Good morning. Bonjour.
I'd like to thank the committee for the invitation to appear before you today about Bill C-42, an act to amend the Aeronautics Act. I am joined today by Khalid Elgazzar, a member of the board of directors of the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations, or CAIR-CAN. CAIR-CAN is a national not-for-profit grassroots organization that continues to work, as it has for over 10 years now, to empower Canadian Muslims in the fields of human rights and civil liberties, education and outreach, and public advocacy.
Since the tragic events of 9/11, Canada has understandably placed a greater emphasis on public safety and national security. However, in some circumstances those measures were implemented at the expense of fundamental human and privacy rights.
For reasons we will explore, many Canadian Muslims have particular concerns regarding how the introduction of new security regimes seems to have had a disproportionate impact on members of our communities.
On its surface, Bill C-42 appears innocuous enough, consisting as it does of only two clauses with a single purpose: to permit airlines flying over a foreign country to share certain information with that country when required to do so by its laws, an act that is currently prohibited under Canadian privacy laws.
However, in our view Bill C-42 raises a number of serious concerns that we hope this committee and Parliament will address. Chief among these concerns is the potential impact that the secure flight program will have on Canada's sovereignty and on the protection of the privacy and human rights of its citizens. We've all seen from past cases how the lack of controls, caveats, or protections set on information shared with the United States has had disastrous consequences on the lives and livelihoods of Canadian citizens.
Finally, we are also concerned that the regime Bill C-42 would have airlines feed information into is one that lacks an adequate system of redress in the case of error or abuse.
With respect to the potential impact on sovereignty, Bill C-42, as it is currently written, will effectively cede the right of Canada to determine who is or is not permitted to travel to and from this country. An internal Public Safety document obtained under the Access to Information Act and publicized in January of this year stated: It is possible that Canadians overflying the United States could be denied boarding based on U.S. no-fly lists that were developed based on a lower U.S. risk tolerance.
In essence, many Canadians who wish or may be required to travel for personal, work, or emergency reasons will only be allowed to do so with the express permission of a foreign state, in this case the United States. U.S. government sovereignty, which extends over its airspace as indicated in international law, allows it to implement its secure flight program; however, the job of the Canadian government is or should be first and foremost to do its utmost to protect the rights of Canada's citizens.
With respect to the potential impact on privacy and human rights protection, aside from the issue of sovereignty, CAIR-CAN is concerned about the lack of consideration the existing legislation grants to the issues of privacy protection and potential human rights violations.
Under the Bill C-42 regime, airlines overflying American territory would be obliged to share personal data with the U.S. government, an act that is currently prohibited by PIPEDA. This comes without any guarantees regarding how or with whom the U.S. might, at its own discretion, choose to use or share that data. These concerns are shared by officials in Canada's own Public Safety department, as was discovered through an Access to Information Act request.
As we know from cases such as that of Maher Arar, the unfettered sharing of information without any safeguards or adequate redress mechanisms can have disastrous and irreversible consequences. Given the price paid by Canadians such as Mr. Arar, who have suffered as a result of the indiscriminate sharing of information with foreign governments, it is imperative that this Parliament do everything possible to mitigate potential mistreatment abroad by third countries, some of which, as we know, do not share Canada's respect for human rights and civil liberties to the same extent.
Finally, with respect to an adequate redress system, as the Department of Homeland Security's own privacy impact assessment suggests, information that is harvested can be disclosed and used for purposes other than aviation security--for example, for immigration or law enforcement purposes.
Significantly, not only will airlines be required to provide DHS with basic information—date of birth, name, and gender—but also with other “if available” information linked to passengers, including meal selection, passport, and itinerary information. This could potentially open the door to racial or religious profiling.
Experts in security fields have testified that religious and racial profiling simply does not work, nor does it our enhance security. Without any assurances or agreements in place to prevent this kind of abuse, it can create or enhance the very real sense of fear felt by potentially targeted communities, such as Arabs and Muslims.
The mandate of the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group's clearinghouse project is to document the impacts of no-fly lists, including so-called false positives. It has noted that “Many of the travelers who have been delayed are members of Middle Eastern or Muslim communities”. Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of the DHS travel redress inquiry program, or TRIP, is acknowledged in a 2009 report by the U.S. DHS inspector general, who confirmed that in most cases the program has done little to improve the situation of those who have been the victims of false positives and misidentification.
The lack of a robust redress system within the watchlists upon which the secure flight rules will rely is illustrated today by the plight of citizens such as Adil Charkaoui and Abdullah Almalki. Deemed by Canadian courts or commissions of inquiry not to pose a risk to the national security of Canada, they still find themselves unable to fly as a result of being on U.S. watchlists.
In conclusion, Canadian Muslims remain unequivocally committed, like our fellow citizens, to finding the necessary balance between ensuring that the public safety and national security of our country and its allies is maintained while protecting Canada's sovereignty and the cherished privacy and human rights of her citizens.
Thank you for giving us the opportunity to comment on this legislation. We will be happy to take your questions.