Mr. Speaker, I am eager to participate in today's debate on Bill C-87, an act to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.
Today, when they look at the world around them, people in Quebec and Canada are concerned. We are concerned because we do not know what awaits us in the future. We are worried about the nuclear weapons that are still around, about the biological and chemical weapons scattered throughout the world.
By passing this bill, the Canadian government will be among the first 65 countries to ratify the convention on chemical weapons out of the roughly 135-there are perhaps 132 at this time-nations that have signed it. The convention will take effect 180 days after the 65th state to ratify this agreement tables it. Along with my party, the Bloc Quebecois, I wholeheartedly support this convention on chemical weapons, which follows the debate on arms control and disarmament.
The convention on chemical weapons is the result of more than 20 years of negotiations at the conference on disarmament and the forums that preceded it.
For the first time, we have an instrument that really resulted from an actual multilateral negotiation process. The signing parties undertake to refrain from various activities in relation to chemical weapons, to co-operate in a number of ways so as to facilitate the implementation of the convention and to ensure that persons also refrain from those activities and provide the necessary co-operation.
Since the Second World War, the issue of the arms race has come up every time the prospects for enduring peace or the possibility of war is discussed. Most observers felt that the arms race was intrinsically dangerous and ultimately destabilizing. Western countries thus found themselves facing a paradox: on the one hand, they believed that force deters aggression; on the other hand, they were convinced that the arms race alone could provoke a global war.
The latter shook up our certainty that deterrence is the best form of insurance against potential aggression. We could not avoid the disturbing realization that the very measures taken to ensure our security could bring about our downfall and lead to a global conflict.
The debate on arms control is largely based on the preconceived notion that any arms race is, by definition, a chain reaction which tends to trigger an escalation of the conflict. The responses of warring states to the stockpiling of conventional, nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, as well as the attempts made by each side to gain the upper hand lead to destabilization and greater international tension.
It is claimed that, if there is another world war, it will be by accident, in the sense that it will result from a climate of suspicion and crucial errors of judgment made regarding a regional conflict. This is why it is essential, for international stability, to control the arms race.
However, military experts contend that arms control merely regulates the arms race, instead of limiting it. Many issues remain very timely, even though the cold war is over and these issues are no longer related to an east versus west situation. There is a new phenomenon on the international scene: regional
armed conflicts resulting from the emergence of new nations and the fact that others are trying to increase their influence.
Since most of the objectives of the superpowers' traditional arms control program have now been reached, the international community is turning its attention to measures designed to prevent a wider proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons. That goal is now part of an effort to face today's geopolitical realities. Indeed, the time has come to carefully reassess existing monitoring mechanisms.
Following a resolution passed by the UN general assembly in December 1993, it was announced, in March of this year, that the delegates at the conference on disarmament had reached a consensus on a proposal to set up a special committee to negotiate a reduction of fissionable material production for nuclear arms. Conference delegates also discussed, among numerous other issues, chemical weapons, in the hope of developing a convention on such weapons.
That was not an easy task, since the participants did not agree on the monitoring procedures. The 1990 U.S.-Soviet bilateral agreements on the sharing of information and the destruction of weapon stockpiles helped further multilateral talks on this issue. In June 1992, the conference on disarmament submitted a draft treaty to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Monitoring activities were delegated to an international organization responsible for the prohibition of chemical weapons, based in the Netherlands.
The long-awaited treaty on chemical weapons was finally signed in Paris, on January 13, 1993. The signature and the coming into effect of that agreement is undoubtedly an historical event. As I see it, this instrument is important for three major reasons. First of all, it represents a real step forward for international security. Second, it is truly universal in scope, since it reflects a number of fundamental balances. Finally, we should also consider what the situation would be like if it did not exist. The convention is the first multinational disarmament agreement that prohibits an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.
It prohibits producing and also acquiring, stockpiling, transferring, using or engaging in military preparations to use a chemical weapon or assisting anyone to engage in any activities prohibited by the convention. The prohibition on chemicals covers chemical products as such, their vectors and any equipment designed for the use of chemical weapons.
Furthermore, any state party to this convention would be obliged to destroy all chemical weapons within its territory, those it abandoned outside that territory and facilities for the production of chemical weapons. This is very important. It means this is a truly comprehensive prohibition that affects all chemical weapons in the world.
The convention constitutes an effective deterrent to developing clandestine chemical weapons production systems because of its unique inspection system. By setting a common standard and giving the international community the means to enforce its application, the convention provides the impetus for joint action to eradicate weapons of massive destruction.
Furthermore, all countries that have chemical weapons will have to destroy these, with their facilities for the production of chemical weapons, within ten years. Consideration was also given to the technical and financial problems that may arise when a country must destroy its arsenal of chemical weapons.
The convention provides for certain adjustments, including an extension of the ten-year deadline, which would, however, involve stricter monitoring procedures, tantamount to being under the supervision of the international community. The same applies to exceptional cases where facilities for the manufacture of chemical weapons are converted to civilian use.
In the case of chemical weapons abandoned by one state within the territory of another state, the convention obliges each state to destroy the chemical weapons within its territory while at the same time assigning responsibility for destruction to the state that abandoned weapons within the territory of another state.
State parties to this agreement are responsible for meeting their commitments at the national level, but how they meet those commitments is monitored by the international organization. This applies to the destruction of weapons and the facilities to manufacture them.
If the convention had not been adopted, this would have been a signal to those responsible for the proliferation of these weapons to continue the production. The security of all countries would have been at risk, especially countries in the southern hemisphere. The result would have been to reinforce unilateral non-proliferation policies which would have increased barriers to trade and technology transfers while in addition penalizing developing countries that respect their commitments.
The chemical weapons convention serves the interests of all signatory countries and all countries that will sign in the future. Contrary to what was said in some quarters, it is not designed to serve the sole interests of industrialized countries. On the contrary, it is developing countries that will benefit from the convention. Indeed, in the past few years, unfortunately, it has been the developing countries which have used chemical weapons in their conflicts, while industrialized countries have found them of no interest strategically or as a deterrent.
And understandably, come whatever may, industrialized countries will always be better equipped to detect and to protect
against chemical weapons than most developing countries, which do not have ready access to such equipment. We have only to think of what went on in Japan.
Japan is, nonetheless, better equipped to deal with such situations while the same would be more difficult for third world countries, where there would probably be more deaths. In fact, it is the industrialized countries which will take on the better part of the task of industry monitoring by virtue of the fact that their chemical industries are more highly developed.
However because of the extension of the definition of industries considered capable of producing chemical weapons, all countries will be affected by monitoring in one way or another.
Likewise, it is only natural that countries which are willing to be monitored and which respect the commitments made under the convention will feel that the current restrictions imposed under the current non-proliferation agreements are eased up.
It is worth noting that the cost of destroying a chemical weapons factory is ten times that of building it.
Having said this, you will understand our concern with the financial burden that the obligation to destroy chemical weapons will place on certain states lacking the necessary financial means to do so.
The convention's provision that some factories may be temporarily converted into disposal facilities when this is possible and cost-effective, so that they can be considered converted, will not relieve such countries of this problem.
I would like to add in closing that the convention is an historical first, which the conference on disarmament can add to its list of accomplishments.
This convention proves that, when the conditions are favourable, the conference does have the required competence and skill to draft agreements which are as politically sensitive as they are technically complex, and which contribute to the well-being of our respective populations.
The question arises as to the role the Government of Canada intends to play in encouraging its partners to ratify the chemical weapons convention as quickly as possible.
To my mind, Canada must play a strong leadership role in this regard. To date, we have seen no hint of such an intention. If the government wants to act consistently, it should announce a series of initiatives in this regard in the coming weeks. After all, only 28 countries have ratified the convention up to now.
I should perhaps point out that neither the United States nor Russia has signed yet. We realize that it will cost Russia significantly to comply with the convention.
What will the federal government do to help Russia get rid of its chemical weapons stockpiles? In my opinion, Canada should take a creative approach. For example, should the federal government not consider providing technical assistance to Russia, as it has in the past? It could, for example, set up a task force of technical experts.
We know very well that there are competent people in Quebec and in the rest of Canada to do this type of work, whose main thrust would be the evaluation of how Russia, for example, could destroy its manufacturing facilities and its chemical weapons at minimal cost.
Clearly, signatures and ratification mean little. Accordingly, in addition to de facto intentions, the federal government must ensure the organization has the intention and the resources to make the monitoring system a reality.
As you know, both Russia and the United States must participate in this convention, if it is to fulfil its role, since they have the biggest stockpiles of chemical weapons. As I said earlier, neither has yet signed.
We in the Bloc Quebecois believe that our support for this bill will mean that Quebec and Canada will be able to quickly carve a choice niche within the various institutions of this new international organization.