of the people of British Columbia. When those people in British Columbia and the environment are put at risk, which we believe they have been over the last several years, then it's up to the minister in British Columbia. Even if he believes that it's federally regulated and he has no formal jurisdiction, it's his job to come here, to contact his federal counterpart and to publicly advocate on behalf of the safety and security of the people of B.C. and our environment.

Personally, I don't accept the position of the Government of British Columbia. I know we may get into a whole constitutional thing here, and I'm not sure I want to, but I don't accept their position. I think they should be much more aggressive and assertive. Their excuse for not being so—and I think it's simply an excuse, and it's not justified—is that CN is federally regulated.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

It is difficult for us to make a recommendation about the speed limit if the community is represented by its government. When the mayor of Montmagny, in Quebec, asked us for a speed limit reduction after several accidents, we heard him and made a recommendation. However, the B.C. geography is such that the speed limit in mountain areas should probably be lowered.

Quebec mountains are different from yours. If you have a different geography requiring different regulations, you should be asking for such regulations. If you don’t, you would have to accept the accidents that are presently taking place. This is the message that has to be delivered to the B.C. government.

It is difficult enough to make a recommendation relating to a specific area without the consent of the province. We would rather have an agreement with elected representatives before making a recommendation.

I would put that question to Mr. Kosinski and Mr. Cotie who mentioned speed limits. Do you believe that a change to the regulations governing speed limits in a region such as British Columbia is the solution? I know there are other things, but would it be a major part of the solution if we consider regulatory changes?

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Mr. Cotie.

[Todd Cotie]

I can't speak much for B.C., because I'm from Ontario and I don't understand the hills very much. But reducing the speed, in particular in towns—I know that's been lobbied a little bit through Quebec—by our crews can be done. I understand the burden CN may say that will put economically, but I live in Capreol, Ontario, which used to be a hub for railway traffic. It's a little bit reduced now, but there's a yard there. And I watched these multi-million dollar trains sit in the yard for an hour or two, maybe three hours, waiting for train crews, etc. So you can't say that the delay caused by the reduction in speed would be much of a problem if it's going to increase the safety when hazardous materials are being run or if it's decreasing the likelihood of a derailment.

CN would not purposely put a train over a defect in the rail at 60 miles an hour. They reduce speed to 30 or 25, and they have to deal with that until the problem is corrected. They put these trains that aren't inspected as much as they'd like you to think, especially during a night shift when these guys are working, by at the maximum speed that track allows at all times, without even considering that. And these trains, as I said, are sitting in the yards and there are delays there too, which nobody likes to mention.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Mr. Kosinski, have you a comment?

[George Kosinski]

I think what Todd was saying about reducing speed limits around work crews certainly should be taken into consideration. Generally speaking, I'm familiar with pretty much all the track in western Canada, with the exception of the track formerly owned by B.C. Rail, and my impression was that the speed limits were overall quite well designed. I didn't find any that were excessive. And while there are some areas where it seemed like the speed limit maybe was a little lower than it could be, generally speaking they seem to be pretty good. But of course that's all based on safe track, proper equipment, brakes that work properly, cars that have round wheels and not square wheels, and so on and so forth. So of course all these considerations have to relay back to the actual condition of the equipment and the track that's being used.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Mr. Julian.

[Peter Julian, NDP, Burnaby—New Westminster, BC]

Thanks to each one of you for coming forward today. This is very important information that you're providing to us.

I'm going to start with you, Mr. Chudnovsky. I'm very sorry that Minister Falcon is not here. He should be here. That's part of his responsibility.

[David Chudnovsky]

He would entertain you, I'm sure.

[Peter Julian, NDP, Burnaby—New Westminster, BC]

I am flabbergasted that the B.C. government is not taking any action. They do have some elements that they could be doing. They could be directing correspondence to the federal government. They're not doing any of that. So I have to ask you, why isn't the B.C. government taking any action whatsoever on behalf of British Columbians?

Secondly, I'd like to come back to the issue of CN. They had their top executives here before the committee last week, and their executive said at first, there's no problem, we've corrected the problem. And then it was pointed out to them that we've actually seen a skyrocketing of derailments in the early part of 2007. They then tried to basically blame everybody but themselves.

So my question there is, do you believe CN executives have any credibility at all now on the safety issue, given the fact that they just refuse to own up to the problems that exist?

[David Chudnovsky]

I think the explanation for the B.C. government's inaction on these questions over the last couple of years is mostly ideological. They chose, in my view, for ideological reasons, to privatize B.C. Rail. Many, if not most, of these problems have taken place on the old B.C. Rail track and lines.

As you well know—I know Mr. Julian knows, maybe other MPs here know, and Mr. Bell certainly knows—the privatization of B.C. Rail was very controversial at the time. It went against a commitment that had been made by the premier. That move continues to be very controversial, and there's a major court case now.