Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in this House today on behalf of the Bloc Quebecois to speak on Bill C-87, an act to implement the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction.
We appreciate that the convention is the result of a long and complex negotiation process that took nearly 20 years.
For more than 100 years, the international community has been seeking to outlaw these weapons, or at least their use, because they are inhumane and of rather limited military value.
We should also rejoice over the fact that the convention is the first multilateral disarmament agreement prohibiting an entire class of mass destruction weapons. Under this convention, it is illegal not only to produce, but also to acquire, stockpile, transfer, use or engage in military preparations to use chemical weapons or assist anyone in any activity prohibited under the convention.
The prohibition applies not only to chemical agents but also to their vectors and any equipment intended for use in relation to chemical weapons.
We are pretty happy with the wording of the convention, which strikes a balance in a mix of areas, such as the protection of sensitive activities and ready access for inspection teams.
The convention provides for a challenge inspection mechanism while at the same time protecting sensitive and legitimate activities by putting time limits on the inspections, and by providing for restricted access and measures to deter abuse.
A balance was also struck between the need to maintain control over exports to suspect states and the will to liberalize the chemical products trade. Members of the Australian group, which includes Canada, and which monitors the proliferation of chemical weapons and defines the guidelines for controlling exports to countries deemed to have chemical weapons, pledged to review their policy and eliminate controls in the case of those states which fully comply with the convention.
Another balance was struck between the requirement to destroy chemical weapons within prescribed time frames and the need to take economic implications into account. All those states which own chemical weapons will have ten years to destroy both the weapons and the production facilities. However, the convention allows for an extension of up to ten years, under more stringent controls which are tantamount to turning over the weapons and facilities to the international community.
The destruction of a chemical weapons production facility costs ten times more than its construction. Consequently, we are concerned about the financial implications, for some states, of this requirement. The problem is very real, even though the convention provides for the temporary conversion of some production facilities into destruction facilities, where this is
feasible and cost effective, thus making it possible to declare such production facilities as having been converted.
Indeed, one of the problems related to the implementation of the convention will be the destruction of arsenals, which is a complex and extremely costly operation. The cost of destroying the American arsenal of these weapons is estimated at $8 billion. Russia, which does not have the funds, has 40,000 to 60,000 tonnes of substances to destroy, which is quite the task and will undoubtedly take over 10 years and then again, only if western countries lend a hand.
By the way, we are not entirely satisfied with the verification system. However, we realize that they are the fruit of several years of negotiation and that they strike a balance between the need to have an efficient means of checking whether countries are respecting the convention and the legitimate need to maintain secrecy in defence and industrial matters which are not related to the prohibited chemical weapons.
We would have nevertheless preferred much stricter controls. The current convention is perhaps the best agreement possible under the circumstances. Regardless, we must admit that the Convention does contain the most rigorous controls ever included in a multilateral agreement. They permit the organization to confirm that substances and chemical weapons factories have actually been destroyed, to monitor very closely all operations authorized to produce certain toxic chemical products, to keep a database on the world chemical industry and, at the request of the signing states, to make inspections.
In addition, the on-site challenge inspection will in fact permit any signing state to request a universal inspection of a suspicious operation in another country by the secretariat of the organization and a multilateral inspection team.
We have concluded that the text of the convention is to be criticized for lacking coherence and logic in certain areas. In some cases, for example facilities used to stockpile or to manufacture chemical weapons, it goes into the greatest descriptive detail, and in others, for example the clauses prohibiting the development of chemical weapons, it fails to go into enough detail.
Furthermore, the verification system for declared facilities seems unnecessarily cumbersome and costly, while the so-called challenge inspection system has far less clout.
A major drawback is that paradoxically, enforcement mechanisms will not be in place when the convention comes into force. The director general will still have to be appointed, inspectors confirmed and the list of inspection equipment approved. In other words, each state party to the convention will have the right to request and obtain a challenge inspection, but there will be no one to carry it out. This is only one of the problems the preliminary commission will have to consider very carefully.
Surely it would have been more reasonable to wait until the organization is in a position to fully exercise its mandate before the main obligations set forth in the convention come into force?
It is also unfortunate that the sanctions provided under the convention are not more specific. Article XII authorizes the organization to ask a state party to the convention that does not fully comply with it to take corrective action. If the incriminated country refuses, the organization can then apply a certain number of sanctions and recommend to states parties a number of corrective measures in accordance with international law.
However, the convention remains silent on the kind of sanctions that can be applied. Furthermore, in recognition of the ultimate responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security, very serious cases may be referred to this body for possible further action, in accordance with the UN Charter.
I would like to take a few moments to consider the consequences for the chemical industry in Quebec and Canada. The convention would not appear to have a major impact. Since the second world war, Canada has not produced chemical weapons and has even destroyed its stockpiles. Under the convention, the chemical industry in Quebec and Canada will, however, be subject to regular monitoring. The national authority, an agency to be designated in each state party to the convention, will provide the link with the organization.
The signatory states are required to submit statements to the organization concerning specifically the possession of chemical weapons or the manufacture or export of designated chemicals. These statements will subsequently be used in on-site inspections.
As Canada has neither chemical weapons nor facilities for their manufacture, it would appear that the effect of the convention will be limited in its case to trade.
We believe that Canada should assume some leadership with respect to this convention. There is good reason to ask, in fact, what role Canada intends to play in encouraging its partners to ratify the convention as quickly as possible. Canada should assume some leadership in this regard.
Until now, nothing has indicated this to be the government's intention. If it intends to be consistent, it should announce a series of initiatives in this regard in the coming weeks. After all, only 28 countries have ratified the convention up to now, and there should be 65. Need I mention that neither the United States
nor Russia has signed yet? Furthermore, other important states that have yet to sign include Iraq, Libya and North Korea.
In the case of Russia, we realize that the costs of complying with this convention will be significant. However, without Russia and the United States, the convention will not entirely fulfill its role, since Russia and the United States have the biggest stockpiles of chemical weapons. Whatever the case, we believe that, if we support this bill, Canada will soon carve out a prime niche for itself within the various institutions of this new international organization.
In our opinion, the convention on chemical weapons constitutes a fine opportunity to eliminate the threat of chemical weapons. The other option would be to continue to take measures in isolation, an approach that would have neither the generality nor the global legitimacy of the convention. The convention gives traditional arms control a universal scope, with the added possibility of responding vigorously to non-compliance. It also calls for widespread support to determine who complies and who does not as well as what political action is appropriate.
We are therefore happy to support this bill, making Canada one of the first to sign the convention. In our view, this is far from an ideal document. The Bloc Quebecois appreciates however that it is the result of complex and comprehensive negotiations, during which several countries had to make concessions on issues they considered extremely important because they could not get the support of other countries.
Canada is probably one of the countries which had to make the most concessions in order to come up with this document, because it was strongly in favour of an efficient, comprehensive and global inspection scheme that would help build confidence. The Bloc Quebecois fully agrees with the position taken by Canada in the past. In fact, we still consider being able to request an inspection anywhere, anytime, and seeing this inspection carried out immediately without restrictions being imposed on inspectors as the best way of ensuring safety.
While, at present, few countries recognize possessing chemical weapons, notably the United States, Russia and Iraq, we know that many more have the means to use such weapons. We were all distressed by the pictures of Iranians and Kurds killed by Iraqi chemical weapons in the Gulf War. We also feared that chemical weapons could be used against not only troops, but civilian populations. We hope that the implementation of the convention will speed up the peace process.