Mr. Speaker, I speak today in wholehearted support of the motion put forward by the member for Mission-Coquitlam.
The motion expresses the importance of having fewer votes in the House of Commons considered to be votes of confidence. This would ensure that the defeat of a government motion would not bring down the government, unless a separate vote of non-confidence was passed immediately following the initial vote.
It is important to make the distinction between free votes and freer votes. Presently free votes occur when party leaders release their MPs from the party line and grant them permission to vote according to their conscience or their better judgment. However this may not necessarily be a vote for the majority of the constituents.
Freer votes would mean having fewer non-confidence votes. This would enable members to vote when necessary against their party but for the majority of their constituents without suffering the negative consequences of party discipline.
In order to illustrate my support for the motion the following three questions must be answered. What is the problem with the system now? What changes are needed? How would these changes make Parliament operate better. The problem lies with the succession of Canadian governments which have taken the convention of confidence motions too far, beyond other British parliamentary democracies.
Legally and constitutionally members of Parliament have the right to vote freely in the House now. However the minority governments of the 1960s had to enforce tough party discipline because voting against the party often led to or at least threatened defeat of the government. Members towing the party line could count on favoured status within the party. Given these two factors there was very little incentive for government backbenchers to vote with the majority of their constituents and against the government position.
This move to a system of top down democracy has marginalized the role of backbench MPs. As a result individual members of Parliament have been denied input into the direction and legislation brought forth by their government.
During the 1972 to 1974 Trudeau minority government the interpretation of a confidence vote was loosened considerably. Trudeau declared that the defeat of a government motion would not mean the defeat of the government. As a result he was able to remain in power despite defeat of government motions, marking a return to the more historic interpretation of the confidence convention. Despite this, however, Trudeau maintained iron--
fist control over members of his party to ensure they voted the party line.
With subsequent governments we have now arrived at an interpretation of the confidence convention in which virtually all votes are considered to be votes of confidence. Therefore changes will be needed in the House in order to make the motion we are proposing today work.
The tradition of tough party discipline can only be reversed with the co-operation of members of all parties. A giant step forward can be made, however, if the Prime Minister were to rise in the House and state that the defeat of a government bill or motion would not automatically defeat the government and, unlike Trudeau, relax party discipline. If this happened we would be well on our way to bringing about this change.
The leaders of the opposition parties must also play a part in loosening the stranglehold of party discipline. A change in attitude is needed to move away from the opposition mentality of automatically opposing everything put forward by the government.
As Reformers we have worked toward providing constructive alternatives whenever possible. This is reflected clearly in the process a Reform MP goes through in determining how to vote on a particular issue.
First, Reformers believe it is the responsibility of each member of Parliament to vote the wishes of the majority of his or her constituents in all cases. How does an MP know what the wishes of the majority are? On important moral issues such as abortion, capital punishment and physician assisted suicide, the issue should be settled by referendum held at the same time as a federal election. Direct democracy is used to determine the wishes of the majority and policy should reflect this.
Because present and past governments have refused to institute referenda as a right on moral issues and on issues presented through citizens' initiatives, Reform MPs go to their constituents through constituency surveys and vote based on the majority view. This is how Reformers will vote in the House on the physician assisted suicide issue, for example.
On certain other well developed policy issues which were presented and debated during the election campaign, MPs will assume that a mandate was given at election time and is valid unless there are indications to the contrary. On other issues which were not campaigned on and in areas where there is not well developed policy, the view of constituents can be verified in different but appropriate ways. When specific issues require an immediate response, like the cigarette tax proposals presented by the government, an MP can solicit feedback from the constituents through a telephone survey. Broader issues of national importance, for example the GST, require more formal mechanisms to determine the wishes of constituents.
When various bills and motions come before the House which are not moral issues or when there is not sufficient time to make a survey of constituents, Reformers measure the pros and cons of the proposed bill or motion by asking themselves how it fits in with the party platform and principles. We ask ourselves the following questions as well. How much does it cost? Is it needed? Can we do it for less? The answers to all of these questions determine how we will vote on a given issue.
MPs will vote in the House of Commons based on the outcome of the caucus vote unless they have determined by the appropriate mechanism that their constituents want them to vote otherwise. In such a case the majority wishes of the constituents always prevail.
On issues such as reducing government spending, justice reform and making the political system more democratic there will usually be party solidarity. On other issues opinions may vary and a split Reform vote will occur in the House. This process certainly helped to overcome some of the problems caused by the current over zealous interpretation of the confidence convention, but not all of them.
The motion we are debating today would help change the current mindset that enforces toeing the party line because the incentive of forming a new government as a result of a defeated government bill or motion would no longer exist.
Once the House is rid of this burden it would enable each member of Parliament to freely voice the views of their constituents without fear of party discipline if they contradict the party line.
I believe this will foster more meaningful debate. It will lead to more informed decisions which genuinely reflect the views of the majority of Canadians and ultimately result in better legislation.
Therefore, when members of another party vote against their party line it should be applauded as a sign of strength rather than viewed as a sign of party weakness or a weak link in the party.
Canadians have become truly disillusioned with government because members of Parliament often vote the party line against the majority view of their constituents.
I realize that when Canadians vote for an individual they are also supporting some of the platform the individual and the party ran on during the election campaign. However, it is unrealistic to believe that any one party, even the Reform Party, can accurately reflect the opinions of a majority of people on all issues.
My question is this. Why should members of Parliament be penalized for representing their constituents? The answer is they should not. MPs no longer will be penalized through party
discipline and trust in government will be restored if this motion is accepted.
In closing there are two questions all members of Parliament might ask themselves. First, what negative consequences could result from backing this Reform motion which would improve the role of individual members and therefore the government as a whole? The answer: none, no negative consequences.
Second, what negative consequences will result if members do not support this motion? Representation will not improve. Maybe there will be no immediate backlash from constituents but as voters see their wishes betrayed again and again over the next four years because members are obliged to toe the party line, the answer will be very clear and it will come in the next election. I believe it will be the same answer the Conservatives received during the last election. Think about it.