Mr. Speaker, I rise in response to the hon. member's point of order.
First, I take very seriously my responsibilities both here in the House and outside, to respect the jurisdiction of the court, to abide by the sub judice rule and to bear in mind that as minister of the crown, I have responsibilities quite different from those judges of the courts of the country.
I contend as well that nothing I have said here or elsewhere in relation to the Simmerman case or its principle has offended the rule against commenting on cases before the courts.
May I first observe that it is passing strange that the hon. member should first ask me about a case in the House and then raise a point of order because I commented on the case in answering his question. It was in answering the very question put by the hon. member that I am alleged to have breached the rule. I was simply responding to a question put by the hon. member, and doing so in good faith.
Second, as I mentioned the other day, when the hon. member raised this point in question period, there is a great deal of difference between on the one hand commenting on the facts of a criminal case which is in process, whether at trial or on appeal, in a fashion that might prejudice the party, the accused, by indicating what findings should be made or who committed what act-that is highly improper-and on the other hand simply observing that we take a different legal interpretation of a statute which, in fact, is what is at issue in the Simmerman case.
I have said that we regard the legal interpretation put on the Criminal Code and the relevant sections at trial as not being the correct one. In fact, the Alberta government is appealing. The appeal is expected to be heard by the Alberta Court of Appeal in about September of this year. The federal government is now considering whether it will intervene in the appeal to put its point of view before the Court of Appeal.
There is precedent for the proposition. I say there is nothing at all wrong with a minister saying that we take a different legal interpretation of a statute than that put on the statute by a court.
It follows that the interpretation relied on by the court at first instance is not in accord with our interpretation. I suggest what is an issue here is that first we must show proper deference and respect to the court and its process and second, nothing must be said or done by a minister or a member that would prejudice the rights of parties in a pending case with respect to matters of fact.
I say that neither of those principles has been offended by anything I said or did. This point of order is without foundation.