I wouldn't express that there were many differences. We each have a delegation system. At their very root, or the reason for their existence, they are similar. The key comes down to, in my view, the degree of oversight that is carried out by the authority. We both delegate responsibilities, but in our system and in the FAA, as it should be, the fact you've delegated authority does not preclude, or alleviate the responsibility of the regulator to understand the design. That's key to this issue.
Clearly, in the case of the 737 MAX, there were issues about the aircraft design that were not known and not understood by the FAA. That's the fundamental starting point of where this happened. As I've explained previously to an earlier question, our delegation system has traditionally evolved to a point where we consider a certification project as a partnership with our delegated applicants. We work hand-in-hand with them, and we work on this together.
The decision at the end, the individual decision of delegates to make the individual determination of compliance to all the standards the aircraft must meet, is truly given and done by them, but that decision is not made without our full knowledge and concurrence right to the end of the project.
The possibility of there being something unknown or not understood in our system, and to a great degree with many of the certifications that come from the FAA, are of that nature. Something happened with respect to the dynamic between Boeing and the FAA in that particular instance. We all know the story. It's not the way it's supposed to work.