Thank you, Madam Chair and committee members.
My name is Massimo Bergamini. I'll move right into my presentation.
The National Airlines Council of Canada represents Canada's four largest airlines—Air Canada, Air Transat, WestJet and Jazz Aviation.
1 am pleased to be joined on this panel by representatives of three of the charter members of our organization, who will each speak to aspects of this legislation and the related process.
The National Airlines Council of Canada was created to do four things: facilitate industry consensus on key issues; act as a conduit with governments; develop and advocate for policies that support a safe, efficient and globally competitive aviation industry; and perhaps most important, provide a window on our industry and the ecosystem in which it operates.
Today I'm going to ask you to look through that window for a moment to consider the following proposition. The reason today flying is safer than walking to work, or that millions of people move across continents every day, taking off and landing with clockwork precision, is that there is no room for impatience, shortcuts or improvisation in commercial aviation.
lt's probably fair to say that to the legislators and regulators around the world who expect no less from their commercial aviation sectors, this a true proposition. They would say that.
Now let me ask you to consider whether that proposition carries any implications for your committee, for Parliament, or for the government. Because here we are, six months before a general election, discussing an aviation policy bill buried within a money bill—and we know what that means—after our industry was told that the government expects the whole process to be signed, sealed and delivered by April 1, 2020.
Let there be no mistake, any suggestion that this process mirrors the successful transfer of air traffic control functions to Nav Canada in 1996 is disingenuous at best. lt may be true that the bill that created Nav Canada was also embedded in the enabling legislation for budget 1996, but the similarities end there. The success of the Nav Canada model was the result of almost two years of tough negotiations, with almost weekly meetings where everything was on the table. Unlike the bill we have in front of us today, which is designed to expedite by government fiat the off-loading of airport security screening functions, the Nav Canada bill followed, reflected and finally enshrined in law the outcome of those negotiations.
Let me illustrate with two examples why this matters.
The Nav Canada bill of 1996 provides compensation for incremental costs stemming from ministerial directives. The bill you have before you does not. This is particularly important for us as it relates directly to one of the three key caveats we raised with the government in 2017, namely the need to recognize the impact of security shocks on the operations and funding of the new entity in order to protect the traveller's pocketbook.
We know that real and potential security threats can cause the imposition of new screening requirements resulting in additional costs. CATSA itself was created in response to such an event, as you know.
A security event in December 2009—the so called "underwear bomber"—prompted an increase in user fees the following year.
The second example relates to transition funding. Both the Nav Canada bill of 1996, and the security screening services commercialization act set a dollar amount to offset operating costs incurred before the new entity is able to secure an independent revenue stream.
The difference, and it's an important one, is that the level of transition funding provided to the fledgling Nav Canada was determined following negotiations and reflected a mutual understanding of what would be required for a successful launch.
While budget 2019 allocated $872 million for transition costs, we do not know how that quantum was arrived at, whether it includes ancillary costs such as the air marshal service or the CTA's new responsibilities, or whether it reflects current service standards or the start-up costs of the new organization.
Those are but two examples. There are others, but for now, let's dispose of the talking point that this bears any resemblance to the Nav Canada experience.
ln 2017 when Transport Canada surveyed industry stakeholders on governance and business model options for CATSA, our industry supported the transfer of its functions to a not-for-profit entity, in principle. As you will see in annexes 1 and 2 of this presentation, we did so with a number of serious questions and caveats.
Instead of engaging with our industry and other stakeholders to address them, for two years the government chose to leave those questions a dead letter. Now, as our industry is grappling with major operational challenges stemming from the grounding of the Max 8, the implementation of new flight duty times rules, and the impossible task of complying by July 1 with prescriptive new passenger rights rules, we are again confronted with a government-imposed deadline and process.
Surely no one would suggest that this way of conducting government business meets the standard of unhurried, prudent decision-making that our air carriers are expected to exemplify.
This brings me back to my original question to you: what are the implications of all this for you as parliamentarians and members of this committee?
As this is a money bill, there are limits to amendments you can introduce to improve it. That remains the prerogative of the minister, but you can use your bully pulpit to signal to the minister that you support an open, unhurried negotiation process, and that the bill must be amended to allow that process to begin.
Thank you.