Thank you for the opportunity to appear today on behalf of the airline division of CUPE.
You should have all been given a slimmer volume, which is our complete brief, in a tumble edition. The red side is English; the blue side is French. You also have two fatter companion documents in support of our brief. The red is the English only; the blue is the French edition.
The airline division of CUPE represents about 8,500 in-charge flight attendants and flight attendants at six airlines. Along with pilots and our passengers, we are among the first victims when our safety systems fail. Our brief is extensive. I would simply like to give you a quick overview.
Bill C-6 constitutes a revolution in how aviation safety will be addressed in Canada for years to come, as shown on page 1 of our brief. As summarized on pages 2 and 3, we have serious concerns about Bill C-6 and SMS.
We brought these concerns directly to Minister Cannon on November 7, 2006, urging him to retool Bill C-6 for safety before proceeding further. If these key amendments are not made, Bill C-6 cannot proceed, in our view. Our first preference is that the government actually withdraw Bill C-6. But if the government insists on proceeding, we urge you in the strongest possible terms to make the needed amendments to ensure that Bill C-6 is indeed viable and effective legislation that will actually improve aviation safety. Let me explain why this must be done.
First, we address the changing role of Transport Canada's regulatory oversight in an era of SMS in pages 4 to 7 of our submission. Despite efforts to discredit Justice Moshansky and the inspectors' unions, TC oversight of the aviation industry is changing. It is being dismantled today well in advance of aviation SMS being in place. We are only in year two of a three-year implementation plan for large air operators. We are five to twenty years away from when SMS will be fully functional. Professional and dedicated inspectors are there for concern. So is Justice Moshansky. So are flight attendants and pilots.
It is wrong to believe that Bill C-6 compels or requires a diminished role for Transport Canada's oversight and inspectorate under SMS. Rather, it is what the department thinks it can do in the absence of effective parliamentary scrutiny and legislative requirements that is the real issue. We believe we have a fix for your consideration. It is found in our recommendations 1 and 2 on page 7. We offer them for your consideration.
We next address, on pages 8 to 9 of our brief, the myth that the current regulations will remain untouched under SMS. This is the so-called regulatory box the government has been telling you about, the rock upon which the SMS castle is built--it's my fist here. The myth is that SMS is an additional safety layer, the umbrella over my fist. It's supposed to be the hand over the fist. This is too simplistic a view, for two reasons.
First, as the department has already told you, this regulatory box is undergoing tremendous change. On page 8 of our brief, this box will become more performance-based, vaguer, more flexible, and open to interpretation. We give you one recent example on page 9 and in tab 1. This is giving more discretion to air operators and others to decide how they will be safe. The rock is crumbling.
Secondly, what the government and the department have not told you, but witnesses like the Canadian Airports Council have, on page 9, is that the regulatory box will also get smaller. Transport is withdrawing entirely from large areas of setting the safety rules. The rock is disappearing. As the box shrinks, the actual level of safety will be determined more and more by the airlines themselves, using SMS. That's why they are so enthusiastic about it. When we move to the theory, as you can see on pages 10 to 13 of our brief, and as my fist becomes smaller and vaguer, SMS takes over more and more how the industry will run itself. And then the paper over the rock, as in the child's game, and we all know who wins.
That's why you, as our elected politicians, should be concerned. In our view—and we've presented you documents so you can look at it for yourselves, in tabs 2, 3, 4, and 5—we believe Canada's SMS regulations explicitly transfer the determination of the level of safety to the air operator who will decide how to manage their risks, including the level of risk they are willing to accept in their operations. This will be a different risk threshold than one set by Transport Canada.
Transport Canada's speaking points say that SMS is not a deregulation of safety. But it is precisely that, because it has transferred the determination of appropriate risk levels from Transport Canada to the airlines, or from the public interest to the determination and interests of private shareholders.
Beginning on page 12 of our brief, we can show you examples. Fuel requirements are being reduced and replaced with a risk assessment. Management can now use risk assessments to make a conscious decision not to do anything. The level of acceptable risk is being redefined upward.
We give several simple examples. Little flight attendant injuries are no longer being investigated. DEET protection against malaria, once provided to flight attendants, has now disappeared as a result of a management-only risk assessment. That airline has accepted the risk that its flight attendants would get malaria as a cost of doing business.
Please read Justice Moshansky in tab 7, as cited on page 13, where he talks about the emergence of a more permissive, higher-risk-taking environment that contributed directly to the Dryden crash.
Safety costs money, and sometimes managers won't and don't spend it. And they won't have to do that with the elevated risks under SMS.
Can you do anything at this stage, as Parliament? I have here a brochure from Transport Canada. It shows their implementation plan for SMS. It's all in place by 2010, regardless of what you do. The only way you can get Transport Canada to listen is to amend Bill C-6 to make its SMS provisions stronger.
Beginning on page 15, we offer recommendations 3 through 11 to improve the SMS.
Moving on, and mindful of my time and the patience of the chair, the concept of designated organizations has rightfully attracted your attention. We provide our analysis on pages 17 to 19 of our brief. We offer two options for the committee's consideration. But after speaking to the author of tab 10, which is the helicopter study, on Monday, we are learning that whatever Parliament does with this clause, Transport Canada thinks it can delegate these powers without even having to use this designation provision and even if this clause is removed entirely by you. We'll answer more in the question period.
We are also concerned about the encroachment of SMS on our rights under the Canada Labour Code. There is a long analysis on pages 20 to 26. We believe you can make the two pieces of legislation work together. As shown in tab 11, Transport Canada and HRSDC have found the way to do that. Unfortunately, ATAC and the air operators want you to amend the legislation to prevent this.
When it comes to occupational health and safety, flight attendants are beginning to recognize that SMS means “selling out my safety”. We urge you to look at recommendations 17 to 23 to help fix this problem. And on pages 27 to 29, we ask you to look at the issues of immunity and confidentiality. You must disentangle them.
Finally, you must address whistle-blower protection. On page 32 of our brief, Transport Canada cites CAIRS as their answer. CUPE recently used CAIRS to report the operation of an aircraft with less than the legally required number of flight attendants—for us, a serious issue. The report was merely acknowledged. There was no further response or assistance provided. It looks as though the issue was simply given back to the violating airline. There have now been two or three more similar incidents there.
Even if CAIRS worked, it is only half the story. We need the equivalent of U.S. FAA whistle-blower protection, and I have the language here.
I could go on, but I have tried the chair's patience.
As shown on page 42, we need your assistance in the following areas to amend this legislation. We need amendments to Bill C-6 and existing SMS practices to correct deficiency; we need to add whistle-blower protection for employees; we must rescind or limit the powers to self-regulate; you must coordinate Bill C-6 with part II of the code and other legislation; you must revisit excessive confidentiality and secrecy provisions; you should restore our right to flight time limitations; and you must maintain proper safety oversight.
We have offered you 37 recommendations, consolidated at the end of the brief.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear and to present our views. We look forward to your questions.