Transport Committee on April 8th, 2014

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

I call our meeting to order.

I'd like to welcome and thank our witnesses for being here today, and with no further ado we're going to turn it over to VIA Rail for their presentation of 10 minutes or less, please.

Mr. Del Bosco.

[Steve Del Bosco, Interim President and Chief Executive Officer, VIA Rail Canada Inc.]

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee and members of Parliament, good morning.

On behalf of my Via Rail Canada colleagues, it my pleasure to speak to you today about the action we have taken, the progress we are continuously making and our overall safety record.

Safety is by far the most fundamental component of our operation. Our passion for travelling by train and the development of the rail passenger industry are intimately linked to our dedication to mitigating risk, improving our performance, and demonstrating to our clients and the public that train travel is reliable and the safest means of travel in Canada.

In this regard, we have performed very well over the past five years. My colleague Jean will present an overview of our action plan related to safety. She'll be followed by Denis, who will explain how a strong safety culture and sound governance practices have become the foundation of what we do. Denis will also say a few words about our initiatives and investments that have contributed to improving our performance.

Allow me first to say a few words about who we are and the particular operational environment in which we oversee safety. Almost four million passengers travel every year on board one of our trains across our 12,500 kilometres of network. We operate over 500 departures per week to hundreds of destinations, through remote areas such as Churchill or Prince Rupert, and in the popular Quebec-Windsor corridor.

We also offer two long distance trains that run east and west: the Ocean and the Canadian.

Our trains travel through 450 communities. Further, there are thousands of ties, crossings, bridges and tunnels that are located in places where sometimes only a train can get through, and this often happens in vary challenging weather conditions.

The context in which we operate is particular for two reasons: first, because our network runs across the country's unique geography and changing landscape; second, because 98% of the railroad we use is owned by the freight industry. Only 255 kilometres of the railway we roll on—located between Coteau and Smiths Falls—belongs to VIA. We therefore have to mitigate the risks associated with our operations without owning the railroad on which we travel. We must share the responsibility for prevention, track surveillance, and risk management. Despite these challenges, train travel is safer today than it was when I started my career 36 years ago.

I'll now welcome Jean Tierney to talk about some of the highlights of our safety programs.

[Jean Tierney, Senior Director, Safety and Corporate Security, VIA Rail Canada Inc.]

Thank you.

Good morning.

A part of the basic principles of our safety management system is that it has helped us to develop and maintain a very good, strong safety culture. All of our employees contribute to our safety management system. Both the unionized and the management levels are fully involved.

It clearly identifies responsibilities and accountabilities for all safety leaders so that we know who does what and who is accountable. It promotes the safety, security, and health of all of our employees, our passengers, and the general public. It helps us to comply with all applicable laws and regulations and even to exceed those.

Also, it provides us a framework for setting goals and targets and for planning and measuring our safety performance.

We have a structure that is headed off with corporate policies and SMS standards at an overview level. Then it works down into an annual corporate safety plan that is communicated throughout the organization. There are regional department plans so that everybody knows what their piece is and how they contribute to the overall success. Then we produce checklists and job aids and such to make it easy on a day-to-day basis. We clearly identify what those expectations are, and then we implement through various initiatives and programs. Then the cycle continues and feeds back up and down and around again.

How do we monitor the performance? We do this daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly on an annual basis through the reviews of various reports and safety performance items to look for trends so that we can conduct risk assessments and prevent any risks that surface.

How does this lead specifically to our safety culture? One of the first things is that we had our SMS, our safety management system, in place at VIA Rail a year before it became a regulatory requirement. We saw the value in having such a system in place, and we worked closely with our regulatory partners, who helped us develop and implement our safety management system.

It's a differentiator for us in our culture. It's quite evident in the leadership that is displayed from our president and CEO in chairing safety meetings on a monthly basis. With front-line investment priorities, we've invested a significant amount of moneys to improve our infrastructure, our equipment, and our various systems, and in technology to help us improve. The continuous focus on risk management and performance management, and on the partnerships that we have with our union partners, the communities, and the regulators, is a joint effort, and we appreciate very much all the support we've received.

If you'll permit me to, I'll share two excerpts about our safety culture from outside sources. The first one was from a statement during the Railway Safety Act review:

Among major rail companies, VIA Rail has a respected SMS system and entrenched safety culture....the Panel also noted that VIA takes safety management seriously by making it important to everyone in the company.

We discuss this daily. An extract from a third-party auditor that we had come in and audit the resiliency of our safety management system observed that a safety culture is well embedded throughout the organization. This isn't an easy thing to do, so we feel that our efforts have been well worth it.

I'll invite my colleague Denis to add more specifics on some of our safety initiatives that have helped.

[Denis Pinsonneault, Chief, Customer Experience and Operating Officer, VIA Rail Canada Inc.]

Thank you, Jean.

There have been some incidents, such as the one which happened last summer in the Lac-Mégantic region, which lead us to rethink the way we do things. These incidents also help us to bring down our tolerance to risk, which is sometimes too high.

For several years now, Via Rail has developed a real safety culture which involves each and every member of the organization.

My background is in human resources. I've spent most of my career in human resources. One of the main aspects of my job is not only to make sure that compliance is part of our organization, but that we bring a safety culture. It's easy to say that we have a safety culture, but bringing a safety culture is something that takes years. It takes strong dedication from everybody, especially the top management.

We have therefore been proactive in adopting measures to prevent tragedies like the one in Lac-Mégantic, from happening.

For instance, prior to the Lac-Mégantic event we never left unattended trains on the main line or a siding. Every train that starts its journey has two locomotive engineers in charge, and that practice has been in place since the foundation of our corporation. Every locomotive is now equipped with an outward-facing camera, and we have just started testing some voice recording devices.

The major reason for train accidents, unfortunately, is human error. We spend a lot of time with training, performance management, mentoring, coaching, etc., to reduce human errors across the organization. But it is imperative that we continue to invest in technology that will not only help us do a good investigation after the fact but will mainly and more importantly facilitate the job of locomotive engineers. We are right now working on different technologies that we believe will make very significant steps in that direction.

We are determined to raise safety standards even more. We have invested, thanks to the economic action plans of the Government of Canada, $80 million to do so by introducing various improvements to our infrastructure, more efficient procedures, and new technologies.

For instance, we've raised the maintenance standards of our locomotives to meet the highest international level. We've made countless improvements, from security fencing to signage, crossing upgrades, and targeted public education. We've closed, on our own infrastructure, 70 private crossings in the past three years. These are crossings on farms and parkland, many of them unprotected. We reach out to each landowner and encourage them to apply for a Transport Canada grant to close their crossing.

We recently began installing train telemetry systems and GPS technology aboard our trains. They are already providing us with rich data about train handling that will help us not only reduce fuel consumption, but more importantly, improve safety. Using a combination of telemetry, wireless communication, and GPS technology, we're developing our own form of assisted train control. The goal is to provide assistance to the locomotive engineer during critical tasks and minimize the risk of human error, as I said.

Let me give you an example.

In collaboration with the local health and safety committees, and along with the Teamsters Canada Rail Conference, whom I am happy to see here today, Via Rail has helped to identify throughout the country many higher-risk zones in order to help prevent the higher potential for incidents in those areas.

Furthermore, we have integrated and extended our safety culture into a comprehensive, risk-based approach. VIA Rail is today highly committed to risk governance. The risk includes train accidents, railway crossings, trespassing incidents. It is a testament to VIA Rail's safety culture that in addition to having an already sound and proven SMS or safety management system, VIA Rail's management and board of directors decided to put this risk at the top of their priority list in the organization.

These decisions and interventions have helped to improve safety throughout our operations. The combined effect of the initiatives I have just described have allowed Via Rail to record its best safety record in 2013.

In 2009, there were 3.6 incidents per million miles involving our trains. In 2013, there were only 1.3 incidents per million miles. This means that, throughout our network, there were eight incidents only in one year. This represents a decrease of 64 % compared to 2009.

This more positive record happened because every day we try to find ways to prevent accidents from happening. The entire raison d'être of our actions is to never have any victims or serious injuries, or at least the fewest number possible.

There was another encouraging result in 2013. Since 2009, the number of incidents at ties or crossings fell by nearly half. Put another way, we saved lives and would like to do better still.

The main reason is because we focus on prevention and because we managed our safety systems only through solid partnerships with stakeholders who are just as dedicated. The enviable record we have today was achieved thanks to our leadership and our sustained and well-established collaborations, both internally and externally.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you.

We now move to Unifor, to Mr. Dias and Mr. Stevens, for 10 minutes or less, please.

[Jerry Dias, National President, Unifor]

Thank you, Chair and members of the committee, for inviting Unifor to discuss our union's perspective on the future of rail safety in Canada as it relates to the transportation of dangerous goods and safety management systems, or SMS.

By way of introduction, I am Jerry Dias, national president of Unifor. With me today is Brian Stevens, national rail director.

Unifor is a new Canadian union formed on Labour Day weekend of 2013 as a result of the combination of the former CAW union and the CEP. Unifor is the largest union operating in the private sector, with more than 300,000 members working in at least 20 sectors of the economy, including all stages of the economic value chain from resources to manufacturing to transportation to private and public services.

We represent close to 85,000 members who work in the federal sector in air, marine, road, and telco, and for the purposes of this committee, just over 12,000 of our members work in the rail sector. Our members are involved in performing safety and maintenance inspections and repair of all passenger and freight cars as well as locomotives at the class I railways, VIA Rail, and a number of regional carriers.

Concerning transportation of dangerous goods, there are goalposts along the railbed of every regulatory change, and the July 7, 2013, Lac-Mégantic disaster comes at the tragic cost of 47 innocent lives. Not only did this disaster test the strength and resilience of family and community, but also of our country. Public confidence in the industry and the regulatory regime has been radically shaken. Public interests are no longer seen as being satisfied in the current regulatory framework that regulates Transport Canada, as observers and auditors of the industry.

The ministerial order of December 26, 2013, in respect to unattended trains and crew size has gone some distance to set out new rules. We do not see this as the end of the road, but rather as the first of many more steps we will need to take to improve rail safety, and more importantly, restore public confidence.

In addition to reviewing grades and duration that trains can be left unattended, the following would improve rail safety and would be in the public interest.

Reclassify crude oil that is shipped by railway tank cars to reflect its volatility.

Immediately ban the transportation of railbit in DOT-111A tank cars that have not been retrofitted to the new CPC-1232 standard, as an interim measure. We anticipate that the TSB report will contain specific recommendations on tank car standards.

Lower the speed of trains carrying dangerous goods when they are travelling through municipalities.

Ensure that a qualified rail mechanic would inspect all locomotive and freight car equipment before a train can be left unattended. Transport Canada should be responsible for licensing railcar mechanics or technicians who have spent four years or 8,000 hours in the trade as a TDG inspector.

Ensure that all trains, and more importantly trains carrying dangerous commodities, receive a visual safety and maintenance inspection every 1,600 kilometres by qualified railcar mechanics.

With regard to the SMS system, SMS is an explicit set of processes designed to integrate safety considerations into decision-making, planning, and operational activities. All federally regulated railways are required to have an SMS in place. As a result of the recently amended Railway Safety Act, there is currently a regulatory working group in place developing new SMS regulations that will include some new provisions, such as defining the accountable executive and ensuring enhanced employee involvement in developing SMS. We are especially pleased to see whistle-blower protection finally being afforded to workers in this industry.

What is worrisome, though, is the increased reliance and belief of the industry that risk assessments and risk control processes are reliable and unquestionably support implementing a change in operations. While an assessment process may turn a corporation's mind to taking risk into their planning and decision-making processes, our experience in the industry is that the decision to implement the change has already been made, and the risk assessment is simply another report that goes into the file. We have yet to see a risk assessment in which the corporation says, “Wow, we aren't doing that. It's too dangerous.”

Under the current regime, SMS risk assessments are privileged and confidential at the behest of the industry. The public will never know what factors were taken into consideration when the industry implemented a change in operations that are in the public interest.

It's no wonder that communities and community leaders like Calgary's Mayor Nenshi are skeptical of the industry. In our view, SMS risk assessments are nothing more than a lens the corporations are forced to look through when they are contemplating changes to their operations. It does little, if anything, to impact their decisions to make operational changes that serve the shareholders.

The industry also operates on the position that the SMS risk assessment is an appropriate substitute for occupational health and safety hierarchy of controls. It is not. To be clear, the occupational health and safety approach is much different in that it is anchored on a hierarchy of hazard elimination. It is about prevention.

Safe railway operation must mean just that: safe. Recognizing hazards, making extraordinary efforts to eliminate the hazards, and preventing future hazards must be first and foremost, not developing administrative measures as a way to ignore the hazards in order to find a way to live or die with the risks.

We would be happy to take your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you very much, Mr. Dias.

We now have Mr. Mark Fleming.

[Dr. Mark Fleming, Professor, Department of Psychology, Saint Mary's University, As an Individual]

I'd like to thank the committee for inviting me here to appear before you.

First of all, I'm an organizational psychologist, and I've been studying safety culture for the past 20 years, so I was very pleased to see the prominence of safety culture in this review process.

I've been working with a range of safety-critical industries such as offshore oil and gas, petrochemical, nuclear power, construction, and transportation. I'm currently the CN professor of safety culture. I also contributed to the National Energy Board's recent policy document on safety culture, which will be relevant for pipeline transportation.

I think it's useful, when we talk about safety culture—and a number of witnesses have already mentioned it—to define what we mean by that term. The definition I use is that safety culture refers to the attitudes, values, norms and beliefs which a particular group of people share with respect to risk and safety.

Safety culture has been around as a concept for over a quarter of a century now and was coined initially from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Safety culture can be viewed as the heart or the soul of an organization's safety management system, as it provides the energy or drive to bring the safety management system to life. Safety culture determines the extent to which an organization lives its safety management system. The safety management system describes how an organization controls hazards. For these controls to be effective, they need to be implemented in practice. Safety culture determines to a greater or lesser extent the degree to which these controls are implemented as intended. Therefore, an effective functioning of the safety management system requires a positive safety culture, which is somewhat different from thinking that a safety management system gives you a positive safety culture. It actually is a necessary prerequisite for the safety management system to work as intended.

There are many different safety culture models and frameworks and there is a high degree of overlap between safety culture models. Most models cover the majority of important dimensions such as leadership commitment. Much time and effort, mainly by people like me, has been dedicated to arguing which model is best and which one is better than the other. Broadly speaking, these debates have not been of much use. Most models are adequately acceptable and cover the main themes and concepts. Therefore we should spend less time arguing about which model is best and choose one that works for us and implement it.

There are many different frameworks. The one that's been adopted or developed by the rail industry is fine, yet it's different from others.

I think it's also important to have a sense of why safety culture is important. There's good evidence linking safety culture with important safety outcomes. Numerous studies have shown a link between worker-perceived safety culture and injury rates in that organization. There's also evidence linking safety culture threats to major disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon or the Chernobyl incident, as I mentioned before.

Recent research conducted in the nuclear industry in the U.S. links employees' perceptions of the safety culture to nuclear plant status, which is the main, primary indicator of the level of safety within a nuclear installation. There's good evidence showing that safety culture, irrespective of how you approach it or measure it, is associated with important safety outcomes.

I think it's important, though, to focus a little bit on what organizations should do when we talk about safety culture. If I were a senior leader in a safety-critical organization, I would want to have an accurate picture of our safety culture, including strengths and weaknesses. I would want to know that we had active processes to promote a positive safety culture and how these processes are working in practice. I would also want to know my role and the role of my direct reports in promoting a positive safety culture. Safety-critical organizations should adopt a systematic approach to promoting a positive safety culture. This should be a continuous improvement process that includes a clear vision of the desired safety culture, clearly articulated roles for key groups such as managers, specific activities to promote the desired culture, ongoing safety culture assessments, auditing, and program review.

One of the things that gets a lot of attention when we talk about safety culture is safety culture assessment. A range of different methods and tools can be used, and a lot of the work that's been done over the last 20 years has principally been in this field.

Assessment can be helpful in identifying areas of relative strength and weakness that can be used to guide improvement activities. Often there is too much focus on safety culture assessment and not enough focus on improvement. There is, I think, a naive belief that if we measure something, by definition we will be able to improve it or change it, and that's often not the case. Knowing that it's raining is often not desperately helpful unless you have a strategy to stop it raining, which we don't.

Assessment for the sake of assessment provides little or no value, and may do harm. It is therefore important that safety culture assessments are only conducted as part of an improvement strategy. Organizations should not conduct a safety culture assessment unless they plan to improve as a result of that assessment.

That's all I have for you. If you have questions, we're happy to answer them.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you very much, Mr. Fleming.

We'll now move to questions. Mr. Mai, you have seven minutes.

[Hoang Mai, NDP, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

Thank, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank the witnesses for being with us today. It is very important for us to find out what is happening on the ground.

I will first turn to the representatives from Via Rail.

I adore your service and I think it is very important. I have often taken the train and I would like to do so even more. To be quite frank, I feel safe when I am riding one of your trains. I would like Via Rail to be in the position of providing even more services and I would like people to take the train even more often because, as you said, it is a humane way of travelling. As well, it is good for the environment.

You also talked about infrastructure. Given the fact that the rail sector is being privatized, you often realize that Via Rail does not own the tracks. So you depend on the companies which own the tracks. Sometimes these companies do their own inspections, but Via Rail tells them that the tracks are still not safe enough for passenger rail service, and so they would not travel along those tracks.

Take, for instance, the Miramichi-Bathurst line. As you know, part of that line is not in working order, so passenger rail service becomes a problem. There is also the Moncton-Edmundston line, which, for its part, would require investment in its infrastructure, since there is no train station, among other things.

What is the problem with those tracks? Why can they not be used for passenger rail service?

[Steve Del Bosco]

We're talking about the infrastructure on the north shore of New Brunswick, between Campbellton and Moncton. As you know, CN has applied to abandon about 44 miles of infrastructure there. We are looking at options. VIA Rail continuously looks at options, but we're not in a position to buy the line, and we're not really interested. We will operate it if it's safe to operate.

On the other hand if some arrangement can be made, we would certainly want to operate in northern New Brunswick if we can. The population base is along the north New Brunswick line more so than along the Edmundston line. There is still some time before the abandonment is effective, and we're going to take the time to see if we can make some agreement.

[Hoang Mai, NDP, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

I really want us to find a solution because it would be very sad if the railway was abandoned; after all, they are part of the history and development of Canada. We know that every time a rail line is abandoned, it is for good and there will be no more new long-term investment.

I hope that everybody will work together to find a solution. It is very important.

Mr. Dias, you mentioned SMS. We know, having asked Transport Canada, having read the Auditor General's report, having heard from TSB, there are some issues with respect to resources within Transport Canada. They can't do their own follow-up because they don't have resources.

We also have issues with respect to SMS. We're not sure if Transport Canada has the time to look at them. We know they don't have time to audit all the SMS. Wondering what's happening is a concern for us. How do we know whether or not the system in place is the right system? What would you recommend to make sure the public knows and feels reassured that the SMS is well in place and is valid?

[Brian Stevens, Director, Rail, Unifor]

I'll take that question, if you don't mind.

In terms of SMS in our industry, there are in essence two lenses.

There is one that we look through for occupational health under part II of the code. Those risk assessments and the SMS through that lens are driven, as Jerry said earlier, on a hierarchy of hazard elimination.

Under the Railway Safety Act, though, those risk assessments are trying to find a way to live with risk. When we see a number of operational changes that come through and some of them—in our view and in our union's view—are not in the public interest, that's worrisome because the public is not aware of what those operational changes are going to be because the trains are going to run through their communities.

The changes may very well be safe or reasonable, or they may not, but there's no way to have the consultation with those communities. If the regime does not open itself up to providing some transparency to those communities, then at least those risk assessments and the material that the railways provide should be made public at some point.

[Hoang Mai, NDP, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

We will be hearing from the Canadian Railway Association about deregulation. Since the Liberals abandoned the public stake in rail transportation, it seems that the pace of privatization and deregulation has increased. Of course, some people will say that there was no deregulation because there were no regulations. However, both of you have mentioned the fact that the government allowed MMA to operate with only one operator onboard. Everyone in Canada said that this was not safe and that there should have been two operators, two conductors. The government had granted MMA an exemption and we all know what happened in Lac-Mégantic.

I do not want to extrapolate and we will let the TSB conduct a review into this matter. However, I would like to ask a question or two to the representatives of VIA Rail and Unifor.

What do you think about the fact of letting companies decide whether they want to have one or two operators onboard or not? What do you think about deregulation?

[Denis Pinsonneault]

At VIA Rail, we do not need a third party to bring about a culture of safety. I believe that our measures which assess whether our safety procedures are in place, are, at the very least, just as rigorous as those which could be implemented by a third party.

As you mentioned, you yourself are a client of VIA Rail. The main reason why people take the train is because they feel comfortable and relaxed doing so. The main reason why they are comfortable and relaxed is because they feel safe.

Our clients audit us four million times a year. They tell me that they feel safe. For us, this is a business issue. Our way of working is safe. I do not want to ever lose my daily obsession with safety. In that regard, we are not bound by the law, but rather by our culture of safety, which is one of the reasons why people do business with us.

[Jerry Dias]

MMA was given an exemption because of money, period. When we deregulated the industry and it went into private hands, it became about a profit-sharing centre as opposed to a public service. So it's about money.

That's why the only way that we can deal with this is through specific regulations, period. We said that there has to be two in the industry, not one, and do not leave it up to CN and CP, who frequently ask for exceptions themselves, by the way. It has to be very specific. We have to be very specific that we need two. It's the only way to prevent the Lac-Mégantics of the world from happening in the future.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you.

Mr. McGuinty, you have seven minutes.

[David McGuinty, Liberal, Ottawa South, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, everyone, and thank you for being here.

Mr. Del Bosco, I want to start with you if I could. There's a local issue here that's very important to raise.

Many of my constituents are asking about the crossings at Jockvale and Strandherd roads in Ottawa. Can you tell the people who are interested and concerned about this whether this has been corrected? Has VIA Rail corrected the problem there?

[Steve Del Bosco]

Just to qualify it, we realize that the issues over the last few months at these crossings have been an inconvenience to the residents of Ottawa. We understand that. We just want to say that at no time was their safety compromised, because basically the default position of the device is safe; the barrier closes.

To try to appease the concerns that people have, we have worked out a communication protocol with the City of Ottawa to make sure that when an occurrence happens, information is given quickly. We've also put some people on location at some of these locations.

Again, it's not because there was an immediate danger, because if there's an issue with the circuit, the gate will come down and it's rail safe. We're continuing to work with the suppliers, the manufacturers, and a third body that will.... We're waiting for a draft report to come out tomorrow, actually, to see what recommendations they have to make them more reliable.

[David McGuinty, Liberal, Ottawa South, ON]

Good.

Mr. Pinsonneault, you alluded to the fact that VIA's board of directors and management and the company as a whole put safety as a top priority. I want ask you and I want to ask Mr. Dias this. Have you read the Auditor General's report on rail safety, and to what extent are you both seized with the details?

[Denis Pinsonneault]

Sorry, I didn't get the question.

[David McGuinty, Liberal, Ottawa South, ON]

Have you read the Auditor General of Canada's report on rail safety? Has your board of directors read the report? Have your lawyers read the report?

Mr. Dias, to what extent are you and your union colleagues seized with the details of the recommendations in here?

The reason I ask this is simple. We've had a series of witnesses come forward and tell us that there are safety management systems in play. No doubt there is a strong culture of safety at VIA. No doubt there's one, apparently, at CN and CP. Although I asked the executive vice-president of CN Rail this week whether or not he was seized with this report, and his answer was, “It's not my job”—unbelievable—“to worry that the regulator is given enough money to regulate.”

Can you tell us if you've read the report? Because despite all you're saying, all your testimony, I think Canadians are going to believe the Auditor General before anybody else. Whether it's the management of VIA Rail, CN, or CP, or the labour movement, they're going to believe the Auditor General. I'm asking if you're seized with the findings in this report.

It's really serious business here. To what extent are you aware of what's going on here now in terms of Transport Canada's failings?

[Jean Tierney]

If I may, we have read the report. That's one of the reasons, though, we don't rely on anyone else other than ourselves to conduct audits to continuously monitor our safety performance. The auditors of Transport Canada have been very present with us, I must say, from a verification even on previous audits. I don't believe that was reflected in the report, all of the information, but they've been very present in our—

[David McGuinty, Liberal, Ottawa South, ON]

But the main conclusion of this report from the Auditor General is that Transport Canada can't say whether or not the safety management system is actually in place and providing safety. It's really simple here. This is a conclusive audit.

In three years, carrying four million passengers a year, VIA Rail was not audited once by Transport Canada in detail, not once. Of the audits that are required to keep our private sector railways safe, only 25% were conducted, based on what Transport Canada says is required.

So you know, it's partly holding VIA Rail's feet to the fire, and CN and CP, but it's also the role of the regulator, of Transport Canada, to do its job. If you go through this report, it's outrageous in terms of the detail around what's going on here. We can't sweep this under the carpet. It's all here in black and white. It's so serious that the Auditor General said when he testified that he's coming back to look at this again in a kind of mid-term, mid-course correction way.

Have you taken this to your board? Do you see that there are only nine inspectors when they need 20? Do you see that only 25% of audits have been conducted? Do you see that they can't even conclude that there is an SMS that's worthy in place?

What are Canadians riding VIA Rail supposed to make of this? What are of the workers with Unifor supposed to make of this?

Mr. Dias, can you help us understand?

[Jerry Dias]

Absolutely.

He can go ahead first, and then I'll complement what he says.