Transport Committee on March 12th, 2020

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Doherty.

Mr. Bittle.

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, St. Catharines, ON]

This is just a suggestion. Perhaps we can save this for the committee business portion, which we've extended, and hear from the witnesses. There was a significant request from the opposition to extend the time because they desperately wanted to hear from these witnesses. Now we're eating into that time. Maybe, then, we can table this for the time that we set aside to actually discuss committee business.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Bittle.

Is there any further comment?

Mr. Bachrach.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

I will move that we table it until the beginning of committee business.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Shall we table it until committee business?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Bachrach, and thank you, members.

Mr. Doherty, the floor is yours.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want it on record that I was in aviation for 22 years, both on the airline side.... I was a proud WestJetter—sorry, Air Canada—and I had a company that worked with other carriers as well. I also was in airports and Transport Canada.

I take safety and security, as you mentioned so aptly, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Strom and Mr. Hudson, as being always paramount. If a mistake is made, that's a bad day, which is, I guess, why emotions are running high, given some of the information that I've received.

I'm not an expert on certification. I will defer to Mr. Turnbull and the minister on that.

My question is for all three of the carriers, given the information that was mentioned in the previous testimony.

At any time, was information brought forward to your carriers about Transport Canada's concern with respect primarily to the stall identification the FAA was using on the 737 Max?

[Murray Strom]

No, it wasn't. I wasn't in this position at that time, but I was never made aware of it. However, in most certifications and from my experience working with the certification group, normally that would not be something brought forward to us.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Does anybody else...?

[Capt Scott Wilson]

I concur with that. I was in the current position when the Max was brought into WestJet.

Again, we're independent from the certification process, so once the aircraft has a validation and we have an operating certificate, we're able to basically move forward.

The information was not available to us.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Mr. Wilson, WestJet has a long history of the 737 being its primary aircraft. Would it have been the expectation of the company that the stall identification criteria applied on the 737 Max would be the same as for any other aircraft they've had?

[Capt Scott Wilson]

That's a complex question. When you look at the requirements concerning how a type is validated, from the basis of the 800 NG to the Max, the whole point of many of the items they've talked about, including MCAS, was to ensure that they basically met the certification requirements.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Thank you.

Are you familiar with the term “nose-down pitch not readily arrested”?

[Capt Scott Wilson]

I am.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

This issue was brought forward from day one by Transport Canada technical experts, and the fact that Boeing was using this as their stall criteria.

Would it raise a concern to you that Transport Canada technical experts raised this issue time and again with the FAA and that the FAA and Boeing refused to answer what stall criteria were being applied on the 737 Max?

[Capt Scott Wilson]

With the detail not fully and readily available to me on what you're actually probing into, sir, I can't effectively answer.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Okay.

I'm going to read an excerpt:

CPC FT 03 has raised again understanding of FAA interpretation of 14 CFR 25.201.

That is Canada's stall identification compliance for the 737 Max.

The approach used by the FAA on the 737 8 MAX is different than what Transport Canada's civil aviation has used on its domestic programs, and even what the FAA has used on other programs such as the 787. This concerned paper will not prevent Transport Canada's issuing, as TCCA will use its 737 9 validation to address this issue with the FAA.

Does that raise any concerns with you?

[Capt Scott Wilson]

Issue papers and concern papers are a normal process, going back and forth. We have been transparently included now with the process we're going through, as far as the recertification of the MCAS software, the flight control software, is concerned

We understand and we see that concerns are raised and that they basically go through an evolution to get to a common understanding or ground. Without knowing what the understanding was truly aligned with, particularly with respect to the individuals involved on the Transport Canada side, I couldn't comment beyond that.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Thank you.

I'll turn it over to Mr. Davidson.

[Scot Davidson, Conservative, York—Simcoe, ON]

Thanks for appearing here today. We all applaud your commitment to aviation safety in Canada.

My question would be about what I will call the AOA or angle of attack “disagree”. It was installed in the 737 Max and was pushed by Boeing sales people as a safety option that airlines could pay for. I believe WestJet had that option, the AOA indicator.

It seems hard to believe that Boeing was pushing a safety option on an AOA.

[Capt Scott Wilson]

I believe you're talking about the angle-of-attack indicator.

[Scot Davidson, Conservative, York—Simcoe, ON]

That's correct.

[Capt Scott Wilson]

One is the AOA alert, the “disagree” alert.

[Scot Davidson, Conservative, York—Simcoe, ON]

Yes.