I think what's happened is over time we have seen two waves—and scholars debate whether it's two waves or three waves—but let's just say it's two waves of P3s. There are ones that were developed in the nineties and early 2000s, that I think by any measure—a lot of them—were quite a disaster. It had to do with trying to achieve off-book financing, which is illusory, or perhaps trying to offload too much risk as the Conservatives in the U.K. found with their PFI model before 1997, and issues like that.
What happened was the P3 model became more tailored to what's needed by P3 investors. There's a kind of sweet spot around what size these projects are in terms of dollar amounts, capital costs, and then the length of the operations or maintenance components, how much risk is exactly transferred, what types of risks. These are commercially variable risks, there isn't any uncertainty that might come up.
The model has been refined over time, and now we have P3 screens at the provincial level, and there's this routine development that's proceeded with, where essentially most are capital projects in this certain range.
Whether that means they're actually better over time or not, I would argue that they aren't, but essentially what's happened is that it has created a routine condition where P3s are the norm, rather than actually establishing what was particularly wrong in the public sector in the first place and that could have been ameliorated in other ways.
I would just like to speak quickly about what you said about the CIB. I opened my statement saying it hasn't done much. Just looking through the 13 projects that were announced, over half are in the MOU stage, a couple are basically providing low-cost financing, some are advisory services. I don't know what the CIB is going to be. I thought I knew in 2015-16, but, yes, it's not clear. What they've talked about is what I mentioned, commercialized projects, bringing in global capital, this kind of thing. That sounds like a P3 to me, so it remains to be seen.