Mr. Speaker, it gives me great pleasure to rise today to speak on Bill C-55, an act to establish the Yukon Surface Rights Board.
I do not speak often on aboriginal matters but I thought this bill merited comment. In fact the last time I spoke on aboriginal matters in the House was to argue for an amendment to the private member's bill which declared ice hockey as Canada's national sport. The amendment which was accepted declared the great aboriginal sport of lacrosse to be Canada's summer national sport.
Aboriginal issues are important to me in particular and should be important to every member from British Columbia. As we know, most of the territory of the province of British Columbia is the subject of some form of land claim by our aboriginal peoples. It is my belief that the precedent set in Yukon may become the precedent for settling claims in British Columbia. Therefore it is important for me to address these issues.
I have a few preliminary comments to make before I get into a detailed discussion of the clauses of the bill. The bill is the third in a trilogy of bills dealing with the settlement of land claims in Yukon. The Reform Party opposed the first two bills which established the settlement of the land claims. Logically, therefore, we oppose Bill C-55 which establishes the mechanism to implement these settlements, or alternatively to settle disputes relating to the claim.
I understand the feeling that a mechanism should be found to resolve disputes without the necessity of going to court. Courts are expensive. Justice usually is not swift. However this leads me to make two comments.
First, perhaps the inefficient slow moving courts would be useful in these circumstances because the possibility of going to court would be seen as such a detriment that settlements may be more easily achieved by the parties involved. I think that is what we would want. Perhaps in this instance the threat of going to court is one to be preserved, not put aside.
My second point deals with the courts themselves. If the courts are in such a state that even the government does not want them involved in settling disputes of the kind presented by the Yukon land claims, maybe we should take a hard look at reforming the courts of the country.
Courts were established to settle disputes between parties. They exist. The infrastructure is there. The salaries of those involved are already paid. Why should we not then use them to settle disputes such as the ones presented here? If the courts because of inefficiencies are not seen to be the appropriate vehicle then maybe we should streamline our judicial system
instead of establishing a new board. We should address reform of our civil law courts.
However I realize that judicial and court reform will not happen before the bill is passed. The government has a majority in the House. We will soon be stuck with the Yukon Surface Rights Board. For this reason I wish to make the following general comment.
I particularly wish to address the fact that this board will only deal with disputes after the parties themselves, the people involved in the dispute, have failed to reach an amicable solution. How will the board know the parties have failed to reach such a solution? Would it not be better if representatives of the board met with the parties prior to the parties going to the board? Such representatives could work with the parties in order to achieve an amicable settlement.
I am suggesting a two step process. In this two step process the first step would be the disputants contacting the board requesting mediation or help from a representative of the board. A representative or a staff person, not a board member obviously, would be dispatched to meet with the parties. If this person was not effective in helping the parties resolve the dispute then the matter could go to the board for a hearing.
Such a two step process, first by mediation with the help of the board representatives and second by a a board hearing if mediation failed, might tend to speed up the process. Let's face it, a board such as this will build its own bureaucracy. Let us give these people something to do beyond shuffling paper. They could engage in mediation.
I wish to comment on some of the provisions of this bill which are especially disturbing to me. My first point, perhaps not surprisingly, is on the subject of clauses 8 to 15 which deal with the establishment and organization of the board. Some of my colleagues have commented on these clauses so I will keep my comments brief.
The composition suggested in the statute seems to be a recipe for divisiveness and eventual disaster. Half of the members other than the chairperson are to be appointed by the Council for Yukon Indians, the others by order in council on recommendation by the minister.
I hope it works and I wish those who designed this all the luck in the world. It seems to me that we are putting forward the possibility that the Council of Yukon Indians is simply going to become the judge of its own causes, conflict of interest or, if not the judge, then certainly an interested party at all hearings.
Virtually all disputes will involve one or more bands of Yukon Indians. Yukon Indians will be in a position of strength on the board and there is the possibility of block voting. As well we are establishing another organization to which Liberals can appoint Liberals. Surely we have enough of those already.
It might be more appropriate to mention here that the Government of the Yukon Territory should have input into the selection of the board members. Perhaps even the chairperson and some of the board members should be appointed through a nomination of the Government of the Yukon Territory. The rationale would be similar to the territorial government being more likely to appoint people who represent the interests of the public at large than is the minister who might appoint Liberals. They could be Liberal loyalists and probably will be who might stack the board full of members of one politically correct interest group. The Yukon government is considerably closer to the people of the Yukon than is the minister. Hence it is far less likely to make poor choices.
Barring the selection of board members through that process I offer an idea for a second selection process. The membership of this board could be appointed by the minister but on the approval of all three parties in the House of Commons. If the minister does not agree to appoint the whole board in this fashion at least the chair of the board should be approved by the two opposition parties in this House.
I also do not like the fact that we are setting up another body to be paid out of the public purse. Surely if the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development had been listening recently to the Minister of Finance he would know how badly in debt the country is and how we cannot afford any more expenditures.
Clause 19 gives the board the power to hire staff and consultants. Here we go again. We just cannot afford to give this kind of blanket authority without limiting the numbers to be hired. As well under clause 21 the board can acquire personal property in its name and dispose of it. This may be all right if we are talking about furnishing an office, but it might not take too long for this to be stretched into a major acquisition program. There should be some stipulation as to what the personal property is to be used for.
Clause 23 deals with the financing of the board. We on this side of the House would feel more comfortable if the matter of annual financing was referred directly to the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs. I know it will be contained in the estimates, but we want to know specifically the moneys allocated to the board and how they are spent.
Clause 24 of the bill requires that the board report to the minister upon his request. I would suggest that this clause be
changed so that the board reports to the minister on an annual basis and that these reports be tabled in the House of Commons and referred to committee.
Clause 26 on the subject of jurisdiction does not refer to the fact that the board should exercise its authority observing the rules of natural justice. Interestingly, this is one of the grounds for the appeal of ruling by the board, but it is not specifically listed as a requirement for its hearings. For greater certainty this requirement should be spelled out.
Clause 40 gives the board the right to set fees. I am torn between suggesting that the fees be low enough so as not to prohibit anyone from taking advantage of the jurisdiction of this board or suggesting the fees be high enough to ensure the board pays for itself. I find my last suggestion to be quite interesting even though it comes from me, and in keeping with my remarks on the affordability of this board, perhaps we should pursue it.
Clause 41 requires the rules made by the board to govern its operation to be published. I think this is a good requirement. However I am concerned that there may be significant disagreement among the stakeholders regarding particular rules.
I believe a method should be found by which these rules could be objected to by major groups and a hearing held on the fairness of the rules. Perhaps the board itself could hear these complaints.
Clauses 42 through 64 contain many areas which would better be the subject of discussion in committee. These clauses describe the main tasks which will be undertaken by the board. I am sure representatives of my party will have comments to make on them as the committee proceeds to clause by clause analysis.
Clauses 74 and 75 give the board the final authority in relation to findings of fact and establishing an appeal procedure to the Yukon Supreme Court. I hope this right of appeal is not abused. We are looking here for quick settlements and the board is established to effect such settlements.
It would be counterproductive to allow too many appeals to the courts. Also in relation to the issue on some judgments, perhaps the minister could consider placing a limit on the time the board has to make a decision, perhaps 30 days from the time the case is concluded.
Clause 79 gives the governor in council authority to make regulations dealing with the board. Again, as with the rules of the board, a procedure should be suggested whereby these regulations could be the subject of objection by the major stakeholders and the objections heard and subsequently dealt with.
Finally, I would suggest that this bill contain an automatic review clause so that we can be assured that it will come back before us so we can assess how effective it has been; perhaps a review in three years.
We are opposed to this bill. It has many deficiencies, but most of all the content is wrong. There should be no need to spend taxpayers' money to set up a body which is designed to do what courts are in existence to do, resolve disputes.