Thank you for the privilege of being here today.
Some of you may know of me as the commissioner who led the three-year inquiry into the disaster that occurred at Dryden, Ontario, when an aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff, killing 24 people. In my four-volume final report, I made 191 recommendations for change, including the complete rewriting of Canada's antiquated aviation regulations. Subsequent to the release of my report, aviation safety improved. Transport Canada initiated appropriate oversight and inspection, and enforced safety requirements, but not so today.
For the past 15 years, Transport Canada has become complacent. Funding has been cut, and the inspectorate has dwindled to numbers not seen since the days before the Dryden crash. You'll hear a lot about safety management systems during your mini-study. My main message to you is that without properly funded direct operational oversight conducted by qualified and trained inspectors, SMS will not improve safety or protect air passengers. SMS was never intended to replace direct operational oversight, yet Transport Canada has done precisely that. Direct operational oversight through audits and no-notice inspections are the exception, not the rule.
For the past 15 years, Transport Canada has been progressively dismantling its oversight program, and now it is eliminating safety surveillance of entire sectors of the industry. After the private jet aircraft carrying Jim Prentice crashed outside Kelowna last summer, Transport Canada admitted it had ceased safety oversight of that sector of aviation four years before, in 2012.
As of August 17, 2016, it removed urban heliports, like the one in Foothills Hospital in Calgary, from its oversight program. Aircraft doing dangerous aerial work to maintain hydro facilities, fight fires, and the like will no longer be subject to any scheduled safety checks.
In addition, all airports in Canada will no longer be subject to full safety assessments. Inspections will now cover only one small part of an airport's safety plan, and those checks could be done as infrequently as once in every five years. By comparison, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration requires full inspections of airports annually.
Transport Canada did not publish those decisions in the Canada Gazette. They did not inform Parliament, MPs, or the public. These decisions were made by internal memo alone. They are now public only because a concerned party released them. I'm tabling with your committee the internal process bulletin 2016-09, in both official languages, where these decisions are documented.
The singular reliance on SMS and withdrawal from direct operational oversight has made flying less safe today than it was 15 years ago. I urge you to recommend to the government that it provide adequate funding for safety oversight, or a per ticket passenger safety fee.
Finally, I recommend the appointment of a commission of inquiry to investigate the state of aviation safety in Canada. I submit, with respect, that you ought to treat this issue with urgency, and not rest until you see meaningful steps to restore direct operational oversight. Among the lives you save could be your own.