Mr. Speaker, I too would like to reiterate some of the comments my colleagues have made and possibly some new ones on Bill C-55.
As we are aware this is the third component of the package in relation to the Yukon First Nations Land Act claims settlement and the Yukon First Nations self-government. This particular bill is essential for the effective implementation of the other two acts. It mainly addresses the federal government's legal requirements to facilitate these other two acts coming into force.
This bill is to establish a board of directors that will handle disputes that occur. These disputes could involve three different components. They could involve owners of settlement lands or owners of non-settlement lands and of course businesses that would be involved. There are three components the board will be facing in relation to disputes. The other main aspect of this board is the determination of compensation in relation to the expropriation of settlement lands.
The orders of course from this board are binding. The board is not going to address disputes unless the two parties or three parties involved have tried to come to some sort of a mutual agreement before this. Should that not occur it will come to the board. Therefore, the board is actually in an arbitration kind of situation and its decision will be binding. Except for limited reasons, it can go to the Supreme Court of the Yukon Territory.
This brings us to the structure of the actual board which I have some concerns about. I realize that my colleagues have touched on some of this, but I think they are important enough to reiterate to some degree. Clause 8(1) of the bill gives us an overview of what the board will consist of: a chairman and not less than two members and not more than ten other members. That would make a possible total of 11 members including the chairman. All these members would be appointed by the minister.
There are some conditions that apply on these appointments. Clause 8(2) indicates that the minister must establish a board of an odd number. That I would assume includes the chairman so that the board would also consist of an odd number of members.
Clause 9(1) indicates that the chairperson is appointed by the minister but on the recommendation of the board. Clause 9(2) addresses the other members. It could be up to 10 members. It indicates that half of those members would be appointed by the minister based on nominations from the Council of Yukon Indians and the other half would be appointed by the minister. It does not indicate where the nominations or the suggestions for those appointments would come from.
To round this up, clause 10(1) indicates that a majority in both of these components, those nominated by the council and those appointed by the minister, must consist of members who reside in the Yukon Territory.
What this to my mind does is put the board in a position of being two components, one being suggested from the Council of Yukon Indians and the other from the minister, wherever those suggestions may come from. This in itself may divide the board. Also, the chairman of the board who is appointed based on recommendations from the board could put the balance of power on the board in either component. For example, if the chair was someone who was appointed by the minister then the bulk of the members on the board would be members appointed by the minister. If the chair happened to be someone who was a nominee from the Council of Yukon Indians then the balance of power would be on that side.
I question why the chairman has to be appointed by the minister based on the recommendation of the board. To my mind that suggests a veto power by the minister. It would seem that the board could elect its chairman instead of making recommendations to the minister to appoint it.
The other concern that comes out of that composition would be the right or opportunity for patronage appointments. Another concern would be that somewhere in the bill I believe it says that disputes do not have to be handled by the full board. We can subgroup the board into panels of three or more and handle the disputes based on that. Again we will look at the composition of the panel. Having these two components on the board, what is the composition of this panel and how they are selected is a very grey area.
Another way of looking at the composition of this panel could be from a representation of the players involved, i.e. the three components: the businesspersons, the owners of non-settlement land or the owners of settlement land. One could possibly pursue having representation of these three components. Another way of looking at it would be representation from the two components, the membership from the Yukon council, or those appointed by the minister. That is a very grey area.
The fact it does not indicate how these panels are composed or selected is also something that should be addressed possibly at committee. It could be based on members available at the time. It could be members in town at the time or whatever. Again it could become a lopsided membership based on these two components.
Another point that comes up would be term of office of the membership. Either clause 12 or 13 indicates that a member can stand for any number of terms. The appointment is for a three year period and then you can run again. There is no limitation. You can run for this as long as you are appointed and it can be any number of years. That in itself may not be a problem but it should be looked at to see if there are any parameters or situations that may pose a problem.
I would like to offer some suggestions on board membership. Again one of my colleagues mentioned that appointments, if that is the route we choose to go, should be made on merit or some criteria other than just being appointed by the minister. There should be some criteria in there. If that becomes the case we would definitely like to see merit included.
Another way of looking at it would be to possibly elect this board as we do school boards or something along those lines. That brings up of course that we may have to have candidate qualifications so that all sides have representation depending on how you wish to look at it.
It does not necessarily indicate that the panel composition would indeed be three members. It could possibly be any number of members, but of course it cannot exceed 11 which would be a full committee. It also does not seem to indicate that the panel would be an odd number. That should be looked at as well.
Another thing to look at is the concept that this board will be independent from government. The way it is structured it certainly does not imply that is going to occur. Two main things come out that are very suggestive it will not be independent from government. Unless you get into the fine print of it or whatever and really search for a method as to how it is independent these two things come front and centre.
One is that if it is funded by the government and if all the members on the board are appointed by the minister, i.e. government, that certainly does not suggest the board is independent of government. That in itself also brings up a number of possible concerns in relation to one's membership on the board. If the minister has this kind of power to appoint or not appoint then one really does not want to be in the position of opposing the majority opinion. I think one would rather tread lightly if they wanted to continue to participate on the board.
Therefore we may in a way be inhibiting some members in participating in full debate in relation to disputes or compensation or whatever they are addressing. I see that as a potential problem. There may be some inhibition on membership participation. I would take that a step further in relation to membership and possibly clarification in these areas might help.
Clause 11(3) indicates the minister can remove for cause. It starts out that one can hold their membership on the board for good behaviour. There is really no qualification as to what good behaviour is. The minister can remove that member for cause or-not and, but or-on grounds set out in the bylaws of the board.
What is happening is the board can be controlled from ministerial appointment, depending as I say on what background the chairman has and can set up what is grounds for membership. It appears that the minister for cause-and I do not know where this cause is coming from, if it is going to be a set of rules and regulations, but I think clause 18 makes reference to that and that implies to me that the board may be setting up what constitutes cause. It is very, very vague. I was first and still am of the opinion that cause is for the interpretation of the minister. That area is rather loose as far as membership is concerned.
The other thing that is missing which should be included would be some sort of recourse if one is found to be in that position where membership is going to be or has been revoked. There should be some sort of recourse for an unbiased hearing into the circumstances of it.
Some tightening up is needed in those areas. Many of the clauses seem to be all-encompassing and a lot is left to assumption.
In the part that deals with meetings, one clause caught my attention immediately. That was the one that said participation in these meetings could be by telephone or some other communication device. I strongly advise when this bill goes to committee that we address the issue of having people attend the meetings in person versus a telephone conference in which there is perhaps one member sitting in the room and everybody else is on the telephone somewhere in the Yukon territory. There should be some indication as to what a quorum is for attendance in person at a meeting.
A second very restrictive clause is where the meetings can be held. I believe it states they can be held in Whitehorse and/or other areas of the Yukon. I agree that is the most sensible area in which to hold meetings as that is the area it is related to but there may be cause to hold meetings elsewhere. If we are going to look at the letter of the law, which seems to be how our justice system is looking at things these days versus the spirit of it, I suggest that we open that one up a little bit so that meetings are not only held right in that area. That is what that clause suggests.
Much of what I am saying today is clause by clause analysis of the bill which will come up in committee, but those are some of the points I wish to highlight. A number of my colleagues have come up with the same types of points and I think that speaks for itself that there is some concern in those areas.
The last item would be the statement of accounts. I did not get the impression there would be open access to these accounts by the public. I got the impression they would be well documented, that there would be a very good system of accounts, that the appropriate people would do them, that they would be reviewed by the Auditor General, and so on, and submitted to government. However there is no reference anywhere for access to these accounts on request.
With that I will close my remarks. Under the circumstances we realize this bill is the third part of the other two and it is necessary for this one to pass. However, in the composition of the bill there are a number of things that we should tidy it up before we actually put it out as the third part.