Mr. Speaker, we just heard the Prime Minister's speech. I think we should point out that this speech is a distinct departure from the approach the Prime Minister has taken in the past two years. During the 1993 election campaign and the subsequent two years in this House, the Prime Minister's approach was extremely hard, rigid and, I must admit, consistent, in other words, he did not mention the Constitution, did not feel it was appropriate to suggest any changes and was quite satisfied with Canada as it is.
He took a similar approach during the initial weeks of the referendum campaign, so much so that he put his feet up and relaxed until the last week of the campaign, when he woke up to the fact that the yes side was surging ahead and had become a very real threat to the no side. His reaction was very nervous, very improvised and came on very short notice.
He quickly arranged for a very large meeting in Verdun on October 24, where he said the following-this was the new Prime Minister-and I quote: "We will keep open all the other roads to
change, including administrative and constitutional means. Any changes in constitutional jurisdiction will only be made with the consent of Quebecers".
Back in the House, after a very narrow win by the no side, improvisation has been the name of the game in the federal government. First, it set up two committees-we still do not know what they are doing-which were short-circuited by the debate we are having today. One of the committees, chaired by the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, is supposed to come up with and propose ways to resolve the current constitutional mess and deadlock. Second, we have the announcement the Prime Minister rushed to make on Monday about a resolution that would include a symbolic recognition of Quebec as a distinct society, a so-called veto and a vague delegation of activities in the area of manpower training.
The question is: What is behind this complete about-face by the Prime Minister, who has consistently fought the concept of a distinct identity for Quebec?
First of all, there were the circumstances. The Prime Minister was very surprised and even distressed by the almost irresistible advance of the yes side during the latter part of the referendum campaign. And it was fear, and fear is a very healthy reaction and also, according to the gospel, the father of wisdom, that inspired the sudden statements he made on October 24 and during the last days of the referendum campaign.
This surprising about-face is neither surprising nor an about-face, since the proposal is meaningless and a worthy successor to all the political positions taken so far by the Prime Minister since the beginning of his career with the federal government and on the federal scene. Words can be made to say what we want them to say, and the phrase "distinct society of Quebec" is no exception. Distortion is always possible.
The expression "distinct identity of Quebec" is a case in point. It may be useful to recall that its initial appearance in our constitutional vocabulary and on the political scene in Canada and Quebec actually dates back to February 1965 and the preliminary report of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, where the expression was used in a rather descriptive way, devoid of any political or legal content. It surfaced again, this time with a more formal meaning, in September 1970, when Mr. Bourassa, the newly elected Premier of Quebec who was attending a constitutional conference, actually used the expression in the meaning it has had more or less since that time.
However, starting in 1985, the term was to develop some very specific overtones, as in the Quebec Liberal Party platform in June 1985, before the election that would be held several months later, and this recognition of the distinct identity of Quebec was to become a precondition for any decision by Quebec to become part of the Constitution of 1982.
We must therefore examine the context. In 1982, Quebec sustained a blow, a blow with which everyone is familiar, and which was felt very strongly by everyone including the Quebec Liberal Party, which had always refused to endorse the Constitution, even condemning it in a vote in the National Assembly in November 1981. And in 1985 the Quebec Liberal Party, in an attempt to unravel the knot, to bring things out into the open, proposed that Quebec set a precondition to signing the 1982 Constitution-the Prime Minister's Constitution, the one that still has a blank at the bottom of its last page next to the name of Quebec-as a precondition to any negotiation the unconditional recognition by the federal government and all of the provinces of Canada of the distinct character of Quebec.
Then, of course, on June 3,1987, came the signing of the Meech Lake accord. The real one, the real Meech Lake; not the one to which the Prime Minister refers all the time, which is his accord, the one he had watered down later on, and the one I shall speak about later, but the true Meech Lake accord. On June 3, 1987, all of the first ministers of Canada, provincial and federal, reached agreement for the first time in history on the signing of a constitutional accord which would have allowed Quebec to preserve its honour, to return to the constitutional family, and then to come on board with enthusiasm. The words "honour" and "enthusiasm" correspond to two separate phases. First of all, the return to the family with head held high, because our distinct character has been recognized, and second, enthusiasm in redefining the division of powers between Canada and Quebec.
I am recalling a context which I see as extremely important since it offers a very good explanation of the degree to which today's proposal, which is totally unacceptable and does not hold up, will not fly. It will not even make it into the history books, except perhaps as a footnote somewhere. It is a truly minimalist effort, nothing in comparison to previous efforts to attempt to settle the Canada and Quebec problem.
What was there in the Meech Lake accord of June 1987? Let us review this. First of all, there was entrenchment of the accord in the Constitution. Entrenching a formal agreement as part of the Constitution is by no means a trifle. This means there are consequences. This means the courts are obliged to take it into consideration, to apply it. They are bound by the clauses introduced into the Constitution.
You will note as well that the wording is extremely strong. So strong, in fact, that it greatly displeased the Prime Minister who has fought it ever since with all of his might. The formulation is that, henceforth-I shall describe it now. I will quote it verbatim in a few minutes-