Thank you.
Just to add to what Mr. Robinson was saying, because of our due diligence and our very careful investigation, it was Transport Canada that discovered the original simulators used for training were not programmed to actually allow the pilots to exercise and carry out the procedures associated with the runaway stabilizer events. In other words, the system had been designed in a way that required pilot input, yet we discovered that the simulators had not been capably equipped to run the pilots through those specific training scenarios. That problem has hence been fixed.
We were front and centre in pushing very hard for procedural emphasis to ensure that the pilot actions that were required were clarified and emphasized, such that when the design was dependent on a pilot action to mitigate a particular concern, the procedures associated with that would be sufficient to bring the pilot up to a sufficient level of awareness to be able to control the aircraft.
We also discovered that the testing of the aircraft without the speed trim system, which includes MCAS off, was not performed. It was our influence that caused the FAA to initiate a significant activity to re-evaluate the characteristics of the aircraft with those systems off. Fortunately for all, we discovered that the aircraft is in fact quite controllable with those systems unavailable.
Further, although the basic design change that we will be validating is technically identical to that which the FAA has approved, we are adding an additional procedural element that allows the deactivation of an erroneously firing stalled stick shaker system. We had deemed it through our own evaluation to be a considerable distraction to the pilot during these failure scenarios. This was recorded in the accident reports as well.
We participated significantly, and I think my team did a great job on the JATR study. We were front and centre in having a very strong voice to speak to the nature of the concerns that related to the application of the changed product rule, which is part of what Mr. Primeau incidentally was concerned about as well.
In addition, we were pushing for the need to acknowledge that, although we have and are about to validate a design change that makes the aircraft perfectly safe, we asked if Boeing could produce some additional changes that would come post-RTS to further enhance the safety of the aircraft. I think we were instrumental in having Boeing put a number of future modifications, which should be considered as product improvements, on the table.