Transport Committee on May 2nd, 2007

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities. This is meeting number 48 and we are meeting pursuant to the order of reference of Tuesday, November 7, 2006, Bill C-6, An Act to amend the Aeronautics Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts.

Joining us today, from the Canadian Union of Public Employees, we have Mr. Richard Balnis; from Dax Air Inc., we have Kirsten Brazier and Gerry Whalen; and as an individual, Mr. Ken Rubin.

I think everyone has been notified that we open the process with commentary. You have about seven minutes. We'll do all three and then we'll move around the table for questions from the groups here.

With that, I'll start with Mr. Balnis.

[Richard Balnis, Senior Researcher, Air Canada Component, Canadian Union of Public Employees]

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today on behalf of the airline division of CUPE.

You should have all been given a slimmer volume, which is our complete brief, in a tumble edition. The red side is English; the blue side is French. You also have two fatter companion documents in support of our brief. The red is the English only; the blue is the French edition.

The airline division of CUPE represents about 8,500 in-charge flight attendants and flight attendants at six airlines. Along with pilots and our passengers, we are among the first victims when our safety systems fail. Our brief is extensive. I would simply like to give you a quick overview.

Bill C-6 constitutes a revolution in how aviation safety will be addressed in Canada for years to come, as shown on page 1 of our brief. As summarized on pages 2 and 3, we have serious concerns about Bill C-6 and SMS.

We brought these concerns directly to Minister Cannon on November 7, 2006, urging him to retool Bill C-6 for safety before proceeding further. If these key amendments are not made, Bill C-6 cannot proceed, in our view. Our first preference is that the government actually withdraw Bill C-6. But if the government insists on proceeding, we urge you in the strongest possible terms to make the needed amendments to ensure that Bill C-6 is indeed viable and effective legislation that will actually improve aviation safety. Let me explain why this must be done.

First, we address the changing role of Transport Canada's regulatory oversight in an era of SMS in pages 4 to 7 of our submission. Despite efforts to discredit Justice Moshansky and the inspectors' unions, TC oversight of the aviation industry is changing. It is being dismantled today well in advance of aviation SMS being in place. We are only in year two of a three-year implementation plan for large air operators. We are five to twenty years away from when SMS will be fully functional. Professional and dedicated inspectors are there for concern. So is Justice Moshansky. So are flight attendants and pilots.

It is wrong to believe that Bill C-6 compels or requires a diminished role for Transport Canada's oversight and inspectorate under SMS. Rather, it is what the department thinks it can do in the absence of effective parliamentary scrutiny and legislative requirements that is the real issue. We believe we have a fix for your consideration. It is found in our recommendations 1 and 2 on page 7. We offer them for your consideration.

We next address, on pages 8 to 9 of our brief, the myth that the current regulations will remain untouched under SMS. This is the so-called regulatory box the government has been telling you about, the rock upon which the SMS castle is built--it's my fist here. The myth is that SMS is an additional safety layer, the umbrella over my fist. It's supposed to be the hand over the fist. This is too simplistic a view, for two reasons.

First, as the department has already told you, this regulatory box is undergoing tremendous change. On page 8 of our brief, this box will become more performance-based, vaguer, more flexible, and open to interpretation. We give you one recent example on page 9 and in tab 1. This is giving more discretion to air operators and others to decide how they will be safe. The rock is crumbling.

Secondly, what the government and the department have not told you, but witnesses like the Canadian Airports Council have, on page 9, is that the regulatory box will also get smaller. Transport is withdrawing entirely from large areas of setting the safety rules. The rock is disappearing. As the box shrinks, the actual level of safety will be determined more and more by the airlines themselves, using SMS. That's why they are so enthusiastic about it. When we move to the theory, as you can see on pages 10 to 13 of our brief, and as my fist becomes smaller and vaguer, SMS takes over more and more how the industry will run itself. And then the paper over the rock, as in the child's game, and we all know who wins.

That's why you, as our elected politicians, should be concerned. In our view—and we've presented you documents so you can look at it for yourselves, in tabs 2, 3, 4, and 5—we believe Canada's SMS regulations explicitly transfer the determination of the level of safety to the air operator who will decide how to manage their risks, including the level of risk they are willing to accept in their operations. This will be a different risk threshold than one set by Transport Canada.

Transport Canada's speaking points say that SMS is not a deregulation of safety. But it is precisely that, because it has transferred the determination of appropriate risk levels from Transport Canada to the airlines, or from the public interest to the determination and interests of private shareholders.

Beginning on page 12 of our brief, we can show you examples. Fuel requirements are being reduced and replaced with a risk assessment. Management can now use risk assessments to make a conscious decision not to do anything. The level of acceptable risk is being redefined upward.

We give several simple examples. Little flight attendant injuries are no longer being investigated. DEET protection against malaria, once provided to flight attendants, has now disappeared as a result of a management-only risk assessment. That airline has accepted the risk that its flight attendants would get malaria as a cost of doing business.

Please read Justice Moshansky in tab 7, as cited on page 13, where he talks about the emergence of a more permissive, higher-risk-taking environment that contributed directly to the Dryden crash.

Safety costs money, and sometimes managers won't and don't spend it. And they won't have to do that with the elevated risks under SMS.

Can you do anything at this stage, as Parliament? I have here a brochure from Transport Canada. It shows their implementation plan for SMS. It's all in place by 2010, regardless of what you do. The only way you can get Transport Canada to listen is to amend Bill C-6 to make its SMS provisions stronger.

Beginning on page 15, we offer recommendations 3 through 11 to improve the SMS.

Moving on, and mindful of my time and the patience of the chair, the concept of designated organizations has rightfully attracted your attention. We provide our analysis on pages 17 to 19 of our brief. We offer two options for the committee's consideration. But after speaking to the author of tab 10, which is the helicopter study, on Monday, we are learning that whatever Parliament does with this clause, Transport Canada thinks it can delegate these powers without even having to use this designation provision and even if this clause is removed entirely by you. We'll answer more in the question period.

We are also concerned about the encroachment of SMS on our rights under the Canada Labour Code. There is a long analysis on pages 20 to 26. We believe you can make the two pieces of legislation work together. As shown in tab 11, Transport Canada and HRSDC have found the way to do that. Unfortunately, ATAC and the air operators want you to amend the legislation to prevent this.

When it comes to occupational health and safety, flight attendants are beginning to recognize that SMS means “selling out my safety”. We urge you to look at recommendations 17 to 23 to help fix this problem. And on pages 27 to 29, we ask you to look at the issues of immunity and confidentiality. You must disentangle them.

Finally, you must address whistle-blower protection. On page 32 of our brief, Transport Canada cites CAIRS as their answer. CUPE recently used CAIRS to report the operation of an aircraft with less than the legally required number of flight attendants—for us, a serious issue. The report was merely acknowledged. There was no further response or assistance provided. It looks as though the issue was simply given back to the violating airline. There have now been two or three more similar incidents there.

Even if CAIRS worked, it is only half the story. We need the equivalent of U.S. FAA whistle-blower protection, and I have the language here.

I could go on, but I have tried the chair's patience.

As shown on page 42, we need your assistance in the following areas to amend this legislation. We need amendments to Bill C-6 and existing SMS practices to correct deficiency; we need to add whistle-blower protection for employees; we must rescind or limit the powers to self-regulate; you must coordinate Bill C-6 with part II of the code and other legislation; you must revisit excessive confidentiality and secrecy provisions; you should restore our right to flight time limitations; and you must maintain proper safety oversight.

We have offered you 37 recommendations, consolidated at the end of the brief.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear and to present our views. We look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Brazier.

[Kirsten Brazier, President, Operations Manager and Chief Pilot, Dax Air Inc.]

Thank you all for the opportunity to speak here today. We must apologize if it seems we have little documentation to present, for we only recently found out that our request had been granted.

What we offer you is our own experience and frustration in dealing with the present regulatory system.

My name is Kirsten Brazier, and this is my partner, Gerry Whalen. Together we own and operate Dax Air, an air taxi service operating under CAR 703 and an approved maintenance organization. We presently operate a Beech 18 on floats. Our work involves tourism, service to the northern communities, and transporting trades and utility people to remote areas.

We are representative of many small operators located across the country who do similar work, and as we stated in our letter to the committee, we are the most underrepresented and the most affected by Bill C-6.

Prior to starting our company, both my partner and I have had experience in operational management positions, so we are both familiar with navigating through and understanding the regulations. While we feel the CARs were a hand-me-down from 705 and not specifically tailored to 703, the regulations in general are, for the most part, fair and logical. It wasn't until we began the process of certifying both our AMO and air operation, and later doing work for other companies, that we began to see major discrepancies between the CARs and how they were being interpreted and applied by Transport Canada.

In certifying our own company, we wanted a clear and concise set of manuals that met the CAR, the standard we must meet in order to operate. Because the manuals are legal documents, we did not want the extra liability and confusion from unnecessary policies and procedures. We feel there is no such thing as a lesser or greater standard in the CARs. One either meets or does not meet the standard.

Other operators were interested in our approach and asked for our help in ridding themselves of unncessary and excessive policies and procedures in their own manuals.

There seemed to be a general confusion about what the actual standards were. We discovered that individual inspectors in various regions had different interpretations of the regulations and accordingly had differing policies to deal with these interpretations. We discovered that the regulations are not being applied equally and fairly across the system.

When we tried to resolve our concerns as they came up, we discovered a complete lack of due process within Transport Canada. The existing complaint resolution system is ineffective, inaccessible, and lacks an independent arbitrator. We also discovered that there is no protection in place for operators, who are often bullied by individual inspectors, or in some cases departments, to meet individual and regional policies not required by law.

When we started our company, we both agreed we would do our best to abide by the standards and operate safely and responsibly. We knew we were going to have a tough time because of the state of the industry we are in, where cutting corners is common practice. We are all faced with rising costs and a declining market, so to compete, many operators continue to overload their airplanes, cut rates, and push weather, basically getting more done for less.

While this “getting more done for less” philosophy may be attractive to the customer who must pay for the services offered, what the customer doesn't understand is the risk they are taking by supporting this attitude. This only serves to tighten the market further.

As an example, in our second year of operation, Dax Air was faced with this type of choice when one of our customers gave us an ultimatum: either carry the loads he wanted or he would find someone else who would. Since we refused, he found another operator.

We find ourselves in the position that many others have come to: either cut corners to survive and compete or go out of business. While we expected a few challenges in establishing our company and operating principles, we also expected that our doing-it-right approach would be supported by Transport Canada. We have found that this is not the case.

In trying to understand why these conditions exist, we began reaching out to other operators across the country; we discovered there were similar problems in many areas and that others were concerned that nothing was being done. Most of these operators are afraid to come forward for fear of reprisal from Transport Canada. In speaking publicly about these issues, we too are afraid of reprisal, based on our experiences with Transport Canada.

Speaking as a CAR 703 operator, we feel that a safety management system is a valuable business tool. However, given the state of CAR 703 as we described it, we feel there are root problems with 703. Until they are rectified, the air taxi is not ready for SMS. The culture of safety cannot be legislated.

Our research has shown that Transport Canada is using sanitized statistics to support their safety claims, as we pointed out in our letter of April 22. Transport Canada is telling us we have the safest aviation system in the world. They said the same thing ten years ago, in the SATOPS final report, yet many of the same issues discussed in that report continue to exist today.

If we are really concerned about safety and truly want to become the safest country in the world, then we need to start sharing information with a view to discussing and learning from our mistakes. Instead of sanitizing and restricting safety information--such as the service difficulty reports, Transportation Safety Board accident and incident reports, and the CADORS--we need to make this information more accessible in its entirety with industry so we can learn from it.

At present, this information is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain from Transport Canada and the TSB, who continuously cite privacy issues as the reason not to make the information available. As far as we're concerned, the day an operator receives the right to operate and provide services for the public, they become accountable to the public, to the government, to the industry, and to themselves for the way they operate.

In closing, there are many issues we would like to discuss to support our claim, but time being a limiting factor, we have prepared the preceding statement as an issue of priority that we as a 703 operator feel must be addressed. If given a set of clear and concise regulations to follow, if given fair and equitable application of existing regulations by Transport Canada, the industry will, we feel, become safer by default.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you, Ms. Brazier.

Mr. Rubin.

[Ken Rubin, Public Interest Researcher, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

As a public interest researcher and frequent access user, I've spent 25 years battling to get various air safety reports made public, including going all the way to the court of appeal.

My concern is that air safety public reporting is being ambushed and essentially eliminated under Bill C-6. The reasoning is that confidential reporting is needed under a safety management system and therefore officials with airline companies believe they must end having publicly available inspection reports done. This secrecy focus must immediately be challenged and changed in the interests of the public and the travelling public.

If left intact in Bill C-6, the effect is public mistrust in air safety. There will be no more publicly available Air Canada, or WestJet, or any other audits. It will also skew Transportation Safety Board accident reports, and, possibly worse, safety errors, because there is too close a reliance on a confidential reporting relationship between airlines and Transport Canada.

The public's right to know about air safety, from repair maintenance to engine problems to human error, is in jeopardy. Fliers must feel safe on planes and be able to choose the best carrier based on up-to-date reliable information.

It is most serious that Transport Canada opts for a veil of secrecy in our skies, airports, and repair facilities.

Bill C-6, clause 43, places air safety reports in a permanent secrecy category via schedule II, section 24, of the Access to Information Act. It's being placed in the same category as tax information. Even cabinet confidences are only 20 years, and security intelligence information doesn't get exempted forever.

There are exemptions, there are public interest overrides, there are injury tests, but not in this case, and that's wrong.

Section 2 of the Access to Information Act says that the laws of this country are extended to try to open up and disclose information. Section 24, things within the act, eliminates any possibility of ever getting that information.

Part of the study of the accountability act, on which I was a witness, had this very discussion of whether we should have a public interest override section within the Access to Information Act, and even whether section 24 should be abolished. It wasn't, and this is going to be the end result if you go down this path.

Already, the effect of the SMS system is felt on access because I've already been denied the first SMS report on Air Transat done in 2003. I got documents, which were dated November, from Transport Canada. They said that as of then there were already 200 secret SMS investigation reports that the public will never get to see, however serious some of the infractions may be.

I noticed in the committee that the minister and officials came to you and said there were only 100 files. Where are the hundreds of SMS reports? When are they going to be made public?

Dozens of regulatory audits were stopped in their tracks, which I or any member of the public could have applied for, but no, they're gone because they've now been transferred, in part, to SMS. This is a power play of the worst order.

It all sounds familiar to me, though, because back in the 1990s, Transport Canada tried to implement a confidential reporting system in partnership with airlines. But when I discovered that from 1990 to 1994 they had done dozens of these studies with the industry, they immediately, once I applied for them under access and I had given the clerk the cancellation order, cancelled them in October of 1994.

Now Transport Canada has ordered that all public regulatory audits be cancelled so that work can “proceed in confidence”.

The gravity, Mr. Chairman and members, of the changes in Bill C-6 can be further illustrated by another past experience. Transport Canada tried to hide from me another confidential air safety post-accident safety survey for which I had to go all the way, for seven years, to the Federal Court of Appeal, the Nationair report where 14 Canadian crew members and 240 Nigerian Muslim pilgrims lost their lives in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on July 11, 1991. That crash occurred after takeoff and occurred because of an improperly serviced DC-8 Nationair plane.

Transport Canada at the time argued against me that revealing the Nationair report would affect the trust relationship with all airlines and any chance in future of getting confidential materials.

Well, that report, when it was revealed--and I shared it with next of kin and the media--catalogued many serious past maintenance and other deficiencies at Nationair. It also revealed that there were problems known to the regulators well in advance of the crash.

Under Bill C-6, I would never have gained access to the Nationair report. Under Bill C-6's sweeping confidentiality reporting systems, I would never get the reporting system being promoted. I would never get the cockpit tapes from the Swissair crash off the Nova Scotia coast, or any other black box tapes, so crucial for understanding what happened.

There are four fatal myths associated with this 100% confidentiality SMS reporting system that the Harper government and many in the airline industry seem, for some reason, to support, when it's going to come crashing down on them too.

One is that the airline industry will always report and always tell the truth via a confidential voluntary reporting system. I think it was Justice Dubin who destroyed that myth many years ago.

The second assumes that Transport Canada itself will maintain a healthy distance from the industry and will be diligent and always do its enforcement job in secret.

The third myth assumes that there's no need for whistle-blowing provisions because the reputed positive benefits of an immunity-based industry-government cooperative reporting system will eliminate any need for people to tell the truth.

Finally, there's a bit of a myth that there'll be more substantive records created through Transport Canada's changing to this confidential system. It's going to be like check-offs of performance standards, and not what you think is going to be the real substantive material.

The underlying problem, by way of conclusion, is that Transport Canada's minister, under the Aeronautics Act, has a dual role: one part is to protect the public when it comes to air safety and one part is to promote the expansion and commerce associated with the airline industry. In my opinion, the transport minister's primary function under Bill C-6, which should be revised, should be on air safety.

Regular, much improved, substantive, and regular air safety regulatory audits need to be done and released in a timely fashion. Air safety reporting by the industry must be transparent, must be made publicly available in objective government summary form, and must be subject to coverage under access legislation. Whistle-blowing protection guarantees must be incorporated too, under a revised Bill C-6.

Transport Minister Lawrence Cannon cannot claim that he and his officials, as they said in front of the committee, are simply adding, via an industry-government confidential non-punitive SMS reporting system, just another protective layer to improve air safety and are implementing a system far removed from airline self-regulation. Rather, they are attempting to circumvent public scrutiny and abdicating their public regulatory responsibilities.

I wouldn't feel this strongly if I hadn't got the Air Ontario regulatory audit a month after the Dryden air crash, which showed what a poor maintenance record that airline had. If that had been reviewed beforehand under access, maybe those people wouldn't have died. But you know what? Under Bill C-6, I'd never get that kind of stuff.

Bill C-6 needs to be seriously amended to bring in proactive disclosure policies and tougher air safety inspection and enforcement reporting to Transport Canada.

Thank you, members.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you, Mr. Rubin.

I'll go to Mr. Volpe, who is going to share his time with Mr. Valley.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, witnesses.

It's certainly a different approach that we have to the issue today. I would summarize it by saying that you've come as close as anybody to saying that the entire exercise is one effort at misleading the public and this committee, but those are my words; I know they're not yours.

I'm going to split my time with Mr. Valley, but I want to ask you, Mr. Rubin, if this bill would be acceptable if the privacy provisions were eliminated. That's number one.

Second, I know you've said this already, but I just want to make sure I heard you correctly. You are skeptical, to say the least. Do you not believe that a voluntary reporting system will enhance a culture of safety and reporting that currently does not exist?

[Ken Rubin]

I remember I did cross-examine one of the previous Transport Canada officials on that subject. So this is not something new. I certainly agree that by way of prevention, the relationship with the airline industry, to try to prevent and educate so that accidents don't happen and best practices are done, is important, but so are regulatory indicators and enforcement of them. So if anything, there should be a duality.

To transfer all your beanies to one system, and to expect everybody to behave.... Listen, they're trying certain things in the food inspection industry where they have delegated certain things to the industry, but CFIA hasn't said they would make all their reports secret. This particular regime goes so much overboard that it creates a problem. If they don't realize that, if they did this risk assessment internally they'd say there's not much of a risk if they do it this way.

I think when the first accident happens and people start raising questions, when they see the first Transportation Safety Board report with “blank, blank, blank”, like some security intelligence report, they're going to wonder what's going on here. Why can't the public know what happened with this particular airline?

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Mr. Valley.

[Roger Valley, Liberal, Kenora, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for allowing me to be part of the committee. Thank you to the presenters.

It's already been repeated a couple of times about the Moshansky report and the tragedy that happened in Dryden. Dryden is my home town. Being at the scene shortly after that accident was nothing compared to 10 years later when I had the opportunity, as mayor of the community, to participate in a memorial service with the survivors. That was something I'll never forget. So we want to do everything we can to avoid those incidents.

Very quickly, I happened to meet Ms. Brazier and Mr. Whalen in the middle of 2,500 square miles of some of the roughest and most beautiful country in Canada--the middle of my riding. When people are coming from the edge of the frontier--and we have very few frontiers left--to tell us there's a problem, we should be listening.

My question for you, Ms. Brazier, is this. You've spoken about the network across Canada, and you mentioned the number of people involved--574 operators in your category. I'm wondering if you could tell us what you are hearing from the operators right across Canada whom you know and contact in your network.

[Kirsten Brazier]

Along the lines of what I presented in our letter, many people are afraid to come forward and speak about these kinds of things. I can't say for all of Canada that absolutely everybody agrees with us. I think the industry, even those that are a problem in our industry, would agree there's a problem, which is a bit of an odd state to be in, unfortunately.

I think the most important thing on people's minds is safety. I think the information that was previously being shared under the CADORS system before it got all locked up, and now is meted out to us daily in a batch, is absolutely useless for consolidating and analyzing information. It's sad. I think Mr. Rubin was talking about privacy issues, but this safety information needs to be shared. I think people are willing to learn from the mistakes of others. I think they're willing to learn from these accidents. The information isn't being made available to us, which is unfortunate. I think a lot of operators would like to operate legally; they would like to operate safely.

The same issues that we are faced with are the problems. Everybody around us is cutting rates, cutting corners. It's very difficult for somebody to put their standards on the line and suffer the cost. It's very difficult to invest all your money in a dream and have it sacrificed by those around you, and you're not willing to compromise your standards, so you have no choice left.

[Roger Valley, Liberal, Kenora, ON]

Thank you.

In the short time I have left, I wanted to point out where you serve. You serve in a very remote part of Canada. So it's not a problem just in the remote sites or the end-of-the-road towns like Red Lake or Sioux Lookout or Pickle Lake. It's a problem in the urban areas too, that are served by some of the same operators?

[Kirsten Brazier]

My partner and I have worked all across Canada in various areas, and the people we are talking to are in areas all over Canada. We just happen to be speaking as operators in the Red Lake area. This is not a Red Lake problem. This is a Canada-wide problem in our system. Unfortunately, again, with the fear of reprisal from Transport Canada, people are just not willing to take the risk that we've taken here today. We took that risk because we believe in what we're saying, and we hope that by doing this others will come forward. But that's not for us to say.

[Roger Valley, Liberal, Kenora, ON]

On behalf of the riding and the rural nature of the riding, I want to thank you and the people who are actually out there doing the work to bring these issues forward. So thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Monsieur Laframboise.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for your presentations. In the short time I have, I will ask each of you a question. I will start with Mr. Balnis.

First, Mr. Balnis, you have done a very detailed analysis of the Bill and I thank you for that because it will be very helpful to us. Going to page 24 of your report, you state that in February 2007 a Transport Canada SMS inspector tried to stop an investigation.

Could you summarize what happened and tell us what would be the significance of the changes you request in the context of that case?

[Richard Balnis]

We had a particular flight in November. Four flight attendants were injured in turbulence. The airline, in particular Air Canada, did not conduct a lawful investigation under the code and did not provide complete information. We therefore filed a complaint with the safety officer in Vancouver. The safety officer promised to issue a ruling. Nothing was coming forward until we phoned the safety officer's replacement, who said, “I have been told not to continue with my investigation.” We then tracked down the person who was told and raised it with him, and then we raised it with other people in Transport Canada. The investigation was concluded. A direction was then issued. Those are the basic facts.

What is amazing is that in doing the SMS assessment, they told the Transport Canada safety officer to stop doing his investigation under the code. That is exactly why we are so fearful--on page 24--and why we need your help to make sure that the code and the Aeronautics Act and the other legislation can fit together to do all their jobs. It's not one over the other; it's making them work together.

That is all I can say at this point. Hopefully, I've answered your question.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Thank you, this is very helpful.

Mrs. Brazier, you stated at the end of your presentation that you would like to have clear regulations that would be uniformly implemented. Your concern seems to be that Transport Canada has already started implementing the SMS. So, this Bill will not help you at all, will it?

Is that your message today?

[Kirsten Brazier]

Yes, it is. Our difficulty with the present system is that if you go to Vancouver or Saint John, or if you go to Victoria or Red Lake, you should have an equal and fair interpretation of the regulations. Right now what's happening is that each little area and each inspector have their own interpretation, which involves the creation of policy to, I guess, enforce it with the carriers.

When you have a system where the regulations are no longer clear, the law is no longer the law. It becomes policy that differs from one corner of the country to the other. Now you have a system of more paper that is subject to more interpretation and a lot of other things.

I think we're going in the wrong direction. I think we need to take the time to resolve the problems so that we have a firm base on which to add additional layers of safety or whatever comes about in the future.

I don't know if that answers your—

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Thank you.

Mr. Rubin, you are absolutely convinced that the Bill will deprive you of your access to information. I know that you have done excellent work in the past to inform the public about important accidents and I commend you for that. What you are telling us is that if the Bill is passed as drafted, without any changes, you will not be able anymore to make information public in order to inform Canadians as you have done in the past. Is that your concern?

[Ken Rubin]

Yes, it is.

I think there's a bit of a misunderstanding, because you have to really understand what clause 43 of Bill C-6 means. You have to turn back to section 24 of the Access to Information Act. What you have in the Access to Information Act are the principles of the act; then people can apply, and there's a set of exemptions, sections 12 to 26. There's commercial confidentiality and there's policy advice. Section 24 says, listen, there are certain statutory provisions passed by Parliament--and this would be one of them--confidentiality provisions within the statute, as laid out in clause 43, including the confidential reporting system, the tape system, the military plane system, and the medical doctor system, which I have less of a problem with. Those things are statutory confidentiality prohibitions that are to be totally excluded from the act. There's no injury test, there's no time limit, and there's no public interest override possible, because they fall within that section.

That's a lot different from putting in the checks and balances. I get...regulatory audits whether I agree or not. I've appealed on some, where there are commercial confidentiality citations or there's personal information or whatever. At least I get a separate report; I don't get nothing. Maybe that's fine in terms of income tax material, but in safety matters, no, it's not fine. That's what I object to. Put it under the ordinary provisions of the act.

They're putting this up God-like on a pedestal and saying confidentiality is so important, we're obsessed so much with it, trust will break down. It's not true. I've see many an access request where initially the parties have a confidentiality agreement, or claim they do, but under the Access to Information Act it isn't the case because there are other provisions that take precedence.

Really, in the end, that full and frank discussion can still occur and things can be done. But to say right from the start, sweep it away and we'll never hear anything any more, ever, is just a touch too much, so to speak.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Mr. Julian.

[Peter Julian, NDP, Burnaby—New Westminster, BC]

I'd like to thank you all for coming forward today.

These are, along with those of Justice Moshansky and the Canadian Federal Pilots Association, the best presentations we've heard on Bill C-6.

We've had two types of presentations. We've had ones about the much more profound operating concerns you've all raised today, and they're much more in depth. We've had some presentations that are very theoretical, as you mentioned, Mr. Balnis, ones that simply talk in theory about SMS. But every single in-depth presentation has criticized this government's reckless bent to diminish air safety, and it's a matter of concern to us. Thank you for being so detailed.

I would like to come back to the issue of inspectors and ask you this, Mr. Balnis, because we've had some playing fast and loose with figures around flight inspections within the Canadian airline industry. The government unfortunately made a kind of mistake this week in publishing a moving-forward document where they actually talk about an attrition rate of 32% to 50% over the next few years. I think they obviously have confirmed what everybody has been raising as a major concern, that we are lowering the number of inspectors and lowering the surveillance around safety. Do you have any comments about inspections, inspectors, and the attrition rate that is so clearly identified in this document this week?

[Richard Balnis]

I think the attrition rate is well known from witnesses, but the issue this committee has not explored—and I've attended most of these hearings—is actually looking at the budget. When Mr. Grégoire testified here, I was very surprised that a department would not know how many inspectors it had in 1992. They couldn't give the comparison with what Justice Moshansky said was 1,400, and we have an inspectorate of about 800-plus for the last five years.

What I'm concerned about is that you haven't asked for future projections. The future projections I've heard.... I was part of a briefing back in February 2006 at which I asked specifically for a presentation on the reorganization. The person presenting it from Transport Canada had a slide show that they presented, and the slide that was most alarming to me indicated that they were anticipating a 46% retirement rate. They then were projecting—this was in 2006—a minus 1% budget cut for each of the next three years, and then minus 5% projected for 2008-09. I said, “Give me that slide”, and they said, of course you're not going to get that slide, but we are proposing this; we are planning with this. And they said, “With the election of the Conservative government, it may be worse.”

It is on that basis, looking forward, that I am very concerned that you have not gotten into the meat of the numbers. The closest you've come to is 140. You should ask for that slide, which gave management's projections of what they're going to have to deal with going forward, because I think that is the issue that needs to be looked at by this committee.