Mr. Speaker, I was talking about liaison and co-operation. Direction on domestic liaison provides guidance on the establishment of arrangements between the service and other federal or provincial institutions. A primary example is the ministerial direction on RCMP-CSIS co-operation.
The principles governing domestic liaison ensure that arrangements are consistent with the service's mandate and that they are in place when there is a requirement for access to information, operational support, information exchange or organizational consultation.
Similarly a direction on foreign liaison sets out principles to guide CSIS in the establishment and conduct of liaison with foreign security and intelligence organizations. The Solicitor General will issue new directions as necessary to ensure that Canada has a responsive and responsible security intelligence agency.
Other cornerstones of the accountability framework established by the CSIS act of 1984 were the review roles of the Security Intelligence Review Committee and the Inspector General of CSIS. SIRC has a mandate to review the propriety of CSIS activities, with emphasis on the delicate balance between national security and individual freedoms. Section 38 of the CSIS act directs SIRC to review generally its performance in the service of its duties and functions.
This includes reviewing such things as CSIS annual reports and certificates of the Inspector General, ministerial direction, CSIS arrangements with domestic and foreign governments and agencies, section 20 reports on unlawful conduct, and regulations.
Section 40 of the legislation makes SIRC responsible for reviewing the service's compliance with the CSIS act, its regulations and ministerial direction, as well as reviewing CSIS activities to ensure they do not involve an unreasonable or unnecessary exercise of powers.
An equally important review function is carried out by the Inspector General of CSIS. The post of Inspector General is unique; it has evolved over time in response to practical experience and ministerial expectations. The basic role of the Inspector General is to conduct independent internal reviews for the minister.
The CSIS act identifies three interlocking functions for the Inspector General: to review the operational activities of the service, to monitor the service's compliance with its operational policies and to submit certificates to the minister.
To ensure the Inspector General is able to exercise these functions effectively, the act stipulates that the Inspector General is entitled to have access to "any information under the control of the service" that relates to the performance of the functions of the office and to receive from the service "such information, reports and explanations" as the Inspector General deems necessary. Under section 31 no information other than cabinet confidences may be withheld on any grounds.
I have provided this detailed overview to illustrate the comprehensive type of legislative safeguards and oversight mechanisms in place to ensure that CSIS operates within its mandate and within the law at all times. Taken together these safeguards and oversight mechanisms provide a solid legislative foundation for CSIS that is in keeping with the best traditions and principles of a free and democratic nation.
The motion before the House would have us turn our backs on these traditions and principles and on the years of work and experience that went into creating a modern and effective legislative framework to govern Canada's national security system.
I am sure the hon. member's motion was prompted by concern for the wellbeing of our national security system. However I would suggest we wait for the SIRC review and the work of the standing committee, of which hon. members across the way are members, before we draw final conclusions.