Yes, indeed. Thank you, Chair. I will certainly confine my comments to that. I may drift into some policy reasons on why one is one way and one is the other, of necessity, just to backfill.
But in my understanding, as I look at both L-3 and G-4, starting with L-3, it of course picks up on that point made by some of the witnesses that there ought to be a contractual nexus, if I can put it that way, right across the board, universally, with these claims by suppliers and either the owner or the owner's representative. That is picked up in the first words that appear in L-3, as proposed by Mr. Volpe.
That is absent, sir, in G-4. G-4 takes a different focus. It, too, recognizes that in the interests of transparency and to have perhaps a tighter lien, if I could put it that way, from a legal point of view, it picks up on the points that were also made by the witnesses, the industry witnesses, which was that the problem appeared to be with the provisions of two kinds of services: stevedoring and lighterage.
It was explained to the committee that stevedoring is basically--I think it's well known--moving cargo on and off a ship. Lightering is the same thing, but it's from a ship that's tied at a buoy, for example. You “lighter” it, or take cargo off and bring it to shore or move it to another vessel on a transshipment. But it's the same breed of service, if I could put it that way.
G-4 concentrates on that, so instead of putting the general exception of the contractual nexus into proposed subsection 139(2) as written, it chooses to put it in proposed subsection 139(2.1). That's difference number one.
There is another difference, which perhaps Mr. Volpe would assist us with in telling us about the choice of words that he has indicated in L-3 in proposed paragraph 139(2)(a) where it says “relating to goods” etc. Now, there is no amendment to that, of course, in G-4, as there was none intended, but if you look at the original text, that is to say, proposed paragraph 139(2)(a) as we now have it in Bill C-7, the language is “in respect of goods”.
First of all, I think there's a difference between something that relates to something, and something that's “in respect of”. That's my view. But in any event, I need to point out to the committee that proposed paragraphs 139(2)(a) and (b) very carefully pick up the language from paragraphs 22(2)(m) and (n) of the Federal Court Act, where what we call the necessaries, the mens provisions, are found, that is to say, the suppliers of goods, repairs, and vessels.