My full name is George Kosinski-Ritmeester, as I appended my wife's name when we got married. Railroaders of my day knew me as George Kosinski.
I worked for CN for five years as a switchman, breakman, and conductor, and then for the next 10 years until my resignation in 1989, I worked as a locomotive engineer. With the exception of CN track formerly belonging to B.C. Rail, I've run trains on every subdivision west of Wainwright, Alberta, to the Pacific Ocean, except the stretch from Blue River to Boston Bar in B.C. When I resigned in 1989, I was already becoming alarmed by the dramatic reduction in track maintenance forces taking place and the impending elimination of the caboose. I just completed my first draft of a thorough evaluation of the Transport Canada action plan to address CN safety issues, commonly known as the CN audit report, to which I will henceforth refer simply as the report.
With the few minutes at my disposal, I'd like to highlight some key points and some key omissions in this report.
The phase one report defines the derailment cause “Unknown/Data Not Entered — contributing factor not yet determined” and indicates that this category of derailment tripled from 2000 to 2005, increasing at a faster rate than the total number of derailments. This emphasizes not only the urgency of resolving these unknown factors but the possible need for new investigators, who, with a fresh perspective, may discover significant facts overlooked by previous investigators.
The report states: “Should non-compliance to legislative requirements, or threats to safety be found, Transport Canada takes immediate enforcement action.” While this assertion appears to offer some external safeguards, it is unfortunately not worded strongly enough. It should be made clear that Transport Canada will take enforcement action against any threat to safety, regardless of whether it is or is not in compliance with legislative requirements. If Transport Canada has no authority beyond enforcing compliance with legislative requirements, then either its authority should be expanded or Parliament should step in immediately to legislative prohibition against a specified safety threat.
In the discussions following the 1997 derailment that killed two running trades employees on the Ashcroft subdivision, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Ways Employees national vice-president, Gary Housch, said that CN had eliminated over 50% of its track maintenance forces in the decade preceding this accident, clearly expressing his concern that lack of adequate track inspection forces may have been a contributing factor. Nevertheless, with respect to the activity of having track inspected visually shortly before it is traversed by a train, at least in locations and/or under conditions that reflect a compelling need, chapter 3 of the phase one report on corrective actions offers not even a hint of the possibility of increasing these forces. In fact, of the nine initiatives undertaken by CN Rail listed on page 29, not a single one of them would have prevented this accident, illustrating the dangers of overreliance on technology and underutilization of humans.
In any case, increasing the use of track testing equipment is of limited value when, as the report points out, CN is not using the data obtained from these tests to take necessary actions so that track conditions do not deteriorate to a point where they fall below the track safety rules before the next inspection.
The class system with respect to disciplinary action must be eliminated. Front-line supervisors who pressure employees into unsafe practices should be vulnerable to the same disciplinary procedure of official internal investigations, potentially leading to the awarding of demerits, the accumulation of which may lead to dismissal. Where it can be reasonably established that a contributing factor in an accident is an unsafe practice that appears to be condoned by the highest levels of management, it is not sufficient to fine the corporation, even if the fine is higher than the additional net profit accrued from the unsafe practice. The executives of the corporation must be personally fined as well, just as running trades employees are subject to fines for safety or rule violations undertaken on their own initiatives.
For example, if the recent accident that killed the CP engineer in Trail involved a locomotive not equipped with dynamic brakes, I would regard that as criminal negligence on the part of management.
Page 19 states: “Transport Canada’s Rail Safety Directorate, in conjunction with the Department’s Transportation Development Centre, is currently conducting an information review on operation of long trains.” The intent is to develop terms of reference for a research initiative describing safety impacts and industry best standards and practices associated with long-train operation. In view of the recent spate of derailments, it is simply unacceptable to wait for the results of this review. It is of the utmost importance to take immediate action, not only to protect against potential environmental disasters but also to protect the lives of running trades employees, who should not have to work under conditions where the occasional death of one or more of their members, every once in a while, seems inevitable.
As a temporary measure, until the review is completed, a blanket length restriction should be imposed. Every train on any subdivision between Edson, Alberta, and the west coast should be restricted to a maximum length of 100 cars, with trains carrying any cars containing toxic chemicals restricted to 50 cars and five miles per hour under the speed limit. These restrictions should also apply in mountainous areas in other provinces, as well as on flat track containing many tight curves, and in other locations where permanent or temporary conditions suggest a compelling need.
Perhaps the review will conclude that it would be wise to retain these restrictions permanently. Transport Canada appears to be authorized to enforce such restrictions, but if it isn't or it isn't willing to authorize them, then Parliament should enact legislation to impose these restrictions. If the federal government has the power to force striking rail workers back to work, they should also have the power, and do have the responsibility, to ensure that those workers and the communities to which their trains are travelling are not subjected to dangerously narrow margins of safety.
CN may complain that such restrictions would increase operating costs, but the fact that it paid its CEO $46 million in salary bonuses and stock options in 2005 suggests that it can easily absorb the minor increase in the operating costs.
I would also like to address the issue of rest, which was completely ignored in the report. However, time restrictions prevent me from offering anything more than one brief comment.
The pay structure, as it was constituted in 1989 and perhaps still is, creates a conflict with a desire to obtain adequate rest. A 1983 study carried out by an American presidential study commission condemned the existing pay structure. Its final conclusion was that there is no reason--logical, legal, moral, or otherwise--to perpetuate the present system as it is, for the unborn child and for persons not yet employed. So one might wish to inquire as to whether it is, 24 years later, still being perpetuated.
Thank you.