Thank you, Chair. I appreciate that and certainly when it comes to the respect I have for all members—they're duly elected—I find very curious the tone that this conversation has all of a sudden taken.
When it comes to the very direct relevance, I will quickly finish reading this because I know my colleagues want to have an opportunity to intervene as well. Let me jump back to where I was, Chair, and look forward to the relevance of this to the matter at hand.
The CCLA goes on to say,
Secrecy undermines accountability and due process: Bill C-26 enables the government to shroud its orders in secrecy, with no mandatory public reporting requirements. While there is an understandable need for some degree of confidentiality in this sphere, the public needs to have a sense of how these powers are being exercised...and to what effect, if decision-makers are to be held to account. Individuals and services collaterally impacted by Bill C-26 must also be given an opportunity to challenge Security Orders.
The next point is “Unknowable orders trump public regulation”.
Bill C-26 tilts the balance so far towards secrecy, its orders and regulations may take precedence over decisions previously issued by regulatory agencies, risking confusion where such regulatory decisions are public while the Security Orders are not. This threatens the integrity and accessibility of Canada's regulatory frameworks, and renders the security-related rules currently in effect unknowable for members of the public.
They go on to say in the next point, “Secret evidence in Court” that:
Even if Security Orders are subjected to judicial review, Bill C-26 could restrict applicants' access to evidence. The legislation does not include any consideration of security-cleared advocates to be appointed on applicants' behalf, as happens in other national security cases. While such provisions are an imperfect solution for due process, they do provide at least a minimal level of protection for applicants' rights. C-26 even empowers judges to make rulings based on secret evidence that is not provided, even in summary form, to applicants or their legal team. It also places the onus on the target of Security Orders to bring legal proceedings, with the associated cost burden.
Next is “Power without accountability for the CSE:”
The CCSPA would let the Communications Security Establishment—Canada's signal intelligence and cybersecurity agency—obtain and analyze security-related data from companies that Canadians entrust with their most sensitive personal information. This would include federally-regulated banks and credit unions, telecommunications and energy providers, and even some transit agencies. The CSE's use of this information is not constrained to the cybersecurity aspect of its mandate, and any uses would be largely subject to after-the-fact review rather than real-time oversight, resulting in a significant deficit in democratic accountability.
Their final point states that there's a lack of justification.
Although the government claims that such sweeping and secretive new powers are required it has not published any sufficiently comprehensive data establishing the necessity and proportionality of the proposed powers.
They conclude by saying:
In sum, cybersecurity is important and we need to get it right: All residents of Canada can agree on the need for cybersecurity. However, civil liberties, privacy, and confidence in the rule of law and accountable governance are foundational for that sense of security. It is imperative that in its efforts to deliver strong cybersecurity for people in Canada, the government also ensures accountability and upholds basic rights.