Mr. Speaker, while there is much that is laudable in Bill C-41, public concern has focused on one issue, the inclusion of the words sexual orientation as one of the categories for which crimes motivated by hatred would merit stricter sentencing in section 718.2 of the bill.
I have listened to those concerns from my constituents who have spoken to me personally and hundreds who have written letters to me, and I share their views. I do not feel the words sexual orientation should appear in the bill and I support the amendment proposed by the member for Ontario to remove the list of categories altogether.
It is important to explain the basis of my objections as there is a misconception that opposition to including sexual orientation as a category in this bill is in itself motivated by hatred of homosexuals. Nothing could be further from the truth.
My riding contains a significant gay community. I have met with some of its organizations and have been very active in trying to address its concerns. I am also strongly opposed to so-called gay bashing or any crimes motivated by hatred against a minority group in society. That is why I support the bill in requiring stricter sentencing for assault and other crimes motivated by hatred.
Yet I cannot bring myself to support the inclusion of sexual orientation as a legal category in the bill, as it seems to me there may be unintended consequences of this inclusion that may affect our definition of the family, freedom of speech and freedom of religion.
When the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was being drafted the then justice minister, the current Prime Minister, said the term sexual orientation had not been included in section 15 because of the problem of the definition of those words. Speaking of sexual orientation he then stated: "Do not ask me to tell you what it is because those concepts are difficult to interpret, to define, and that is why we do not want them in the Constitution".
Why should a term too vague for the Constitution of Canada in 1981 suddenly be clear as day in 1995? Some hon. members have proposed amendments to define this term for greater clarity but I think the wiser approach is to avoid the problem altogether by striking the list of terms from the bill.
I fear that by including the words sexual orientation in federal law for the first time without clarification or definition, we are extending an invitation to the courts to read sexual orientation into other statutes as they have done with the Canadian and Alberta bill of rights in previous provincial court decisions. The legitimacy of this reading in has not yet been ruled on by the Supreme Court of Canada. By including these words in a section 15 like list in a federal statute we are saying as federal legislators that what we did not want to include in 1981 we want to include today.
The courts may well turn to this wording for guidance on other matters. What we have already seen is not encouraging. The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench ruled the Alberta human rights code had to be read as if sexual orientation was included in the Vriend case, which meant a private Christian Reformed college had to hire a teacher who was a practising homosexual despite its religious objections to his behaviour.
In recent years we have seen attempts to deny the Salvation Army the right to use municipal property in the city of Toronto as it will not hire openly homosexual employees or clergy.
We have seen Catholic school boards in Montreal forced to rent property to homosexual organizations all on the basis of including sexual orientation in human rights legislation and despite freedom of religion and freedom of association.
Two weeks ago in Ontario a provincial court judge ruled homosexual couples were eligible to adopt children despite the fact that the legislators had defeated a similar measure only a few months before.
If we as federal parliamentarians choose to include the words sexual orientation in federal law for the first time we will only encourage the courts in this practice at a time when many Canadians are questioning whether the courts are being too swift in striking down the decisions of elected legislators.
While this bill may be a simple sentencing bill, not the charter or a human rights bill, our use of this language sends a message to the courts they may choose to interpret in ways we had not intended.
We may not want to prevent a Salvation Army band from playing a Christmas concert for the poor on public property. We may not want private religious schools to be forced to hire openly homosexual teachers despite their religious teachings. We may not want paedophilia to be accepted as a legitimate sexual orientation. That is what may happen not because of this bill but because of what the courts may choose to do in applying this statutory language in other unrelated contexts.
I hope I have made it clear why I, without any personal disrespect or malice toward homosexual persons, do not feel it would be prudent to include the words sexual orientation in this legislation. We are opening the door to the use of this language in other contexts that may lead to legitimizing other forms of sexual orientation we would not want to approve or to the use of the concept of sexual orientation to harm the rights of religious and other groups to freedom of religion, freedom of expression and freedom of association.
The whole problem can be avoided by accepting the amendment by the member for Ontario and eliminating this contentious list of categories altogether.
If the purpose of the bill is to ensure crimes motivated by hatred are more severely assessed in sentencing, let us leave it at that. If the purpose is to create a precedent of recognition of the concept of sexual orientation, a concept the Prime Minister felt was too ambiguous to include in the Constitution of 1981, one that might be used in other contexts we would not approve of as legislators, then this section of Bill C-41 does not deserve the support of the House.