Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to speak this afternoon if for no other reason than the temperature in the Chamber is bearable.
It is an honour to speak on third reading of Bill C-87, an act to implement the prohibition of the production and use of chemical weapons. I join most members of the world community in abhorring the use of chemical weapons.
This proposed legislation takes into account many concerns and tries to establish a compromising balance between these concerns. It acknowledges the devastation caused by the horrendous use of chemical weaponry as well as the ongoing studies and testing of these substances for future development.
The convention modernizes the 1925 Geneva protocol which was an international attempt to limit the use of chemical weapons after the first world war. This protocol was brought to present day standards by having observed past experiences and having learned from them. We now realize that putting a ban solely on the use of chemical weapons left many areas open and
allowed the stockpiling of such weapons but closed the doors for use and further study.
Bill C-87 is the act to implement the more recent convention of 1993 and realizes there are many uses of chemicals and outlines both the positive and negative aspects. The 1993 convention ensured states would not stockpile chemical weaponry for retaliation against future attacks or to instigate war. If they did they would face the condemnation of the world and sanctions as well.
Canada has always been among the first to initiate peace. In 1983 Canada made large contributions to the committee that developed and outlined a treaty on disarmament leading to the conclusion of discussions in 1992 when Canada was urging a ban on all warfare to be accepted internationally. There is now such a ban on the use of chemical weapons which caused such brutality. It is this ban we are discussing in the House today.
The convention involves not only those who engage in war but also those industries using chemical substances in their production and testing. This is where Canada assumes its role in the convention.
Canada will primarily be enforcing the legislation when it comes to the importing and exporting of chemicals listed in the three schedules. Canada does not own chemical weapons nor do we contain any manufacturing facilities that do so. Therefore our role in implementing the convention is fortunately not very complex.
In 1915 Canadian soldiers were victims of the first gas attack during World War I. The 1925 Geneva protocol had a certain amount of control on the use of these weapons but was not able to completely rid their usage.
Recently we have seen chemical weapons used in the Iran-Iraq war, in Japan and by Iraq against its own civilian Kurdish peoples, among others. This convention, which will be headed by the organization for the prohibition of conventional weapons, will enforce legislation in all the signatory countries prohibiting chemical weapon usage and will hopefully have the international support and pressure to impose greater sanctions against those contravening these policies.
Areas of legislation included in today's convention include verification policies, creation of an organization to implement them, specific guidelines with regard to levels of chemical ability as well as processes for destroying weapons and their plants.
The verification regime, which is global, is to ensure these weapons of mass destruction will never be developed again. The international monitoring system will safeguard against weapon production by inspecting all facilities which are or were used for these purposes. This system does not affect Canada as there are no facilities here. This verification process will also be extended into other chemical industries.
Three schedules are to be used in ensuring no chemical weapons are or can be manufactured. Industries using such chemicals will be required to report annually and each government of the signatory countries will be required to report to the international organization, the OPCW.
In Canada the Minister of Foreign Affairs will designate officials who will act as Canada's national authorities. Canadian officials will collect information from Canadian industries and transmit it to the OPCW for inspecting purposes. However international inspection teams have the right to conduct inspections without warrant in accordance with the provisions of this convention. It contains appropriate provisions for inspection and keeps them in accordance with the need to protect privacy.
As will be a requirement of other countries, Canada will enact legislation in the Criminal Code providing penalties, fines and imprisonment for warlike use or production of chemicals. Legislation will protect but keep a close eye on usage of these chemicals for medicinal purposes as well as for pesticides, fertilizers, paints, textiles and lubricants.
The convention will also require state organizations to enforce restrictions on the export and import of schedule chemicals with states that have not signed the convention. All chemicals on the list will therefore be subject to the Import and Export Permits Act. Although there are restrictions which will be imposed on exports to suspect states, the legislation has balanced these restrictions with the desire to liberalize trade for industries and medicinal purposes.
The schedules which will be used in identifying chemical legality are in three groups. The first contains chemicals such as mustard gas. Some other chemicals in this same group are used in pharmaceuticals and in cancer research. Schedule 2 consists of chemicals which are precursors to schedule 1, chemical weapons. Schedule 3 contains the least powerful of the three groups, often used in industry but can also be used as weapons when in large quantities.
Each group will be under scrutiny, whether it be checks and balances, limited amounts permissible or whether they must obtain a licence and pay a fee to use them.
Under international supervision all stockpiles and producing facilities of chemical weapons will be destroyed within a given time frame. Given this, the legislation will have to consider economic implications. There will be a 10-year limit for states to destroy their stockpiles and facilities. However a 10-year extension is also allowed which has stricter controls. I have a problem with this 10-year extension because if we continue to allow extensions on the destruction of these facilities we are allowing them to remain for greater use.
The Reform Party supports Bill C-87 and would like to see it implemented immediately. Canada has always been a strong supporter of multilateral efforts to promote peace and restrict arms proliferation.
By accepting the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and eventually on their destruction Canada is promoting common norms and values with like minded countries.
Reform acknowledges the government has consulted for many years on this topic but still does not know how much it will cost to implement nor the exact size of the bureaucracy to be created. Foreign affairs has speculated a full time staff of five as a national authority plus one staffer at foreign affairs might be needed. We would like to make sure the bureaucracy does not expand beyond this.
Section 15(3) states exigent circumstances would make it unnecessary to obtain a search warrant when an inspector is refused entry. This should be clarified. The wording in section 20 also seems too broad. Section 23 states:
Where a person has been convicted of an offence under this act, any thing seized by means of which or in respect of which the offence was committed is forfeited to Her Majesty in right of Canada and shall be disposed of as the minister directs.
Exactly what could be confiscated under this provision is unclear. The powers of inspection should not be allowed to get out of control. Reform does support this legislation and hopes there will be some accountability in its enforcement to see it is not used unnecessarily.
(Motion agreed to, bill read the third time and passed.)