Mr. Speaker, in speaking to Motion M-38 today, I am convinced that important Canadian issues are involved. That there are problems with the Communications Security Establishment, CSE, is emphasized by the fact that the hon. member for Scarborough-Rouge River who chairs the subcommittee on national security feels obliged to call for the government to authorize a regular ongoing review of CSE operations.
Concerns over the mandate of CSE and other Canadian intelligence agencies have been reported in the media, and the release of Spyworld has caused indignation in many quarters.
CSE is not directly accountable to the public purse, to Parliament or to any other independent body. The 1990 review by the special committee of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act acknowledged that it is now time to examine the wider dimensions of Canadian security and intelligence community and to impose statutory mandates and review mechanisms where necessary.
However, government took no action. Ten years ago Parliament passed legislation holding CSIS operations accountable to an independent body, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC, which is made up of five political appointees.
SIRC would not rank anywhere near being the best check and balance on the operations of CSIS but it is certainly better than having no review or accountability mechanism. To paraphrase an old saying, if halitosis is better than no breath at all then SIRC is better than no supervision at all.
Thus, while SIRC may not be the best answer, one wonders why the review committee did not also invoke the same requirement for CSE operations. Therefore, Motion M-38 is timely and important.
When the special committee called for a regular review of security and intelligence agencies it also recommended that this agency should have statutory mandate to provide for review and monitor mechanisms. At the time government was considering providing the Minister of National Defence with additional capacity for review of the CSE. To this day government has dragged its heels and has failed to initiate the means for review. It has failed to hold the agency accountable to an independent body for its expenditures or even direct legislation to protect private citizens from the prospect of CSE intruding into and invading our privacy.
There is cause for great concern. Today high tech, computerized world is much different from that which prevailed at the time of CSE's inception during the second world war. It was then set up to intercept signals and break enemy codes, referred to as ciphers and codes.
Today CSE is responsible for communications or information technology security, COMSEC or INFOSEC, and signals intelligence, SIGINT. It sounds not unlike Goldfinger in James Bond or Captain Kirk in "Star Trek"or "Star Wars" all rolled into one.
Unquestionably there is a need to know the state of the art so that CSE can ensure federal government telecommunications or electronic data processing systems are known to be secure.
It must ensure that government personnel are given security training or education and that Canadian industry has access to appropriate security advice, although this aspect might better be left in the hands of the private sector.
The darker side, of which little is known, is that CSE monitors the communications of foreign countries to provide intelligence to government. It listens in on radio and telephone communications between embassies and home countries or consulates. It follows all national and international telephone calls. It records foreign radio communications and reads electromagnetic transmissions from embassy typewriters, processors, and so on.
We understand that 80 per cent of its operational budget is directed to the signals intercept program for communications intelligence which uses radio waves or radar to spy and protect national security; for example, telemetry intelligence, interception of signals relaying information from sensors on board a test vehicle to test engineers, revealing the vehicle's flight and performance characteristics.
Parliament has no statutes or laws to direct the CSE because it was established by order in council, by a cabinet directive. Thus one can speculate on the obvious CSE operations but only the depth of our imagination limits the breadth of its capability and potential involvement. By and large it seems that CSE is accountable to no one. It has virtual carte blanche to write its own terms and exercise full discretionary powers.
Little is known of its operations and even less about how it spends the public's funds it is given. During House of Commons debate hon. members have quoted from the Globe and Mail that expenditures in the order of $100 million to $125 million were budgeted for 1991. Another hon. member ventured to guess that $250 million would be a conservative estimate. Who knows how much is spent, how it is spent or why it is spent-perhaps some cabinet ministers, but certainly no independent regulatory agency exercising control.
When one considers Canada's massive deficit-debt it becomes obvious that government has an obligation to seek ways to trim fat, ensure accountability and avoid duplication of efforts. This motion provides government with an excellent opportunity to do just that.
Two special joint committees of this Parliament have only recently concluded reviews of Canadian foreign policy and defence policy. As a result Canada's role in foreign affairs and our military will be adjusted to better reflect today's needs. It would be logical to follow with a review of Canada's security and intelligence agencies. There has been no such review since
their inception in the 1940s and operational control has become lax because their accountability is not adequately enforced.
Obviously a certain amount of secrecy and restricted knowledge of activities is required for CSE. Everyone understands that an intelligence agency cannot adequately perform its duties unless it is to some extent clothed in a veil of secrecy. However, there must still be a mechanism to ensure that activity control limits are in place and enforced and that the taxpayer's dollar is being appropriately and efficiently employed in service to Canada and Canadians.
In 1975 an order in council transferred responsibility for CSE from the National Research Council to the Department of National Defence, but only administrative responsibility was transferred, not its mandate, powers, control or accountability. Thus, I strongly endorse Motion M-38 calling for the government to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to authorize the Security Intelligence Review Committee to review CSE's operation and budget.
Government could and should go even further by transferring CSE from the Department of National Defence to CSIS. Such action would make CSE subject to the same control and accountability that CSIS now is.
There is urgency required in implementing some statutory directive because of CSE's capacity to invade and intrude into our privacy. Southam News has already reported that the Privy Council Office has asked the RCMP's legal branch to examine legislation that would make it easier for police to intercept digital or computer communications.
In the United States similar laws are under study and the Digital Telephony and Communications Privacy Improvement Act giving telecommunications companies funds to develop software technology allowing full access to telecommunication systems has been debated in the U.S. Congress.
If enacted, this U.S. law would permit monitoring of a wide range of personal data. Are we in Canada also to have our own big brother tracking our every move? Electronic eavesdropping is surreptitious, easily used, and has the capacity to intrude into our most private lives with no search warrants required.
Despite the minister's assurance that CSE has no mandate to spy on Canadians, we do not know what its mandate is. Without checks and balances CSE has no limits to its operations and can be used against anyone without their having any knowledge that it is happening. To have the legal ability to so infringe on our right to privacy is simply unacceptable.
In conclusion, while I have concerns about SIRC being as responsive and appropriate a monitoring agency as I would like, it is certainly better than having no monitoring agency at all. Perhaps an improvement in answer to this dilemma would be for the monitoring agency, for both CSIS and SIRC, to be constituted as a separate cell under the aegis of the Auditor General who reports to Parliament. Unless there is some technical reason why this cannot be, it would seem to provide the arm's length monitor required to do the job without political bias or interference.