Transport Committee on April 1st, 2014

[Mike Sullivan, NDP, York South—Weston, ON]

I read the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board recommendation dated January 23, and yours is similar:

Rail carrier[s]...must annually analyze the safety and security risks for the transportation routes to include 27 risk factors, such as the volume,...track type, class,...maintenance schedule...curvature, environmentally sensitive or significant areas; population density along the route; emergency response capability...; areas of high consequence along the route.... [They] must identify alternative routes over which it has authority to operate and perform a safety and security risk assessment of those routes for comparison.

Then the FRA, the Federal Railroad Administration, analyzes those risk analyses and determines whether or not they need to be revised, whether in fact they are the safest opportunities.

We don't do that in Canada, do we?

[Wendy Tadros]

I can't tell you that we don't do it in Canada, because I'm not aware of what every single railway is doing in terms of their risk analysis. We're calling for the same thing in our second recommendation. However, there would be nothing to stop a railway company from doing that kind of analysis within their safety management system.

[Mike Sullivan, NDP, York South—Weston, ON]

With regard to what we've heard from people in the public who have asked why they don't move the trains around major population centres, that would be part of the risk analysis, whether or not it's too expensive, whether or not it's possible, whether it's not as practicable. I know in the U.S. they do legislatively prohibit the transportation of dangerous goods, for example, around the city of Washington, D.C.

We don't do the same thing in Canada, do we?

[Wendy Tadros]

I'm not aware that we're doing that, but you have to look at things from a logistics point of view. These railways were built throughout Canada, and cities grew up along the railways. They grew up there because that's where their industries are.

For instance, if you want to route everything around the city of Montreal, but the goods are going to the port in Montreal, you're going to end up with a rail line—I don't know—way north or way south of Montreal, and then how are you going to get the goods in? You're going to have to truck them in.

I think that sometimes easy solutions are not the way to go. You have to look at the network. You have to look at the realities on the ground, and you have to bring the risks down within the system that's there.

[Mike Sullivan, NDP, York South—Weston, ON]

In terms of the DOT-111 specifically, since 1991 we've known they're not safe for the transportation of dangerous goods, and yet we've continued to use them for the transportation of dangerous goods.

When the Mississauga train derailment happened in 1979, the reaction from the regulator was to lower the speed to 15 miles per hour, until it was determined that it was safe, in other words, until there were enough inspection points along the route to give a reasonable assumption that it was safe. The transportation of dangerous goods in DOT-111s is now widely known not to be safe. Since we cannot stop them, can we at least slow them down? Is there a possibility that a 15 miles per hour regulation could be placed on DOT-111s through densely populated areas?

[Wendy Tadros]

Part of the route analysis is to look at the speed. That's one of the risk factors. Certainly that's something they should be looking at, but what was the speed...?

I was just asking Mr. Jang about the last cars there. For the cars you see that are very badly damaged, the ones that have derailed, the analysis has shown they were going about 20 miles per hour, so they were going very slowly. The problem with these tank cars is that they do not perform well in a derailment or a collision, even at lower speeds.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Young, you have five minutes.

[Wai Young, Conservative, Vancouver South, BC]

Thank you very much for being here today.

I note that in the range of questions that were already asked, there seems to be a gap between what the standards say, what the train companies are doing, and what's being implemented. Would you agree with that comment?

[Wendy Tadros]

The devil is in the detail. I would think it would depend on exactly which fact situation you're talking about. As we have pointed out, there is certainly some room for improvement in the standards for the tank cars, for the operations, and for the emergency response.

[Wai Young, Conservative, Vancouver South, BC]

For example, there's SMS, there are ERAPs, but it doesn't appear there's a consistent way of ensuring that SMS is followed or ERAPs are monitored or filed somewhere where they're consistently upgraded, looked at, or implemented. Would you say that's correct?

[Wendy Tadros]

We haven't looked at the ERAPs for other products, but they are required to be filed and approved by Transport Canada. You're talking about the auditing of the SMS, and that is something the Auditor General has dealt with in his report.

[Wai Young, Conservative, Vancouver South, BC]

What I'm struggling with is we're hearing from you that obviously we know a lot more today than we did before, which is fantastic. We have these systems in place, but having said that, we've also heard from others to say that these things aren't followed up, or that's not done on a regular basis, etc.

Who looks after best practices to ensure that those safety mechanisms are consistently followed and in place?

[Wendy Tadros]

It's primarily the responsibility of the individual companies, the railways. The regulator provides regulatory oversight, so they do audits for SMS. They do inspections on the ground. Those two are intended to complement one another.

[Wai Young, Conservative, Vancouver South, BC]

Do you think sufficient measures will be put in place in the report you've tabled and in your ongoing investigation to ensure that these gaps or oversights no longer happen?

[Wendy Tadros]

In this investigation and in almost all the investigations we do, one of the elements we look at is regulatory oversight. We will be examining those issues.

[Wai Young, Conservative, Vancouver South, BC]

How is the public assured that the safety management systems are being followed to the highest standards?

[Wendy Tadros]

Kathy.

[Kathy Fox]

Again, the Auditor General has done an extensive review of the implementation of safety management systems and Transport Canada's oversight of SMS in railways.

I'd like to add that every safety management system must have certain basic principles. They are specified in slightly different ways, depending on the mode of transportation. Air is a little different from rail, a little different from marine, but they're all based on the same principles.

I think what we've seen in our investigations is it isn't always easy to foresee the combination of circumstances that can lead to an accident, because there's always more than one, as we saw in the release of our report last week on the First Air accident. It has to mature over time as people gain experience, but that's why it's very important to have effective oversight.

[Wai Young, Conservative, Vancouver South, BC]

As a committee we have heard from air, for example, but what I found interesting today in hearing from rail is that there doesn't seem to be the stringent reporting. With air, every incident must be reported. What I read here is that with rail that's not the case, but we're moving toward that. Is that correct?

[Wendy Tadros]

I'll ask Mr. Laporte to answer that question.

[Jean Laporte, Chief Operating Officer, Transportation Safety Board of Canada]

The standards for rail are just as stringent as in aviation or marine or pipeline. There are 10 criteria In our regulations, and if any one of those 10 criteria applies, then there's an obligation to report the incident, the accident, whatever the case might be. Most of the time we find a multiple of those criteria apply to a particular situation, so pretty well all the occurrences are reported.

In the rail mode, over 1,000 occurrences were reported in the past year. That figure has increased from the previous year by 4% in the number of reported occurrences in 2013 compared to 2012.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Your time has expired.

Mr. Mai.

[Hoang Mai, NDP, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the case of the Lac-Mégantic tragedy, we know there was only one conductor. The Department of Transport had allowed only two companies to have a single conductor. MMA was one of those two companies allowed to operate trains with a single conductor. Have you any recommendations to make on that subject?

[Wendy Tadros]

This is one of many issues that we are looking at in this ongoing investigation from a safety perspective.

[Hoang Mai, NDP, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

In 2012, the TSB issued recommendations on automatic braking systems for trains. We know that this is considered the ultimate integrated safety mechanism. It has already been implemented in the United States. However, Transport Canada has not yet proposed that this be required for railways in Canada. Have you any comments to make on that subject? Have you made recommendations to the minister? Why has this not been implemented here? Were you told why your recommendations were not followed?