Thank you, Chair and members of the committee, for inviting Unifor to discuss our union's perspective on the future of rail safety in Canada as it relates to the transportation of dangerous goods and safety management systems, or SMS.
By way of introduction, I am Jerry Dias, national president of Unifor. With me today is Brian Stevens, national rail director.
Unifor is a new Canadian union formed on Labour Day weekend of 2013 as a result of the combination of the former CAW union and the CEP. Unifor is the largest union operating in the private sector, with more than 300,000 members working in at least 20 sectors of the economy, including all stages of the economic value chain from resources to manufacturing to transportation to private and public services.
We represent close to 85,000 members who work in the federal sector in air, marine, road, and telco, and for the purposes of this committee, just over 12,000 of our members work in the rail sector. Our members are involved in performing safety and maintenance inspections and repair of all passenger and freight cars as well as locomotives at the class I railways, VIA Rail, and a number of regional carriers.
Concerning transportation of dangerous goods, there are goalposts along the railbed of every regulatory change, and the July 7, 2013, Lac-Mégantic disaster comes at the tragic cost of 47 innocent lives. Not only did this disaster test the strength and resilience of family and community, but also of our country. Public confidence in the industry and the regulatory regime has been radically shaken. Public interests are no longer seen as being satisfied in the current regulatory framework that regulates Transport Canada, as observers and auditors of the industry.
The ministerial order of December 26, 2013, in respect to unattended trains and crew size has gone some distance to set out new rules. We do not see this as the end of the road, but rather as the first of many more steps we will need to take to improve rail safety, and more importantly, restore public confidence.
In addition to reviewing grades and duration that trains can be left unattended, the following would improve rail safety and would be in the public interest.
Reclassify crude oil that is shipped by railway tank cars to reflect its volatility.
Immediately ban the transportation of railbit in DOT-111A tank cars that have not been retrofitted to the new CPC-1232 standard, as an interim measure. We anticipate that the TSB report will contain specific recommendations on tank car standards.
Lower the speed of trains carrying dangerous goods when they are travelling through municipalities.
Ensure that a qualified rail mechanic would inspect all locomotive and freight car equipment before a train can be left unattended. Transport Canada should be responsible for licensing railcar mechanics or technicians who have spent four years or 8,000 hours in the trade as a TDG inspector.
Ensure that all trains, and more importantly trains carrying dangerous commodities, receive a visual safety and maintenance inspection every 1,600 kilometres by qualified railcar mechanics.
With regard to the SMS system, SMS is an explicit set of processes designed to integrate safety considerations into decision-making, planning, and operational activities. All federally regulated railways are required to have an SMS in place. As a result of the recently amended Railway Safety Act, there is currently a regulatory working group in place developing new SMS regulations that will include some new provisions, such as defining the accountable executive and ensuring enhanced employee involvement in developing SMS. We are especially pleased to see whistle-blower protection finally being afforded to workers in this industry.
What is worrisome, though, is the increased reliance and belief of the industry that risk assessments and risk control processes are reliable and unquestionably support implementing a change in operations. While an assessment process may turn a corporation's mind to taking risk into their planning and decision-making processes, our experience in the industry is that the decision to implement the change has already been made, and the risk assessment is simply another report that goes into the file. We have yet to see a risk assessment in which the corporation says, “Wow, we aren't doing that. It's too dangerous.”
Under the current regime, SMS risk assessments are privileged and confidential at the behest of the industry. The public will never know what factors were taken into consideration when the industry implemented a change in operations that are in the public interest.
It's no wonder that communities and community leaders like Calgary's Mayor Nenshi are skeptical of the industry. In our view, SMS risk assessments are nothing more than a lens the corporations are forced to look through when they are contemplating changes to their operations. It does little, if anything, to impact their decisions to make operational changes that serve the shareholders.
The industry also operates on the position that the SMS risk assessment is an appropriate substitute for occupational health and safety hierarchy of controls. It is not. To be clear, the occupational health and safety approach is much different in that it is anchored on a hierarchy of hazard elimination. It is about prevention.
Safe railway operation must mean just that: safe. Recognizing hazards, making extraordinary efforts to eliminate the hazards, and preventing future hazards must be first and foremost, not developing administrative measures as a way to ignore the hazards in order to find a way to live or die with the risks.
We would be happy to take your questions.