I understand your question better now. In fact, it was mentioned earlier by one of our esteemed members that it was a software failure. Actually, it wasn't, and most aircraft accidents are a combination of various things.
In terms of one of the things we've learned and one of the things we questioned very early on—and I think this is more to your point—it's that given what we now understand and that we didn't as well as we should have, perhaps, about the MCAS, that system, its failure modes and the resulting effects in the cockpit with an AOA disconnect, an angle of attack indicator disconnect, what we've learned from there has implications with respect to the design itself, the basic architecture, but also with respect to whether the training was indeed sufficient.
In other words, were the changes between, in this case, the NG and the Max, adequately reflected in the training material? You see, the key to all of this is that the training material in the OE is a direct result of the design. It's not the other way around. You design the airplane, it has functionality, and you create training material that reflects the design. If there are aspects of the design that are not sufficiently covered by the training material, that may be what comes out of this.