I think the issue there is what “on time” means.
The existing regulatory framework will pay the railways the same amount of money whether we move the grain in six months or in 12 months. So that regulatory framework that exists does put a kind of overarching framework, if you will, in terms of how and when grain moves. There is no incentive built into the system today to allow us to provide more at peak capacity. There is an issue also with the railcar component.
So to the extent that farmers want to move grain in a peak period, they're no different from any other commodity shippers that are trying to maximize their netback. When I'm speaking about netback, I'm really speaking about grain companies, not farmers, and we need to kind of separate these two as two distinct groups.
If a grain company wants to benefit from higher market prices and wants to ship more when those prices are high, it is behaving in the same manner all other commodity producers behave. The question is what incentives can be built into the regulation that would encourage incremental capacity.
Today it's up to the railways to provide that service, but I have a rate regulation that says I can't earn any more to service people more volume in a peak capacity. They'll get a higher margin, but I get the same margin. So there's something broken in the existing regulation, I think, that we need to fix if we really want to incent incremental peak-period types of shipments to benefit grain companies' margins, where the railways could at least somewhat participate in that upside potential.
James, do you want to add anything?