Mr. Speaker, I would like to comment on the very reasoned presentation by the member for Hamilton-Wentworth. I have always appreciated his sincerity on any issue of potential controversy and I am addressing this issue on that basis.
I can see his point that such a judicial restraint would be a limitation to freedom; that is a given. But even the charter of rights in the Canadian Constitution allows for limits to freedom where it can be demonstrated in a democratic society that such a limitation is allowable. Who will interpret this allowance? Ultimately it will be the Supreme Court of Canada. For example, the laws on hate where we may not spread hate propaganda definitely represent a limitation to freedom of speech.
The Supreme Court of Canada would like to establish that the goal to be achieved in any limitation to freedom is a very laudable goal for society at large. In terms of the subject under debate now, the limitation would be imposed in the case of serious injury to a Canadian citizen and there is no other alternative that we could use as a tool. I am sure that in this instance, any court of law in Canada would take that into account when trying to pass judgment on such an application by an attorney general of a given province. I am sure the courts would like to see that such a means would be capable of achieving that ultimate goal.
Being a non-lawyer, I do not recall all the tests that Canadian courts of law have applied when a balance must be struck, when limits to freedom have to be imposed. I continue to have faith in our judicial court system.
The very learned member spoke about shackles. I could imagine the physical shackles and not being able to move with the restraint of the weight on one's legs. I remember historical photos. But if electronic monitoring is used, it would likely be non-visible, non-intrusive to the eyes of others. Perhaps only the person upon whom this device would be imposed by a court of law would know that such a device existed on his body. I am sure this will be taken into account. To compare the electronic monitoring to shackles as we were used to imagining them is extending our imaginations a little too much.
The member indicated that this may be a return to enslavement. The only enslavement I can see in this would be the enslavement of risk. We will now have one additional tool with which to control risk of serious injury to others with this control being imposed on other members of society.
It is a huge step but the challenge of personal safety which is before society is very huge indeed. On that basis I would like to submit that such a provision in the bill is reasonable. Considering that it has only to be determined by the attorney general of a given province based on reasonable grounds of fear that the person is
about to commit a serious personal injury, there will be an examination of this during the hearings.
My last point is that electronic monitoring is not a monitoring that will be imposed on the person for eternity. It is only for a period of 12 months. In other words, there is a finite period. If the person's behaviour has been sustained such that such an occurrence is not likely to happen again, then the person will be freed of his electronic monitoring.
I submit that this is a reasonable approach to a serious problem that faces society. Therefore, I concur with this initiative on the part of the government.