Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
It's good to see everyone again this evening.
At the end of our last meeting, we left off with a motion that I had put forward regarding the disclosure of some documents related to emergency response assistance plans and key route risk assessments. While these assessments and plans are required by Transport Canada, both are written and compiled by the shippers of dangerous goods and by the railway companies.
The scope of this study that we've undertaken is about whether communities have adequate capacity to protect their safety and whether the emergency response plans that are in place—and which are required by Transport Canada—are up to the task of saving human lives and preventing the destruction of our communities in cases of rail disasters.
I don't think we can get very far in this study without seeing the contents of the existing response plans and the risk assessments, without better understanding what those risks are, and without understanding the level of detail and the scrutiny that Transport Canada requires of the companies that operate in this space.
I have had some conversations off-line with members of the government, who have expressed concerns about the sensitivity of some of the information contained in those response plans, and by no means do I want to put our communities or the country at any level of additional risk through the disclosure of documents. I want to make that very clear. If there's information in those response plans that could jeopardize or expose our communities to additional risk, that's certainly not my intention. However, we have the ability, as a committee, to seek documents, to hold them in confidence and to use their contents to inform our work and the scope of our inquiry. That's very much the intention of my motion.
I did craft the motion on the fly at the last meeting. Sometimes, if you sleep on it for a few nights, you come up with some other ideas about how it might better serve its purpose. I know I can't amend my own motion, but I'd like to offer a revised version that, perhaps, addresses some of the concerns we've heard from the government.
The new motion text that I would be comfortable with would read:
That Transport Canada provide to the committee by January 15, 2025, the [unredacted] emergency response assistance plans and key route risk assessments applicable to the following rail routes: Prince George-Prince Rupert, Fraser Canyon, Montreal-Sorel, Toronto-Windsor; that the documents in question be provided in both official languages and considered at an in camera meeting of the committee to take place before February 15, 2025; and that the documents be kept confidential by the committee and committee members.
It's been expressed to me by some of my colleagues that I don't know what's in these plans, that what's in them isn't actually what I want to see in the first place and that I should just keep my nose out of it. That may very well be the case. I think the best way to find out is by seeing the documents. Maybe these documents aren't relevant to our line of inquiry, but they remain some of the key plans that protect our communities.
I did take the chance, over the past couple of days since our last meeting, to go on Transport Canada's website to learn more about emergency response assistance plans specifically. The website lays out in great detail what is required of those plans. I'll just read, for the committee's edification, a few of the requirements. It includes creating the potential incident analysis, or PIA. Companies' PIAs, potential incident analyses, “must include, at a minimum, the following four scenarios”:
Scenario 1: An anticipated release of dangerous goods
For example, a...tanker containing hydrochloric acid involved in a rollover...with no apparent loss of contents.
Scenario 2: The release of less [than] 1% of the dangerous goods in a means of containment
For example, a full DOT105J500W rail car inspected in a rail yard is giving off an odour of chlorine at the protective housing.
Scenario 3: The release of more than 50% of the dangerous goods in a means of containment
For example, multiple intermediate bulk containers...were punctured and are leaking in a road trailer that has been involved in a motor vehicle collision.
Again, that doesn't pertain specifically to rail. These ERAPs apply across the entire dangerous goods environment. The ones that we're looking for pertain specifically to rail transport.
It goes on:
Scenario 4: The exposure to fire of a means of containment that contains dangerous goods
I think that one in particular is of interest when we're talking about protecting our communities from industrial fires related to dangerous goods shipped by rail.
For “What to include for each scenario”, the companies that ship these products are required to explain the following:
the possible consequences of the release or anticipated release
the measures, organized by tier, to be taken in response to the release or anticipated release for each scenario
the persons responsible for taking the measures
In addition to persons who will respond on [their] behalf, [they may] include persons responsible for taking measures not identified in the ERAP. For example, [companies] may identify municipal first responders in [the] PIA.
Going on to “ERAP response equipment”, they have to list the availability of equipment and the type and amount of equipment that will be brought to bear in a dangerous goods emergency.
For “Availability of equipment”, the company must show whether it owns and maintains the equipment itself. It must “have identified suppliers where response equipment can be procured and delivered to the site”.
It says:
Plan for the worst
Certain incident scenarios may require more equipment than could be expected or planned for. If you own, maintain and replenish the equipment yourself, mention alternative third parties in the ERAP, such as other responders or suppliers that could provide additional equipment.
It goes on and on, Mr. Chair. I don't want to belabour this point, but if you go further on, it talks about “Fire response knowledge and skills”. Companies are required to lay out the knowledge and skills of their teams.
It also requires them to list the locations of those teams. There are response times that are required. They have to list whether they plan to deploy personnel by air to meet response times. There are all sorts of criteria around the deployment of teams by air.
This is a serious consideration for the communities I represent, because, to my knowledge, the nearest team is up to four hours away from the communities they would be responding to. These are the specialized haz-mat teams that would be required. That leaves the local volunteer fire department as the front line of defence.
When it comes to municipal fire departments and other first responders, there's a whole section of these ERAPs that talks about third party responders. The companies are required to list which responders they have agreements with and what capacity those responders have. This is a comprehensive emergency response plan.
I had a conversation with a local fire chief yesterday, and he described a scenario involving a road accident in which a tank truck had crashed and there was a release of a dangerous good. His department responded very valiantly and were able to mitigate the situation and to stop the release of the dangerous goods. With the emergency response assistance plan, you end up in a situation in which you have the transportation company and you have the shipper of the dangerous goods, and, in some cases, they end up fighting over liability for the situation. It took two days before the responsible party was able to visit the scene and carry out its obligations.
These are the things that we need to find out as a committee. It's whether these emergency response assistance plans are adequate, whether they're sufficient to protect our communities and whether the resources that are included in these plans are close enough to get there quickly.
We heard what I think was fairly alarming testimony from Transport Canada at our last meeting, about some of these high-consequence scenarios. They read into the record the very short amount of time that first responders have to evacuate people in the case of a serious haz-mat event in a rail yard. It's nine minutes and an evacuation radius of 1.7 kilometres.
When we're talking about specialized teams that are up to four hours away by road and have to get there in inclement winter weather, I think there are some very serious questions that people in our communities should be asking about whether these plans are sufficient. It may be that when we see the plans, they're much more detailed and much more effective than we think they are or than I think they are, in which case, I would find that very comforting.
I think the only way to know that is to see the plans.
We want to protect any sensitive information that might be in the plans, and that's the reason for the amended version of the motion. I believe that it achieves that by bringing it to an in camera meeting of the committee and holding it in confidence. If we look at this information and decide that it is in the public interest for it to be released publicly, we can choose to do that either in whole or in part.
Our responsibility as a committee on behalf of Canadians and on behalf of the communities we represent is to ensure that we get to the bottom of this question about whether the government is carrying out its fundamental responsibility to keep them safe and to regulate a sector that carries dangerous goods through the hearts of our towns and our villages.
I'll leave it at that, Mr. Chair. I hope my colleagues will agree to dispense with this in short order so that we can hear from our excellent witnesses who are here today. I certainly want to hear from them.
I know I went on at some length—I see Mr. Badawey laughing—but this is really serious stuff, and I think we need to see the documents.
Thank you.