Transport Committee on April 20th, 2010

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Given the delays we are seeing...

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Merci, Monsieur Laframboise.

Mr. Bevington.

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thanks to the witnesses for coming here today.

In retrospect, what we saw in the events in December was a failure of communication on the part of intelligence agencies in dealing with a particular individual. It is clear through the evidence that this individual had been identified. Really, this whole situation in December could have been prevented by the sharing of information and intelligence on that particular individual.

Is that your assessment of the situation as well?

[Kevin McGarr]

From the limited knowledge I have of it, I don't disagree with your statement.

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

So now we've made decisions about technology, about increasing our physical search infrastructure on a particular pre-screening line at the airports, for a threat that really could have been solved by intelligence. We made a decision to protect through technology, whereas, really, the threat occurred because of a failure to share information.

So I'm just wondering, in order to understand how to spend our resources in order to provide safety and security at the airports, what's your threat assessment process?

[Kevin McGarr]

The first point I'd like to make is that the testing, utilization, and integration of imaging technology into the security screening environment was under way well in advance of the events of December 25.

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

But our minister said in a statement after the event that he was up all night making a decision about implementing this technology. That doesn't sound like something that was well planned or well thought out. It sounds like something that was done at the very last moment--to decide to buy the equipment and install it over the Christmas season.

Where was the threat assessment out of the particular incident so that the decision-makers could understand where the threat was coming from and make qualified decisions about the implementation of very intrusive technology into this particular security line?

[Kevin McGarr]

I certainly cannot speak for the minister, but I do want to repeat that we had been testing this technology with Transport Canada since 2008. We do believe...and the threat assessments that have been conducted do identify the existence of non-metallic objects that could be a threat to aviation security. We recognize that the options for detecting non-metallic threats require either a physical search of the passenger or the use of imaging technology. We have--

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

Okay. Of those two choices you had, which, in the end, is more likely to show the non-metallic object on a person: a personal search or the particular body scanner that you picked? Which is more certain to come up with the answer that you want?

[Kevin McGarr]

Personally, I believe they have an equal opportunity to detect a non-metallic threat on a person's body. The--

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

I'm sorry to interrupt, but we only have about a minute left, and I have a lot of questions. I could spend hours talking to you, I'm sure.

Let's roll back a bit to 9/11, when the incident happened that changed the nature of aviation security. Access to the cockpit was changed. When you changed the access to the cockpit, you made very strict rules about access to the cockpit. Did you go back and reassess what you're doing with aviation security based on the fact that the access to the cockpit is denied? Has that been done?

[Kevin McGarr]

We have participated in threat assessment exercises, through Transport Canada and security agencies within the government, that have been done subsequent to the hardening of the cockpit doors. That is exact.

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

What was the conclusion drawn from those threat assessments? Did the threat of taking over a plane and creating a weapon from a plane change at that point in time?

[Kevin McGarr]

The threat did change once the cockpit doors were hardened, but there are--

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

Did that play out in your security development from that point on? Did you then say, okay, we have a different situation here, so how do we approach security now? Is that the process you followed?

[Kevin McGarr]

As the environment changes, that environment is considered when doing threat analysis, absolutely, and we have changed our approach. Every time new technologies or new security measures are put in place and the dynamic changes, our response changes appropriately.

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

So did you then consider that knives and guns and small metal objects... Once you hardened the access to the cockpit, did that change the nature of the threat with those particular small metal objects? If you can't take over the plane, you can't create the situation that you had with 9/11.

[Kevin McGarr]

Within our mandate, the security screening that is done by CATSA screening officers is to interdict items that are on a prohibited items list from entering the restricted area. Knives and objects like that are still on that list and it is still our mandate to interdict the entry of those items into the restricted area.

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

So a pair of scissors is an important item to you in terms of your threat assessment once the cockpit doors were hardened; is that still correct? I'm just trying to understand the rationale. We went through a process with 9/11 where we had a knee-jerk reaction to aviation security.

Now what we need to do is understand how to spend our money to ensure that we do have a safe system, and I just want to understand that threat assessment. When you change things, do you go back and look at what you're doing?

[Kevin McGarr]

We certainly look at the operational impacts of it. We do not make up the list of prohibited items. That is done by Transport Canada. We operate within the regulatory framework that Transport Canada has put in place, and within that framework, if CATSA is instructed to interdict certain objects from entering the restricted area—

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

You're really not responsible, then, for threat assessment--

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you. I have to end it there.

Mr. Richards.

[Blake Richards, Conservative, Wild Rose, AB]

Thank you so much for being here today to share your expertise in this particular area.

It is a well-known fact that air traffic in Canada has declined significantly in the last 10 years or so. It isn't much of a coincidence that the steepest plunge in that frequency of air traffic occurred in the year following September 11, 2001, with the terror attacks that took place on that day.

I guess that trend has only recently started to show some signs of recovery, but we're still nowhere near the totals from before 2001. I'm sure the recent volcanic activity has not done anything to improve that either, but September 11 really was a game changer for the world in many ways, not the least of which was for our aviation system and the security that surrounds it.

Restoring the confidence of Canadians in air travel has meant that as governments we've had to respond with new comprehensive security measures and other measures to counter the reality we face from terrorist threats. I think Canadians have two concerns when they're going through airport security. One of those is in regard to ensuring that they are safe and feel safe on the airplane they are about to board. The other one is that they often face long lineups at security, and they want to make sure that, in ensuring their safety, they're not unduly delayed.

I think some of the most recent measures taken to deal with both of those issues would include the full body scanners that are being installed at the major airports and the development of passenger behavioural programs to identify suspicious or erratic behaviours. I'm wondering if you could speak to those two measures.

First, in your opinion, what is the effectiveness of the full body scanners and of the observation of individual behaviour? Secondly, how much better do the two measures work when they're used in concert? Do you see any weakness inherent in one of the measures that's sufficiently covered off by the strengths of the other measure?

[Kevin McGarr]

Thank you.

First, with respect to the full body scanners, the full body scanners have proven to be an extremely effective technology for detecting items on a person. The alternative, or the primary method, of detecting non-metallic threats has always been a physical search. The introduction of the full body scanners has been brought forward in order that passengers may choose.

The use of the scanners is 100% voluntary. Passengers have the choice between submitting to a physical pat-down search or using the technology. The reception of the technology by the travelling public has been very positive.

The vast majority of Canadian passengers prefer using the technology to a physical search. They find it less invasive, especially in the manner in which we have integrated the technology into our screening operations, whereby the person viewing the image has no opportunity to see the person related to that image, and the officer at the screening portal who sees the passenger has no access to the image of that passenger, which is being monitored in a separate room out of the view of the passenger.

So we feel that the technology is very effective and that the way it is being used is being very well received by the travelling public and has increased the level of comfort and efficiency of our operations.

With respect to passenger behaviour observation, we have undertaken the development of a passenger behaviour observation program with a firm specializing in this area. We believe this will allow us the opportunity to identify passengers who demonstrate indicators that they wish to deceive the security screening process, and it will allow us to ensure that these passengers receive the secondary screening measures currently in place, be it the physical search or, if they choose, the use of the full body scanner. Again, it will be their choice.

Using these technologies in concert allows us to be far more efficient in the allocation of resources, and we'll do that without giving away an iota of the effectiveness of the security screening. In my opinion, the full body scanner is just as effective as the physical search conducted by a screening officer. Joining the two programs will allow us to be more efficient without losing any effectiveness--we will actually gain effectiveness--and will increase the comfort of Canadians travelling with our air transport system.

[Blake Richards, Conservative, Wild Rose, AB]

I'm glad you touched on the aspect of a choice between the searches and a full body scanner, because that's an important element of this. It certainly is a measure our government brought forward to try to make sure we're providing security but also decreasing delays.

But there are obviously some privacy concerns around the full body scanners, which I think you've addressed quite well in your comments, certainly in regard to the fact that there is a choice for people to go with that method or the others, and then with some of the safety mechanisms built into it, such as you've outlined, to ensure privacy. That's important. I'm glad you outlined that.