My apologies, Dr. Lewis. The floor is yours.
As I was saying, what is very concerning is that Canada is one of the few G20 nations without a firm regulatory framework around cybersecurity. It's essential at this point, when we're looking at Bill C-33 and Bill C-26, that we keep in mind the need for Canada to act to protect the nation's critical infrastructure and the interconnectedness of these two bills.
We also know that in 2016, member states of the EU passed what was called the most comprehensive cybersecurity bill in the history of the EU. The bill was called the NIS Directive. The EU cybersecurity rules, which were introduced in 2016, were updated and later ratified in 2023. They continue to modernize and create this legal framework, which I think is quite instructive in the Canadian context. It keeps up and it increases the digitization...and the evolving cybersecurity threat, which is something we are attempting to grapple with in the present bills we are contemplating.
Expanding the scope of cybersecurity rules in the new sectors and entities further improves the resilience. We have dealt with resilience in the infrastructure context in this committee. This is also a very important part of what we're talking about in Bill C-33.
We have seen the problems that a huge infrastructure gap can cause, and one of the problems is the ongoing lack of transparency. We have seen, in our situation with the taxpayer-funded Canada Infrastructure Bank, an unacceptable performance over the last seven years. We want to build mechanisms into Bill C-33 to make sure we're not falling into the same traps and shortcomings we've had with other legislation.
Moreover, we have provisions in Bill C-33 that also raise concerns on cybersecurity and response capabilities of the public and private sector entities and competent authorities. In the case that I was discussing before, the EU as a whole can be used as an example of a model that Canada could adopt. When we're contemplating this bill, I think we should look at enabling legislation from different jurisdictions.
We know that most G7 member states are under the umbrella of the EU. The U.S. and the U.K. and Japan have separately implemented cybersecurity regulations to differing degrees, which I think are also instructive in how we confuse Bill C-33 with Bill C-26.
We also have to look at Canadian businesses and how they continue to be impacted by malicious cybersecurity and cyber-activity. This ranges from cyber-attacks to ransomware, and even things that we are exposed to on an everyday basis.
Many of these attacks include those on critical infrastructure. That accounts for nearly half of the attacks, and many of those go unreported.
This is very concerning. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security has identified attacks on operations networks. They've also identified attacks on how it would impact the physical safety of Canadians. That was published in their biennial publication, the “National Cyber Threat Assessment”.
Now, in this context, when we look at the Ministry of Public Safety, we know that they acted to introduce new legislation, Bill C-26, an act respecting cyber security. I believe it was at the first stage in Parliament sometime in November 2022, and it went through second reading, I think, on March 27, 2023. Bill C-26 currently sits in committee. I believe it's going into law, if it hasn't done so already. When we look at where it is, going through the committee stage, and we look at the fact that Bill C-33 is contemplating sections of this bill, we know that it's very important for us to focus on it, because it may have the capacity of adding teeth to the governance and compliance structure of cybersecurity in Bill C-33.
It's very important that we look at the interconnectedness of these two bills, especially inasmuch as is needed in the area of operational technology where critical infrastructure lies.
Although we don't know how the bill is going to necessarily impact on Bill C-33, between the absence of similar legislation in Canada.... We don't know what the impact is going to be, because this is new. This is untested territory, but we know there is an increasing trend toward increased cybersecurity regulation among our international peers.
Having practised international law for a number of years, I can see the importance of Canadian businesses being prepared. Contemplation of this aspect of the bill and how it will be infused in Bill C-33 is very important at this time.
Canada does not have an overarching governing cybersecurity legislation, let alone require the reporting of vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure breaches, which is extremely problematic. Bill C-26 would empower some regulators to impose fines or issue some summary convictions to ensure governance and compliance. This is something that my colleague, Mr. Kurek, spoke about. It's critical to turn our minds to that, especially as we contemplate this bill.
Now I'll go back to Bill C-26. In its current form it includes four critical infrastructure sections, which I think are related to the transportation aspect of Bill C-33. When we look at the transportation corridors that are contemplated in Bill C-33, we see, in Bill C-26, that it's very important to look at these four critical infrastructure sectors: telecommunications, finance, energy and transportation.
The requirements for organizations in these sections are threefold.
First is to implement, maintain and report on the cybersecurity program, which will essentially address the risks across organizations. It will address the risk in third party services. It will address the risk in supply chain—