Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I think this is important. Again, the title in Bill C-33 says “Coordinating Amendment”, and then the subtitle is “Bill C-26”. If Bill C-26, which was introduced in the first session of the 44th Parliament and is entitled “An Act respecting cyber security, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments other Acts”, receives royal assent, that is what I am talking about. The title does not say, “if clause 18 of that act receives royal assent”, but it talks about the bill, and clause 18 cannot be considered in isolation from the rest of the bill.
I'm sorry. Perhaps, Mr. Bachrach, when he gets the floor in a more extended way, can indicate why he thinks we should focus solely on a certain section. It's very clear in my reading of Bill C-33 that we are discussing whether or not we believe there should be coordinating amendments with a piece of legislation, Bill C-26, which, as the witness just said, is about cybersecurity. Clause 18 is about cybersecurity and it's about how we deal with threats to cybersecurity in the transportation space.
I've highlighted numerous briefings that referenced the transportation sector as being one of the key sectors that are impacted by Bill C-26. Certainly, I don't think we can consider one section of a bill. It's not a private member's bill that amends one section of a bill that we're considering here; this is the entire bill, as is said in the title, “Bill C-26”. If Bill C-26 receives royal assent, then these following issues happen.
I'm expressing, and putting on the record, some very serious concerns about Bill C-26. I remain hopeful as I continue to read these things from people who are very concerned about things like the implications on the rights of Canadians under the charter.
I know Mr. Bachrach is a fan of the charter. Certainly he would want to ensure, in any clause he voted on, that the concerns of individuals who spend their lifetimes defending charter rights are considered. He would want to have knowledge of the impact that this bill, which is referenced directly—the entire bill, not just one section, but the entire bill—could have on the charter rights of Canadians.
I will continue to talk about Bill C-26 in its entirety, because that is a piece of legislation that includes the relevant section that he's talking about. It's not a stand-alone clause that has been introduced by the government. This does not specifically indicate that if clause 18 remains unamended or if it's taken on its own, it could receive royal assent. It talks about Bill C-26 receiving royal assent.
I appreciate the latitude given to members of Parliament to raise their concerns and to share the concerns of Canadians when we're considering a piece of legislation as important as Bill C-33, which cross-references specifically, purposely, Bill C-26, which is also currently before the House.
I appreciate the spirit in which Mr. Bachrach's comments were made. However, I simply don't believe that you can consider clause 18 in isolation when considering Bill C-26. We would do Bill C-26 and what it means to Canadians a disservice if we simply talked about clause 18. I will get to that part when we break down the detailed analysis of the clause, but this is the information that I believe is relevant when considering whether or not we can support clause 124.
I will continue, because I know that it would be extremely out of order to rule that we weren't allowed to talk about a bill in our deliberations here that is specifically referenced by title in the first part of this clause,.
I will hopefully not omit any of the information that I had here. If so, I apologize to Citizen Lab for not getting all of their words in there.
I'll start back again at the text under Freedom of Expression and Section 2(b) of the Charter”, which states that:
14. The current draft of Bill C-26's excessive secrecy and confidentiality provisions jeopardizes the right to freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter. The government's Charter statement focuses on the speech of the commercial entities who will be directly regulated under Bill C-26. The Charter statement posits that because restrictions on commercial speech do not tend to implicate the core values of section 2(b), restrictions can be more easily justified. However, this analysis fails to account for how individuals' Charter rights may be impeded under the current drafting of the legislation. The excessive secrecy and confidentiality provisions in the bill also restrict the public's and media's expressive freedom in Canada.
15. The principles of open courts and open government are derivative components of section 2(b) of the Charter (the freedom of expression). The open court principle requires that court proceedings, including judicial reviews in federal court, presumptively be open and accessible to the public and to the media. Access to information about government actions can also arise as a derivative right to section 2(b), if a denial of access to government information effectively precludes meaningful public discussion on a matter of public interest. Where restrictions on access substantially impede meaningful discussion and criticism about matters of public interest, the government must reasonably justify its infringement of the freedom of expression.
16. Telecommunications and cybersecurity law and policy is undoubtedly a matter of public interest. There is a close nexus between human rights and public policy concerning the regulation of telecommunication services. Canada's telecommunications policy is intimately linked with the “social and economic fabric” of Canada and its regions. Equitable access to telecommunication services is sometimes described as a mechanism for “digital self-determination”, which speaks to the need to protect the potential for human flourishing in the digital era.
17. The recent Citizen Lab report, “Finding You”, highlights several ways in which excessive secrecy surrounding telecommunications oversight has itself endangered the public. The authors note historical deficiencies in oversight and accountability of network security, which have led to geolocation-related threats associated with contemporary networks. Excessive secrecy has contributed to the persistence of the “low-hanging geolocation threat” identified in “Finding You”:
Decades of poor accountability and transparency have contributed to the current environment where extensive geolocation surveillance attacks are not reported. This status quo has effectively created a thriving geolocation surveillance market while also ensuring that some telecommunications providers have benefitted from turning a blind eye to the availability of their network interconnections to the surveillance industry.
18. The geolocation surveillance threats discussed in “Finding You” disproportionately jeopardize human rights defenders and other individuals who face heightened risks of targeted security threats (e.g. corporate executives, military personnel, politicians and their staff, senior bureaucrats, etc). Industry has historically charged large amounts of money to receive information about well-known industry threats, with the effect of impeding non-industry groups such as security researchers and civil society from obtaining and disseminating information about the nature of the threats faced by at-risk individuals, or from advocating for the remedies that would benefit the security and privacy of civil society. The authors note that, in many instances, individuals cannot determine whether their own telecommunication provider has “deployed and configured security firewalls to ensure that signalling messages associated with geolocation attacks, identity attacks or other malicious activity are not directed towards their phones.”
19. Citizen Lab's research highlights the substantial public interest—