I'll make a couple of comments first on where we saw some of the flaws in extended interswitching, and then bring it across to where LHI has flaws.
Extended interswitching was done at a regulatory costing at a prescribed rate, which didn't necessarily give us an adequate return. You were effectively giving a regulated, below-cost rate to an American shipper or carrier to gain access to our networks. So that was one of them.
Another component was that it was very regional, which I think the government has acknowledged in some of the amendments it has made.
Then, what's carried over—the final flaw—was this lack of reciprocity. Today let's say that the Burlington Northern has a downturn in crude oil going to the Pacific northwest. It can now choose to fill that vacant capacity and try to cover its fixed cost of that capacity by potentially getting the shipper to get an LHI rate down to the border, and then pricing the rest of the move very cheaply and attracting that volume to be incremental on the top to fill the density.
As you've heard, that takes revenue away from the Canadian railways, takes jobs away from Canadians, and it also takes the density out of the other components in our supply chain, such as the ports. That's the third component that we see is the flaw.