Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to participate in the debate on this very important bill, which has almost gone unnoticed and has the potential to alter the very basis of internal trade in Canada. That is why I welcome this opportunity to speak on Bill C-88, an act to implement the Agreement on Internal Trade.
We will recall that this agreement is the fruit of very difficult, very strenuous negotiations that went on from 1987 to July 1994, less than a year ago, when 11 governments, together with the governments of the Yukon and the Northwest Territories, finally came to an agreement. The purpose of the agreement was obviously to enter into some kind of domestic free trade agreement for Canada.
This agreement affects 11 main fields of economic activity, which I shall list for the sake of clarity. These fields of activity are as follows: government procurement, investments, work
force mobility, consumer standards, agri-food production, alcoholic beverages, natural resources processing, communications, transportation, energy and environmental protection.
At this stage, I want to tell this House that the Bloc Quebecois, as the official opposition, is for internal trade and, in that sense, supports the bill. On the other hand, the Bloc Quebecois flatly rejects the role, powers and importance the federal government gives itself in this bill. And this is what we will be illustrating.
We disagree with this bill in three regards: first, the context in which this bill was introduced; second, the actual wording of clause 9, which is the main clause in Bill C-88; and third, the rationale behind clause 9.
First, with respect to the context in which Bill C-88 was presented, it is very shocking as it exemplifies this government's logic, its habit of making decisions without prior consultation with the provinces, preferring to do things on the sly, while at the same time having no mandate to do so. We learned from a reliable source that, at the last meeting of the federal and provincial ministers responsible for internal trade in Canada, which was held on April 10, 1995 in Calgary, the federal government never stated its intention and never received from the parties the mandate to do what is being proposed today.
Second point with respect to the context, although the parties agreed that the dispute settlement mechanism, which is often the stumbling block in this type of agreement, should be based on the good faith of the parties and not on judicial procedures, that is what the federal government chose to do, again without consulting anyone. It chose the judicial route through clause 9, to which I will come back in a moment.
Finally, still as regards the context, this bill shows how the federal government sees its role in internal trade and gives itself the power to interfere in interprovincial disputes, although this power is not granted anywhere in the agreement.
I now come to clause 9 which, as I said earlier, is the cornerstone of this bill. I will read it to you because it is worth reading. I can assure you that this clause will soon change the way this country is run. Through clause 9, the federal government gives itself the following powers:
9.(1) For the purpose of suspending benefits or imposing retaliatory measures of equivalent effect against a province pursuant to Article 1710 of the Agreement, the Governor in Council may, by order, do any one or more of the following: a ) suspend rights or privileges granted by the government of Canada to the province under the Agreement or any federal law; b ) modify or suspend the application of any federal law with respect to the province; c ) extend the application of any federal law to the province; and; d ) take any other measure that the Governor in Council considers necessary.
(2) In this section, "federal law" means the whole or any portion of any Act of Parliament or any regulation, order or other instrument issued, made or established in the exercise of a power conferred by or under an Act of Parliament.
Two phrases are worthy of note: "by order" and "pursuant to Article 1710 of the Agreement". I will look at this clause more closely with the emphasis on the words "by order".
Therefore, the governor in council may, "by order", suspend benefits or impose retaliatory measures of equivalent effect against a province. "By order" means that, without consultation, debate, or resolution of the House of Commons, the rights or privileges granted by the Government of Canada to said province at fault may be suspended under the agreement or a federal law.
The governor in council may, "by order", modify or suspend the application of any federal law with respect to the province. The governor in council may, "by order", extend the application of any federal law to the province. And, as if this were not enough, the federal government may, again without any mandate, "by order", take any other measure considered necessary.
This is why Premier Parizeau referred to this as a trade war measure. This is quite a statement, considering it comes from the Premier of Quebec.
There is also the reference "pursuant to Article 1710". Let me read you quickly the provision which, I feel, is the most important one of the 13 paragraphs of Article 1710.
Paragraph 7 reads:
In considering what benefits to suspend, or retaliatory measures to impose, the complaining Party shall: a ) suspend benefits or impose measures in the same sector as the measure found to be in violation of the Agreement; and b ) only if such suspension or imposition would be impracticable or ineffective, suspend benefits or impose retaliatory measures in other sectors covered by the Agreement.
We are referring to Article 1710 which implies that, if there is a problem with manpower mobility, and if it is not possible to impose a similar retaliatory measure against the province at fault, it is implied that retaliatory measures could be taken regarding natural resources, communications or investment, for example. This is what is provided.
It must be pointed out that this whole agreement, and particularly Article 1710, is very vague as regards the role of the federal government. Can the government intervene in a dispute between two provinces, once it is determined which province is at fault? This is not at all clear in the agreement as it is worded.
Given our Canadian history, we know how much the federal government resents any vacuum.
Now, we are faced with a legal vacuum. We know how much the federal government abhors a vacuum. Given the way it has used its spending and residual powers in the past, we can count on the federal government to take full advantage of vague wording in the bill. As a matter of fact, it just took the necessary means to be able to interfere freely to have unruly provinces toe the line.
Reactions have been quite interesting. The Minister of Industry, who is the minister responsible under the act, said that the official opposition's reaction is paranoid and that our remarks are weird. However, Manon Cornellier, who has been following this issue for years, questioned two officials of the internal trade secretariat, Mr. Lecherson and Mr. Knox, hours after the tabling of the bill.
Mr. Lecherson is a senior strategy advisor. When asked about the scope of the bill and its compliance with the intent of the agreement and the scope of the bill, he said: "As a matter of fact, the bill goes further than the agreement itself". Mr. Knox, who is the executive director of the secretariat, said: "In theory, the government could take retaliatory measures deemed appropriate in any sector, but that is very unlikely. They would be basically economic measures".
Now, we are dealing here strictly with economic issues. These remarks suggest that the federal government would even target social programs in order to make an unruly province, Quebec for example, toe the line. That door has been opened, and that is why it seems legitimate to impute motives. Given the lack of openness of this government, we are justified in imputing motives.
There was an official reaction, and I want to quote paragraphs 3 and 4 of a letter Daniel Paillé, the Quebec Minister of Industry, Commerce, Science and Technology, sent to his Canadian counterpart, on May 10, 1995: "The government of Quebec thinks it is unacceptable, pursuant to a Canada-wide agreement where the federal government enters into a partnership with the other parties to an agreement and where the scope of action given to the various partners is well defined by chapter 17 of the agreement, that the federal government found it important to give itself such extended powers as those mentioned in clause 9 of the implementing bill. Therefore, the government of Quebec is opposed to this provision, which gives the federal government very extended powers that go beyond what is needed to implement the retaliatory measures provided for in chapter 17 of the agreement".
I think that is quite clear. We have to imagine what all this would mean in the normal course of events. Although a number of examples were given earlier, we could give some more in order to really show all the significance of the issue being underhandedly addressed here. For example, any province at fault could be denied federal subsidies. If Quebec, for instance, were to be found at fault in some hypothetical situation, Hydro Quebec could be prevented from selling its electricity to another province.
Natural gas shipments to a province at fault could be banned. This is a very serious issue. In terms of work force mobility, it could mean that workers from one province could be prevented from working in another province recognized as the party at fault in a dispute between these two provinces. These are powers the federal government is assuming, because nowhere in the agreement is it mentioned that Ottawa has to introduce such a bill.
This may not have been the government's intention, but if this bill is adopted in its present form, the federal government will be able to take such measures under clause 9, and that is what makes the situation so serious. Finally, we have reservations regarding the origin of clause 9. I was shocked when it was first drawn to my attention.
In fact, clause 9 is essentially identical to section 21 of NAFTA except for certain references to the fact that the latter is an international agreement. What the government did in clause 9 is to replace the word "country" that is found in section 21 by the word "province". As far as I am concerned, there is no better example of a lazy or careless government.
It seems too easy to copy almost word for word such an important document because the problems are different and the relationships that exist between sovereign countries are not similar to the ones that can exist between a central government and its provincial counterparts. I find it rather astounding that the government would take the liberty of just changing the word "country" for the word "province" while taking the opportunity to give itself enormous powers.
Perhaps there are visionaries in the Langevin Block-which is not impossible-who saw that there will soon be a need for an international treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec and who thought that it would be better to save some time, money and energy and recognize immediately, in a rather subtle way, that Quebec would be party to an international agreement because the day is coming when Quebecers will have to deal officially at the international level with Canada as well as with the United States and other countries. This goes with the Bloc Quebecois's recent suggestion that there must be an economic association, that the closest ties must be maintained and that we must be good neighbours.
In closing, I think that clause 9 must be amended so as to reflect the spirit of the agreement and to limit the federal
government's intervention as an injured party, otherwise Bill C-88 is likely to create problems instead of solving them.