Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak today on Canada's national security system and on the unique role played in that system by review agencies.
The amended motion before us calls for the establishment of an independent external mechanism to review the operations of the Communications Security Establishment or CSE.
I agree with the motion. It is my view that Canadians would be well served and would feel safer and more comfortable if they knew that this component of our national security system was overseen by both a cabinet minister and by an independent oversight committee.
Experience gained over the last decade with the Security Intelligence Review Committee which oversees the Canadian Security Intelligence Service may hold important lessons for the future.
The Security Intelligence Review Committee or SIRC was designed as a unique body to provide review for one particular agency, CSIS, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. It provides an appeal mechanism as well for matters involving security clearances that are from time to time required under certain statutes.
SIRC was to fulfil its responsibilities within the framework of a national security system that is wider than SIRC and wider than CSIS and includes the Communications Security Establishment.
If the motion before us is to be successfully implemented, care must be taken to ensure that any new review body would have an appropriate role with respect to CSE. It must contribute as well in a positive way to what I would suggest is a delicate balance between the national interest and individual human rights, the hallmark of Canada's national security system.
In 1984 the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Security Offences Act were established. In these statutes a new legislative framework was created to govern Canada's national security system. The new legislation was designed to create the balance I talked about, a balanced and accountable system for the protection of Canada's national security interests and for the preservation of the democratic way of life of its people.
Balance must be a distinguishing feature of any new legislation involving CSE, just as it is a distinguishing feature of the CSIS-SIRC legislation. I should like to categorize some balances that we need to maintain.
First, we need to protect national security that has to be balanced by respect for individual rights and freedoms.
Second, we need to provide the service with sufficient powers to produce effective security intelligence which we should then balance by statutory controls and strong policy direction.
Third, as with CSIS there is a need to employ certain intrusive techniques. These should be balanced by the requirement for a prior authorization by a minister of the crown and the Federal Court, or at the very least that is what we do under the CSIS act.
Finally the need for secrecy must be balanced by ministerial accountability and informed independent review. The principles of ministerial control and accountability are central to Canadian parliamentary democracy. The CSIS act ensured that the Solicitor General would have full knowledge and power of direction over policy. The act also equipped the minister with the means to direct and guide the service.
There is also independent review through SIRC. Responsibility for the independent external review function was given to the Security Intelligence Review Committee that reports to Parliament through the Solicitor General. The unique role of SIRC is an innovative and important component of our national security system in the CSIS act. SIRC's review role is a cornerstone of the accountability framework established by the CSIS act and an important element of our national security system. SIRC has a mandate to review the propriety of CSIS activities with emphasis on the delicate balance between national security and individual freedom.
Given SIRC's importance as presently constituted, it is my view that it would be inappropriate to expand its mandate to encompass review of CSE. Such a change would have the effect of either diffusing SIRC's functions with respect to CSIS or of diminishing ministerial accountability.
I am certain hon. members would not wish to see SIRC's effectiveness diminished by such outcomes. To expand SIRC's mandate to review CSE would almost certainly mean increasing significantly the present number of SIRC members. This would require adding to SIRC's staff that has acquired an enviable expertise in the domain of security intelligence on a domestic basis. The skills and the knowledge base required to review foreign intelligence activity are totally different from that needed to review a domestic security service like CSIS.
We need to examine closely the significant implications of what is being proposed in the motion before us. We are not without guidance. The experience we have acquired over the past decade with the existing national security system can stand us in good stead by looking at CSIS and by looking at the roles that the minister and SIRC play in relation to CSIS. I would suggest that we look closely at those lessons and apply them to the motion before us today.
The proven effectiveness of the national security system designed more than a decade ago is an excellent foundation upon which we can build. As we consider the motion our intention should be to continue the good work that has gone before, to build on that experience, and to create satisfaction within the community and within our country that the Communications Security Establishment is also accountable.