Transport Committee on March 1st, 2011

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Good morning, everyone.

Welcome to meeting number 50 of the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities. Pursuant to the orders of the day under Standing Order 108(2), this is a study of aviation safety and security.

Before I introduce our guest today, I want to recognize Mr. Dhaliwal on a point of order.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Newton—North Delta, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to clarify my remarks of the February 15 meeting. Unfortunately, a misunderstanding occurred, and some members were offended by what I said. I had no intention of suggesting that Mr. Guimond or his colleagues are racist. I do not believe that he is and I did not intend to suggest that he is.

I regret that my remarks came across in that way. I apologize to my friend and his colleagues for this misunderstanding and I hope we can continue to work constructively on vital matters of transport, infrastructure, and communities at this committee.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you, Mr. Dhaliwal.

Monsieur Guimond, do you have a comment?

[Michel Guimond, Bloc, Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

This is the first suitable opportunity for me to say something since the unfortunate incident. I would like to reiterate that my questions were about an event that was made public and that indicated that two people were filmed with a cell phone at Dorval Airport. They were wearing the veil and were going through the final checkpoints at the boarding gate for Air Canada. My questions had to do with the facts only. I have consulted the “blues” and I have carefully read everything that was said word for word. It is true that my colleague, Mr. Dhaliwal, never said that my party and I were racist. But he did use the words “incompetent” or “intolerant”. I want to stress that Bloc Quebecois caucus members, myself included, are not intolerant towards people of other origins, and that we are not incompetent in the matter. Now that the record has been set straight, I accept my colleague’s apologies and I consider the matter closed.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Merci, monsieur Guimond.

Moving forward, I will now introduce our guest, Joram Bobasch. He is the executive vice-president of ICTS Europe Holdings.

Welcome. We appreciate that you've come a long way to present to our committee. I think you understand the procedure. I'll ask you to present and then we'll move to committee questions.

[Joram Bobasch, Executive Vice-President, ICTS Europe Holdings B.V., ICTS Europe]

Good morning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you and of course the distinguished members of this committee for allowing me to appear. I am very honoured to be here today as part of your important and ongoing study into aviation safety and security.

As noted by the chair, my name is Joram Bobasch, and I'm the executive vice-president of ICTS Europe Holdings. We are one of the largest and most trusted aviation security companies in the world. In Canada, you may be aware of our affiliate, SEALS. SEALS stands for Security Excellence in Air, Land and Sea. That's our Canadian air arm of our international operations.

I hope my remarks and our discussions today will be helpful in your deliberations on this very important subject. I have personally spent decades in this industry and the opportunity to address Canadian parliamentarians is quite an honour for me.

I would like to start by introducing to you ICTS Europe—who we are and where we operate—and outline for you what we believe to be some of our core experiences that could contribute to the country's aviation security system. I would then like to touch on our commitment to the Canadian marketplace and of course would be willing to answer any questions you might have. I'm ready for the grilling.

ICTS was founded in 1982 as a consulting company. In the late eighties, it became a leader in the field of aviation security services. At present we comprise many subsidiaries, maintaining over 80 offices and locations--mainly in airports--in 27 countries, and employing over 13,000 employees. In comparison with the TSA, which employs about 48,000 screeners, we are probably the second-largest aviation screening operation worldwide, with the slight difference that we are privately owned and we operate in an international environment.

Almost literally, we have operations in most of all the major airports in Europe, and with our high-tech solutions, we serve more than 500 airports internationally. Our pride as a company has been the development of an unrivalled reputation for professional integrity, service quality, innovation, and responsible commercial practice.

To put the size of ICTS and its operations in perspective for committee members, we process on an annual basis probably three to four times more than all the passengers who are screened in Canada.

I have followed your committee's deliberations over the past year and also some of the policy developments that the government has made as a result of the strategic review of CATSA. Each country works to achieve its own security balance, and I hope that ICTS and our discussion today can be helpful for you as you work to achieve Canadian aviation security excellence.

The importance of a robust and comprehensive aviation security system cannot be overstated. The aviation industry has long been a target for attacks, and Canada has suffered direct tragic results of this targeting, with the Air India disaster in the eighties. The post-9/11 era spurred an unprecedented emphasis on aviation security, making it a significant concern and priority for travellers, government, and the international air community as a whole.

As a result, we have seen a flurry of changes to aviation security regulations and procedures. New measures have included the adoption of advanced screening procedures and technology, the expansion of the list of banned or prohibited items, increased inspection of baggage and cargo, increased information sharing between international partners—something, I understand, that you just voted on—and the enhanced presence of law enforcement. The application of those new, more stringent measures, while designed to counter emerging threats, has also garnered criticism from the public, who have begun to question whether these measures are reasonable, effective, and justified.

The primary objective of aviation security should be to safeguard passengers, personnel, and the general public from unlawful acts of interference on aircraft and at airports. Security threats range from unruly passenger behaviour through hijacking to terrorism.

While the security and safety of the general public should be of the utmost concern when considering aviation security policies, the corresponding mechanisms employed in support of this goal should not affect the efficiency of passenger flow and passenger service at the airport and in security systems. It is ICTS Europe's view that security measures should not be excessively expensive, should make sense for both passengers and staff, and should not cause unreasonable waiting times or interference with human rights.

When it comes to geography, local legislation, risk levels, and physical complexity, every airport in every country is unique in its own requirements. We believe it is essential to develop a control system that can adapt quickly, effectively, and in a flexible manner to current events, environments, and occurrences.

As a full aviation security company, therefore, ICTS develops and deploys innovative solutions that are flexible and scalable in order to meet airport security needs. These include the basic establishment of a comprehensive security concept that is based on an in-depth risk analysis. This is the basic start to every process that you see: what is the risk that we are dealing with? Then comes the design and implementation of all aspects of the system that might mitigate this assessed risk. And then comes doing the service, undertaking the full handling and control of the system, and supervising it.

What ICTS does in the 27 countries is sometimes to help the regulator, but mostly to accept from the regulator what is perceived and analyzed as the right risk and what the protocol is, what the procedures are for them to mitigate that risk, and then to make sure that the level of services is in compliance with those needs, knowing that we are dealing with human beings—and we only employ 13,000 of those. We know that the level of performance of employees varies, so it is at the level of compliance that is required from the employees worldwide—when they hit the bottom line—that we talk about the security protocols.

Our goal is actually to manufacture a system of compliance. ICTS Europe implements a far-sighted approach that allows multi-skilled individuals to work flexibly and efficiently together. They operate within the systems and structures specifically developed to deliver the optimum standard of streamlined, stress-free service while producing this kind of compliance.

Delays caused by rigorous screening processes or, at times, the complete shutdown of terminals, as we all know, result in significant economic losses. Delays--also called bottlenecks--at airports of origin can cause a domino effect of even more delays at the destination airports. We know that the major transportation at major airports is transiting, and if a passenger arrives late at a certain airport, he cannot board the next flight. Either the passenger's flight is delayed or the airplane is being delayed, so we have a domino effect. As aviation is a global product and we're talking globally about moving three billion people annually around the world—almost half of the world's population is travelling on an annual basis—a delay at a starting point can create a domino effect of a major delay at the end point.

Furthermore, airport tenants, such as retailers, suffer heavy losses as a result of events such as terminal closures, evacuations due to false alarms, and so on. We have seen this recently at London's Heathrow airport, which was closed due to weather. We saw it through the Christmas Day event of 2009 in Detroit. Another example would be last year's ash cloud over Europe.

The evolution of aviation security has seen a shift in recent years, whereby the nature of a potential individual and the nature of the threats may have changed significantly. As a result, authorities have reacted by adding new layers to their security protocols. However, it should be expected that these new security measures would actually correspond to current and to changing threats.

Another example you might remember occurred in August 2006. Due to new information that was guarded by the British intelligence forces, overnight there was a banning of the known LAGs, liquids and gels, which created chaos the next morning. But the requirement and the challenge for security systems is to react as fast as possible and to implement a new protocol overnight because the risk is as such.

If security staff become skeptical of the measures they are applying and do not understand the rationale behind them, soon they will fail to enforce them and follow the required procedures. Therefore, in order to ensure the proper deployment of new security measures, the security staff must understand them and recognize their purpose. When we are manufacturing compliance, one very, very important element is to monitor and to manage the personnel on the floor. This is one of the capabilities we have developed in the past years: monitoring the personnel.

It is also crucial that any procedures or techniques reflect the current status of research and development. Furthermore, staff must be oriented with the present security situation and be aware of any new threats. Every bit of up-to-date information will impact current security procedures. It is not only the technology but also the personnel that should be developed on a continuous basis through training and monitoring. Only a combination of up-to-date technology on the one hand and well-informed staff on the other hand will assure the most optimal level of security.

Canada is a big country geographically and a diverse one ethnically. Air services are critical to the movement of people, goods, and services. Therefore, it is essential for the Canadian way of life to ensure a safe and continuous air travel system. Studies like the one you are conducting are a great exercise, and I hope you will take the time to examine best practices internationally and apply those elements you believe will serve the Canadian public in the most appropriate manner.

Here in Canada, SEALS, an affiliate of ICTS Europe, has acquired A.S.P., which is a security service organization based in Burlington, Ontario. This acquisition is consistent with our desire to serve the Canadian market with the same level of excellence that we have achieved internationally over the past 25 years. It is an objective of the SEALS organization to utilize A.S.P.'s positioning and operational strength and ICTS Europe's experience and knowledge to offer significant additional value to the aviation sector within the security spectrum, thus leveraging our experience and introducing the beginning of a long and, we hope, very successful future in the Canadian market.

ICTS Europe aspires to be a fully engaged partner with the government and contribute to the public policy debate in Canada to ensure that Canadians continue to enjoy safe and secure and efficient aviation services.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to give my opening remarks. I would be happy to take any of your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you very much.

Mr. McCallum.

[John McCallum, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Bobasch, for being with us today and for your interesting presentation.

My first question is about air marshals on airplanes. I wonder if you could give us an idea of the extent to which they are used around the world, and whether you think they are an important part of airline security.

[Joram Bobasch]

This is an easy one. We are a private security company, and air marshals, as far as we are involved, are still a law enforcement task. Only government and governmental entities are allowed to bring weapons on board airplanes. This is a task that, according to the threat analysis and risk evaluation, is being conducted by various governments worldwide.

We know of their existence. Sometimes we even recognize the colleagues who are walking around. Nowadays, with the physical stature of those guys, it is very easy to identify them.

This is an area in which we are not involved actively. We know that it's part of mitigating the risk, but we are not suppliers of this part.

[John McCallum, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

I understand that you're not suppliers, but I also understand that you have a broad knowledge of the whole issue of security. My question is whether you think that air marshals on planes are an essential, important, or not-so-important element in the total scheme of things.

[Joram Bobasch]

The question is more, I would say, if I may, what the risk is that you want to mitigate with this solution. If you anticipate that you will have a hijacker on board who will bypass all of the security regimes installed in all the airports, that those security people will not identify a possible hijacker, as happened on 9/11, and there is an information that on a certain flight a certain assassin will be able to infiltrate the airplane, then this could be the answer.

It could not be the answer, obviously, for mass production. On every flight, you could not have the first two rows of any airplane manned by air marshals.

It is related to and based on specific intelligence information and of course a lot of training. It's very risky.

[John McCallum, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Second, we've also had some controversy about the advisability of allowing people to go on flights with short scissors. Some of our unions representing flight attendants have strongly opposed this new policy on the grounds that it represents a risk to the passengers and the crews on the airplanes. I'm wondering if you have any views on that.

[Joram Bobasch]

We have to go two steps back before addressing the issue of the scissors. First of all, aviation is a global product, and it does not matter what a certain country, airline, or airport perceives as a risk. In order to harmonize, there has to be a global understanding about what can and cannot be brought on board.

If I have a bad intention, I can hijack an airplane with my glasses. I can use them to stab anyone, and then I can open the cockpit door and hijack the airplane. I don't need scissors for that, and there are probably more skilled people who don't need even the glasses. They can do it with their hands.

The question is the international understanding of the risk and the steps needed to mitigate it. We need to determine the list of allowed or prohibited items. If I had a pair of scissors, I wouldn't hijack an airplane, but I also don't hijack airplanes with my glasses. If I had a gun, I would not hijack an airplane either.

It is the intention and the information that matter, not so much the list of items. The list of items has to be agreed on globally and has to be implemented globally. Otherwise, it cannot produce a global product.

[John McCallum, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Right, but the list is not identical in every country in the world.

[Joram Bobasch]

It is identical in 95% of the world. There are still local requirements that allow a little bit more or a little bit less, but for most of the international travel in the west, the requirements are the same. I don't know what happens in China or in other places of the world, I really don't know, but I assume that if they want to be integrated with and accepted as a part of the international community, they will have to accept the levels that are used in North America, Europe, and South America. They will have to adopt the list of prohibited items.

[John McCallum, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Okay.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Monsieur Guimond.

[Michel Guimond, Bloc, Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord, QC]

Mr. Bobasch, Canada is going to increase the use of body scanners at airport checkpoints. It has been a while since I last went to Europe, in May 2010. Are body scanners being used in Europe more and more? As a specialist, an expert, and furthermore testifying before us in that capacity, what is your opinion on using body scanners? Do you think it is safer than manual searches? What is your opinion?

[Joram Bobasch]

Whole-body scanners or whole-body screening is a new technology that has been developed in order to mitigate additional risks that the walk-through metal detectors we have worldwide do not indicate on passengers. For instance, a knife that is made not from metal but from other ingredients would not be identified by a walk-through metal detector.

I'm a service expert, not a physician, and not a physical expert. But the challenge for the developers of those technologies would be to mitigate the risks of those items that could be concealed in the body and to identify them.

From what I've seen, the technology does go a step further, in my personal, humble, and very subjective opinion, but it's not there yet. On one hand, we have not yet seen 100% waterproof whole-body scanners that would identify without any doubt hidden items that are on this prohibited list. On the other hand, I'm not aware of the official results, but I know that the TSA did some testing--the TSA being the American authority--after the events of December 25, 2009, to try to see whether the whole-body scanner would identify the underwear in which the bomb was concealed. I understood--I don't have the results on hand--that the results weren't so positive.

It is definitely a step in the right direction. From what I have seen personally at exhibitions and in some of the airports in Europe, it is still in the trial process. Some machines have been installed. They still have a problem with the terrible word “throughput”. As you know, one of the things that airports are measuring is how many passengers they can manage to get through a checkpoint in an hour. If a passenger is standing in front of a checkpoint and has to take a lot of items off his body in order to go through a whole-body scanner, that creates a longer process for x-raying those objects. It's a very short process to go through the whole-body scanner, but the whole process becomes longer.

It is a step in the right direction. It is not there yet, but the nice thing about technology, hopefully, is that they will develop a solution that will be satisfactory with regard to this known list of prohibited items in a manner that will not create an additional obstacle for the passengers when they are standing in front of this checkpoint and trying to take off all the shoes, jackets, watches, and pens and whatever.

[Michel Guimond, Bloc, Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord, QC]

I have one last question, Mr. Chair.

When someone testifies on a topic, to some extent, they are expressing a personal opinion and making a value judgment. How do you assess the control systems in force in the United States, Canada and Europe? Of the three examples I mentioned, is one better than the other or are they completely sufficient, equivalent and effective?

[Joram Bobasch]

I think we have to look back into the history. Most of the happenings in the North American market for commercial aviation security are a result of the 9/11 era.

Prior to 9/11 in North America, commercial aviation security was perceived as having one of the lower levels of risk and, therefore, being at a lower level for requirements to comply with, due to the fact that the local threat was perceived as lower than it actually was. Then came the events of 9/11. As an outcome of such a surprise, there is also a reaction of paranoia and chaos.

Ten years later, I believe that TSA and CATSA--CATSA more quickly than TSA because of its size--have succeeded in presenting the new generation that can adapt to the new threat situation that was presented in 9/11: to harmonize procedures according to the then existing risk situation and to present a higher level of security services than there was before.

We passed through a similar situation in Europe, 20 years ago, and it was not because we were smarter or faster in Europe. It's because 20 years ago the Iron Curtain was raised and it was the job of the regulators to see where the borders were and where the risks were. Having moved to the east...there was a vacuum that was created and a need for a commercial solution in aviation security in mainland Europe. We started in the process a bit earlier due to a political situation.

That's why one might assume that processes, changes, and discussions like this have taken place in Europe a bit earlier. I think a step in the maturity of the process is a meeting or a study like you are conducting right now, to say okay, we're now 10 years down the line, so what did we achieve, what did we pay, what did we get, what is the level of service, what is the level of the security that we are producing, and is it up to the expectations of the public?

Having said that as a remark, I believe that in Europe we started earlier with the perception that what 3 billion people buy annually--a flight ticket--is a service and we're service suppliers. The perception of aviation security in North America is still as an obstacle and not as a service. This is still a challenge to be met. You have a wonderful infrastructure. You have wonderful terminals. You have wonderful locations. But passengers, as they enter the terminal, still don't perceive it as accepting a service. Sometimes they do, but they perceive it as a burden.

As an example, I was at a meeting two months ago in Washington, in which John Pistole, the head of the TSA, was very proud to announce that during Thanksgiving, which is one of the holidays when there is increased traffic, only in 10 of the major airports did the waiting lines exceed 30 minutes. If you go to a restaurant and you wait 30 minutes for the waiter to come to you, you don't perceive it as a good service. The fact that he has already started to measure, and the fact that we are discussing those issues here, is a step in the right direction. Thirty minutes is by no means acceptable if you want to sell a service in order to improve it....

In comparing Europe and North America, the process in Europe in commercializing the service started earlier and therefore Europe is a little bit ahead.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Merci.

Mr. Bevington.

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Bobasch, for joining us here today on a subject that we've worked on for about a year. We've had a variety of presentations.

I want to start out with one thing. You said about inflight security measures--I don't know if you said it, but I have it here--that only in 2005 were strict protocols struck for access to cockpits in the European Union.

[Joram Bobasch]

I have to admit that I don't remember.

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

Okay. But it's a fairly recent development?