Many of the remedies we have in the act today actually came as a result of possibly a maverick, Don Mazankowski, back in the eighties. The advent of the National Transportation Act of 1987 introduced final offer arbitration and the competitive line rate mechanism. It changed the interswitching mechanism to the thing we have today. Those were bold.
CLR, as you've heard, doesn't work. The railways have refused to compete with one another on that basis. They don't have to. There's no law that requires them to compete with one another. What we're talking about, again, is a market structure problem. When you create a remedy, you want that remedy to be effective, to act as a surrogate for what the market is not going to be able to do.
I practise in the area of antitrust law, and in antitrust economics, the main thing we want is for competition to occur. In a natural monopoly environment, like the one we have here with the railways—not for their entire systems but for large parts of their systems—you want every mechanism available to allow those rail carriers to compete without restrictions. That's where I would say LHI has largely gone wrong. It imposes a bunch of unnecessary restrictions that really will keep those railways from having to compete with one another and with others.
Have I answered that adequately? I may not have.