All right.
I regret to inform you that TC aviation inspectors now spend more time pushing paper than inspecting airplanes. With the introduction of aviation SMS, Transport Canada has systematically dismantled the key components of its prudent surveillance program in contravention of ICAO requirements to evaluate and inspect an operator's procedures and practices at least once a year, augmented by periodic random inspections. Transport Canada cancelled enforcement action in 2006. There has not been a single enforcement action against a large commercial air carrier in two years, despite Transport Canada's being aware of serious violations of safety regulations. You can find those at tab 3.
The national audit program was cancelled in March 2006, and Transport Canada quit conducting pilot proficiency checks in 2007. As a result, there are now unqualified pilots and pilots with expired licences operating aircraft in Canada. I'll refer you to correspondence at tab 6 for one example, and there are more. In addition, TC has delegated licensing and oversight of entire segments of the aviation industry to lobby groups like the Canadian Business Aviation Association, and that is in direct defiance of our international aviation safety obligations.
Most recently, the requirement for operational inspections on a mandatory frequency was cancelled in January of this year. Instead of regular and comprehensive inspections, Transport Canada inspectors simply conduct paper reviews of company safety management systems and follow up with superficial on-site validation of the paperwork. With SMS, we are simply not watching.
Because of the shortness of time, I will relate only three examples of airlines that have broken safety rules while we were not watching. These examples point to systematic problems with SMS. Under normal circumstances, a reliance on assessing and evaluating management systems, rather than actual aviation operations, means that Transport Canada aviation inspectors do not see these incidents. Each of these examples documents incidents that would put lives at risk.
The first example relates to an application for a flight permit. I refer you to tab 8 of the “Book of Documents”. This is an application to modify a passenger-carrying airplane. In this case they had fuel capacity in order to travel distances far exceeding its normal maximum range. This was to include a temporary installation of a high-frequency radio. The operators applied to TC, promising that the installation met all requirements and regulations. Under SMS, an inspector's job is to review this application and sign off that the paperwork is in order, nothing else. As you can see on the next slide, the installation fell far short of the paper promises. The electrical installation is held together with masking tape. Under SMS, this clearly dangerous installation slips under Transport Canada's radar because we're not watching. Slide 5 shows that the power feed had been improperly hot-wired through the instrument panel, and that's a potential for an electric short. Slide 6 is an example of the use of illegal parts.
Under the SMS, TC inspectors no longer conduct pilot proficiency checks. Companies check their own pilots. For inspectors this has closed an important window on flight operations, especially since TC's policy is to replace audits and inspections with paper reviews. This image was taken by an inspector who stumbled upon this plane. Through a combination of extraordinary circumstances this inspector conducted a pilot check ride. When he saw the condition of the airplane, he refused to fly in it. As you can see, the bolts used to attach the wing to the fuselage are clearly not intended for this purpose and could potentially fail as a result of the stress they are not designed to withstand. The inspector also found parts anyone can buy at Canadian Tire improperly installed in this airplane's electrical system. This airplane is not safe to fly, yet it has carried passengers in this condition, all because its state of disrepair was not visible through an assessment of this company's SMS.
Shouldn't TC's oversight be adequate enough to ensure planes in this condition are not allowed to fly?
The next example I will describe is chilling in its similarity to the crash of the Air Ontario jet that killed 24 people 20 years ago at Dryden, Ontario, a seminal event in Canadian aviation that led to a full inquiry and the rewriting of Canadian aviation regulations. On October 9, 2009, Air Canada flight 271, with passengers and crew, diverted to Grand Forks, North Dakota, due to the closure of the Winnipeg airport. This led to a series of life-threatening decisions that could easily have resulted in tragedy. The first breach of the regulations occurred when the aircraft was refueled with engines running while the passengers were still on board. Why would the captain allow such a dangerous procedure that contravenes the CARs? It turns out the airplane was dispatched without having the equipment necessary to restart the engines in working order. These were the same circumstances that caused the captain of the ill-fated Air Ontario airplane to take off from Dryden airport without de-icing. Second, even after being advised by a passenger, who was also an airline captain, that the jet's wings were contaminated by ice, the Air Canada pilot decided to take off anyway. In effect, he was acting as a test pilot, with crew and passengers on board.
We know about this nearly disastrous incident because of the passenger report that came to me personally. In the words of the pilot passenger, “Is this how Canadian operators are allowed to operate? Where's the regulatory enforcement required to keep the travelling public safe? Why were my fellow passengers and I subject to such illegal and unnecessary risk?”
Transport Canada's response was to let Air Canada's SMS handle it. This was in spite of the fact that the corrective action Air Canada put in place two years ago following a de-icing incident obviously failed. We have steadily lost track of aviation safety as a result of TC's SMS. These examples show an industry that is taking decisions and adopting practices that are endangering the public while we're not watching. Isn't it time someone stepped in to safeguard the public? Wouldn't it be better to have the next full-scale inquiry into the state of aviation safety before a major accident, not afterwards?
Some members of this committee regularly travel to Winnipeg, so this is personal. We travel the same skies. I want to assure you that I personally brought details of these examples to the attention of the senior management of Transport Canada. The decision to freeze the rollout of the safety management system for 703 and 704 operators is good news, but it highlights concerns about the safety of all air carriers for which SMS is a requirement. The problem this decision acknowledges undermines the safety of the big airlines, which carry the vast majority of travellers. We no longer are confident that the major carriers are compliant with safety regulations. To address the current situation, we recommend a number of critical measures that I would be pleased to address. They are in the document I handed out.
Thank you.