I understand. That leads me to my second question. The committee had an opportunity to take a close look at the safety management system for air transportation. I see that you used Air Transat as an example. Representatives from ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, told us during their testimony that a safety management system must not replace Transport Canada's inspection and oversight. That coincides with the recommendations you make in your report. The objective is to create a culture of safety.
Of course, the situation for air transportation is not the same as it is for rail. After all, once an aircraft has taken off, its highway is the air, whereas a train travels on thousands of kilometres of track. On page 67 of your report, you say:
It has been nearly seven years since railways have been required to implement SMS. While progress has certainly been made, in the Panel’s opinion, the implementation of SMS across the rail transportation system and by the regulator has been inconsistent. The Panel expected that, after so many years, both the regulator and the industry would have made more progress.
Your observation is blunt: after seven years of SMS, you expected more progress than has actually been made. That concerned us with air transportation and it also concerns us with rail. We do not feel, in fact, that there is enough staff to oversee the SMS and to do the required inspections.
In your report, you say that Transport Canada should attach more importance to overseeing performance than to inspections. The fact remains that thousands of kilometres of track have to be inspected. If Transport Canada is not capable of taking on this oversight through inspections on the ground, how are we to be sure that the safety management system is operating perfectly on every stretch of track?